



CIA FILE ON
REINHARD GEHLEN
VOL. III



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27-2073

201
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The handling of this document will not be disclosed to Foreign Nationals or their representatives.

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

21 JUN 1956

ATTN: Mr. J. Daunt
Liaison Agent

RE: AUGUST WILHELM PASCH,
aka: FRED BAILEY (DOB: 14 Apr 1913)
Member of the Crew of an Unidentified
Tanker of Liberian Register

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to our letter dated 6 March 1956 concerning the above SUBJECT. Attached for your information is a copy of an OSI memorandum setting forth the details of the interview of the SUBJECT.

You will be apprised of any further information received in this matter.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED *Sincerely,*
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

1 Incl

Memo fr OSI, DO 2,
dtd 5 Mar 56

cc: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 "E" Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Deputy Director, Plans

Robert F. Eldridge
ROBERT F. ELDRIDGE
Special Assistant to the Chief
Counter Intelligence Division
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General

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NEW YORK 3, NEW YORK

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this document will not be dis-
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Date 3 March 1956

File No: 56.

SUBJECT: Essential Elements of Information

FROM: Detachment Commander, Detachment 206, APO 856, New York, N.Y.

TO: District Commander, APO 856, Counter Intelligence Division

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agency by OSI; distribution of the document
information contained therein to any other
agency is not authorized by the Department of Defense."

1. This is to confirm the spot report from this Detachment of 3 March 1956 and to furnish additional information pertaining to this matter.

2. At 0115 hours, 3 March 1956, the Officer of the Day telephonically notified the undersigned that a Mr. PASCH, a German National, had told Captain [redacted], Duty Officer, 303rd Air Refueling Squadron that he had been offered a sum of money to kidnap or kill a United States Security Official in Germany recently.

The undersigned repaired to Kinley Air Force Base and interviewed Captain [redacted] A. JOHNSON, APO 856, Duty Officer, 303rd Air Refueling Squadron this station. JOHNSON advised the undersigned that he received a telephone call from Airman [redacted] of his organization, who advised that Mr. PASCH wanted to talk to an American Intelligence Officer and volunteered to come out to the base. JOHNSON advised that the St. George Town Patrol drove PASCH to the base and escorted him into the operations office, 303rd Air Refueling Squadron at which time Captain JOHNSON interviewed PASCH. JOHNSON advised that PASCH smelled of alcohol however appeared to have complete control of his senses. JOHNSON stated that PASCH refused to have anyone in addition to JOHNSON present while he (PASCH) talked to him. JOHNSON advised that he believed he better get the information and therefore interviewed him. JOHNSON advised that at the conclusion of the interview PASCH was taken back to St. George Base by the Town Patrol and was under surveillance at all times while at Kinley Air Force Base. JOHNSON advised that PASCH was staying at the White Horse Tavern, St. George, Bermuda.

3. At 0700 hours 3 March 1956, the undersigned contacted PASCH at the White Horse Tavern and advised him that he was being interviewed by the undersigned at the base where he was interviewed by the writer.

PASCH, a German National, advised that he was born at [redacted], Rhineland, Germany on 1 April 1916. PASCH advised that he was raised in the United States, explaining that he first entered an Italian orphanage in 1922 and his parents were American citizens.

205-97

and his father is now deceased. He stated that his mother is MARY DUBBAN, was MARY PASCH; present address: East Flanders Street (Street number unknown) Portland, Oregon. PASCH advised that his mother lived at 2313 West Belmont, Phoenix, Arizona prior to moving to Portland. PASCH advised that prior to being deported from the United States in June or July 1934, he was married to MAXINE PASCH, nee: FOSTER and was divorced from her. PASCH stated that he had a daughter JOAN PASCH by that marriage who is presently residing with her mother at East 15th Street, Portland, Oregon. PASCH added that he is presently married to ELSA PASCH, German National, who lives at Amburg, Altona, Gilbert Street 21, Germany. The undersigned inspected PASCH'S passport which disclosed the following information: Passport No. 772/54; Deutsch No. 1861231; issued to AUGUST WILHELM PASCH, born 14 April 1913, on 13 September 1954 at the German Consulate, San Francisco, California. (PASCH advised that the reason the passport was not issued in Germany was due to the fact that he had lost a passport that had been issued in Germany).

PASCH advised that he was raised in the United States since the year 1922 and his address prior to being deported to Germany in June or July of 1934 was 695 East 11th Street, Portland, Oregon.

PASCH advised that prior to being deported from the United States in June or July 1934, he had been employed by BOB EVANS who was a bootlegger and he (PASCH) was involved in a robbery with three (3) other men and the victim was killed and he was charged with manslaughter. PASCH advised that he was also charged with two (2) charges of bank robbery and was deported to Germany for having committed a criminal act. PASCH stated that during the year 1934, he was convicted of larceny by a German Court, and was sent to prison in Hamburg, Germany. PASCH advised that he met RICHARD CRAPES, author of "Out of The Night" (pen name JOHN WALTON) in this prison and at that time CRAPES told him that he (CRAPES) had been deported to Germany from the United States after having been convicted of robbery in San Francisco, California during the year 1928 or 1929. PASCH stated that CRAPES told him the incident was actually an assault for political reasons however was passed off as a robbery. PASCH advised that the Germans allowed CRAPES to escape from this prison in 1935 in order that CRAPES could act as an informant for the Germans. PASCH stated that CRAPES furnished the Germans with information which led to the execution of the Germans of a Danish fisherman who was supplying the underground with forged passports. PASCH added that CRAPES then got back to the United States the same year (1935).

PASCH advised that he also met ERIC SEYMOUR in the Hamburg prison.

PASCH advised that he was convicted of larceny and he spent 1941 to 1943 as an inmate of Concentration Camp No. 3, located near Papenburg, Germany, where he met ERIC SEYMOUR who was a political prisoner. PASCH states that SEYMOUR was a "convicted" communist. PASCH added that he and SEYMOUR were taken to Schneidermühl, Germany to work in a factory (forced labor) in 1943. PASCH stated that he (PASCH) was transferred from factory to Stutthof Concentration Camp in Danzig and changed names only a few days prior to Christmas 1944. PASCH stated that he obtained a German uniform, was recaptured by the Germans and he (PASCH) was given a new German name by the name of ERIC BAILEY and was taken care of with British food and clothing in Germany where he remained until

liberated by American Forces on 3 May 1945. PASCH stated that he told the Americans his story and gave them his correct name. He was then issued a pass and a vehicle and was told to drive it to Hamburg, Germany and deliver it to the British Military Government. PASCH stated that he did this and was not held by the Allies. PASCH stated that from 1945 to 1946 he worked as an interpreter for the Royal Navy (British) and in the first part of 1946 he stowed away on a ship and went to England where he remained for awhile. He stowed away on another ship and went to Cuba. He advised that he spent approximately ten (10) months in Cuba, stowed away on another ship and went to Miami, Florida, where he entered the United States and was caught by American officials and received a six (6) month sentence in the Federal Prison in Tallahassee, Florida. PASCH stated that he escaped from this prison approximately thirty (30) days before his time was up as he had told the officials that he was FRED BAILEY, a British subject from Singapore and he did not want to be deported to Singapore. PASCH stated that he was recaptured in Jacksonville, Florida; was tried for escape in the Federal Court of Tallahassee and was sentenced to a year and a day. PASCH stated that he served his sentence; told the officials his true identity and was deported to Germany in February 1949. PASCH advised that he has been in the Merchant Marine since that date.

PASCH stated that FRIEDRICH FELLEBERG, Burgemeister of a town in the Eastern Sector of Germany, had, on three (3) or four (4) occasions, the most recent being approximately three (3) years ago, offered him Five Hundred Thousand Marks to kidnap FNU/GEHLEN (Phonetic), a former German General and presently employed by the United States Government as a key intelligence official, and to turn him over to the Russians and if he could not capture GEHLEN, to kill him.

PASCH stated that while he was in Hamburg, Germany on approximately 15 February 1956, he visited the office of Arbeits Amt in an attempt to find out why he had not received his "unemployment money" for the past five (5) weeks. PASCH advised that he was referred to FNU/DZUBER who is the head of all the German employment agencies, namely, Arbeits Amt (Besenbenderhoff), Hamburg, Germany. PASCH stated that he was very surprised to see DZUBER because he had last seen him in prison. PASCH stated that DZUBER talked to him privately and asked him if he had been propositioned to kidnap GEHLEN and failing that, kill him. PASCH indicated that he had whereupon DZUBER asked him how much money FELLEBERG had offered him to do the job. PASCH stated that when he told DZUBER that he was offered Five Hundred Thousand Marks, DZUBER told him that the job now was worth Five Million Marks and was an easy way to be set for life. PASCH would be paid in American money and could live anywhere in the world. PASCH stated that DZUBER told him that the job would be easy because although GEHLEN is under heavy guard "they" ~~know~~ that he is in the habit of visiting a woman and at such times he is not under guard. PASCH advised that he told DZUBER that he was not interested; that he may be a crook but he didn't get mixed up in this type thing. PASCH advised that he asked DZUBER why he wanted him to do the job and DZUBER told him (PASCH) because he spoke good English, was educated in the United States and could get closer to GEHLEN than anyone else.

PASCH advised that both DZUBER and FELLEBERG told him that RICHARD ABES wanted to get GEHLEN and indicated to him (PASCH) that FELLEBERG and DZUBER were receiving their orders from RICHARD ABES, however gave no details.

PASCH stated that FELLEBERG made numerous trips to Hamburg, Germany and that when he had last seen him, it was approximately three (3) years ago, in a bar in Hamburg.

PASCH advised that he got a job at the Shipping Agent's office in Hamburg, Germany on 27 February 1956 to work as a pumpman on the ship Febcal of Liberian Registry which was due into Bermuda on or about 2 March 1956. PASCH stated that he was furnished an airline ticket to Bermuda by the Shipping Agent in Hamburg and left Hamburg via Pan American Airlines on 29 February 1956 and arrived in New York at 1200 hours 1 March 1956. PASCH advised that he remained overnight at the Prince George Hotel on East 28th Street and left for Bermuda via Colonial Airlines, Friday, 2 March 1956, where he arrived at 1630 hours.

PASCH advised that he was in St. George, Bermuda, the night of 2 March 1956 and the above information was preying on his mind so he went to the St. George Police Station to see an American Intelligence Officer, however would not cooperate with him and some Air Policeman took him over to the base where he talked to a Captain (Captain JOHNSON). PASCH advised that he didn't tell anyone about this in Germany because he did not trust anyone.

Physical description of PASCH based on the undersigned's observations and information contained in PASCH'S passport is as follows:

Name: AUGUST WILHELM PASCH, alias FRED BAILEY
Date of Birth: 14 April 1913
Place of Birth: Krefeld, Rheinland, Germany
Race: Caucasian
Height: 5'9"
Weight: 152
Build: Heavy
Hair: Red with streaks of gray; widow's peak, combed straight back
Complexion: Ruddy (red faced)
Eyes: Light blue; was not wearing glasses.
Occupation: Pumpman, Merchant Marine (oil tanker)
Speech: Speaks slightly broken English, German
Scars and Marks: Faded tattoo as follows:
On top of left hand has crossed flags, British flag on left, American flag on right, American spread eagle on right. Below flags on left wrist in English the sentence "My life for my country".

4. At the time the undersigned talked to PASCH he was not evasive and appeared to be truthful. PASCH advised that his employers know nothing of his past and requested that if they are contacted, that no mention of his past be made known to them nor the reason for their being contacted be made known to them. PASCH advised that he signed a one (1) year contract to work on the ship Febcal and he has been told that the ship's next port of call will be the West Indies. The undersigned advised PASCH that he may be contacted at a future date and he said that that would be perfectly all right.

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SECRET

351

5. On 5 March 1956, ERNEST COOPER, Customs Officer, St. George, Bermuda, advised this office that PASCH arrived in Bermuda on Flight 100, Colonial Airlines from New York, passenger list No. 14 on 2 March 1956.

COOPER also advised that the Febcal arrived at the oil dock, St. George on 2 March 1956, discharged it's cargo to Esso Oil Company and left in ballast for Aruba, West Indies on 5 March 1956.

6. This memorandum is classified SECRET pursuant to the authority contained in AFR 205-1.

Thomas B. Casey, Jr.
THOMAS B. CASEY, JR.
Special Agent, OSI
Detachment Commander

Nbr	Sequence Number	Search
2nd District OSI IS ESAT 7 MAR 1956		
SEARCHED	FILED BY	
INDEXED	FILE AUTHORITY	

13431
Nr. 13431

17 July 1956

TO: 38

FROM: 801

SUBJECT: Report of Kidnap Plan

1. According to information received from an American agency in Bermuda on 3 March 1956, one August Wilhelm PASCH, aka Fred BAILEY, contacted and reported that on 15 February 1956 one Druber MADEVIA-CH (sic), an official in the Arbeitamt (sic), Hamburg, contacted him and offered five million marks to kidnap General GEHLEN and deliver him to Soviet agents. If this was not possible, the same offer held if PASCH would assassinate GEHLEN. The offer ostensibly came from Frederick FELLEBERG, a Bürgermeister in an unknown town in the East Zone of Germany. MADEVIA-CH was reported to be a friend of the Bürgermeister, who had made a similar offer three years ago. PASCH said that both FELLEBERG and MADEVIA-CH received orders from Richard KREBS, author of "Out of the Night". (In this connection, it is noted that "Out of the Night" was written by Jan VALTIN, whose real name was Richard KREBS, and that he died in January 1951).

2. PASCH appeared to have a comprehensive, but generally known, knowledge of GEHLEN's activities. He said that this was the first occasion he has had to report this information to anyone, since he could trust no one in Germany. It is believed that PASCH was a crew member of a tanker of Liberian registration, the SS Febcal. His date of birth is 14 April 1913.

3. Our efforts to check out this rather fantastic report have brought out some interesting, but inconclusive facts. In the first place, there were no traces on PASCH, BAILEY, or MADEVIA-CH; the latter name is, however, obviously a garble. KREBS was born 17 December 1905 in Darmstadt, Germany. He lived in Hamburg in World War I, and was active subsequently in Hamburg in the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH), working under WOLLEBER. In 1924 he attended the Lenin school in Moscow. In 1925 he attended a special school of the Profintern in Leningrad for six weeks, attending courses in organization of workers, direction of strikes, radicalization of strikes, etc. After returning to Hamburg he shipped out as a seaman and went to San Francisco, where he was arrested for assault with intent to kill and sentenced to San Quentin prison. After 39 months he was paroled and deported to Germany. After his return to Germany he was active

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DATE 2005

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24/GEHLEN, Remington

In the seaman's cell of the International Port Bureau. He attended the Bremen Nautical Academy at the same time where he was supposed to organize a Communist cell among student ships officers. After graduation he became Secretary of the Interclub in Bremen which in 1931 became the Interclub of the ISH. In August 1931 he became Secretary of the Interclub at Hamburg, which moved to Copenhagen after Hitler came to power, and he was sent on ISH instruction missions to various European countries. In the fall of 1933 WOLLMEIER sent KREBS to Germany to do underground work among seamen, harbor workers and rivermen. He was arrested shortly after arrival, held prisoner for over two years, then convinced the Gestapo he had defected. He was sent by the Gestapo to Copenhagen to act as an informant among Communist and ISH persons there. Upon his return to Copenhagen he acted as a double, but was controlled by the Communists who, through him, fed misinformation to the Gestapo. Antagonism developed between him and WOLLMEIER and the Communists became suspicious of him. According to his own statement he escaped being sent to the USSR by making his way to France and then to the U.S. (in 1937). His book "Out of the Night" recited his career as a Communist agent in Germany between 1923-1937; the book is a mixture of truth and fiction. In 1942 after California pardoned him, he was ordered deported again. This was during the war and deportation was impossible. He was pardoned as an enemy alien and drafted into the army. He won the Bronze Star Medal for valor against the Japanese at Mindoro in 1945 and early in 1947 was granted U.S. citizenship. He died in January 1951.

4. Although the above traces are inconclusive, they do seem to bring out a common denominator, in that PASCH is a merchant seaman in touch with a Hamburg official, and that both KREBS and a fru FELLEBERG were for many years active in the Hamburg area in illegal Communist activities.

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21 Sept 56

Extract from a memorandum for the record of a conversation between the DCI and General Gehlen, Chief of the West German Intelligence Service which took place in Frankfurt, Germany on 27 August 1956. Filed: Policy

"14. Dulles asked Gehlen whether he had decided to send his daughter to the U.S. Gehlen replied that he hoped to do so in the second half of next year. No specific mention of support was made though I believe Gehlen must have recognized from the general tenor of the conversation a willingness to provide some."

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General Gehlen-201

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

D. ATCH NO. EGNA-9935

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Base, Bonn
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
SPECIFIC— Meeting with UTILITY

DATE: 4 October 1956

INFO: COS, Germany
Pullach

1. UTILITY and alias RAINER came to tea the afternoon of September 30.
2. There seem to be no worrisome problems involving us. Personnel and other problems arising from legalization are UTILITY's major concern (Dr. Horn said to me at dinner the other night: "If he (UTILITY) keeps on with this Ausverkauf, he wont have any decent people left.") As you know, he has given up 80 in the past few months. This assures him friends in important places, but it doesn't produce reports.
3. We discussed the problem arising out of the pressure in my office of a USAREUR representative under instructions to liaise in Bonn on an opposite number basis. We agreed that this is probably just as well, since the opposite number will be Wieland, who will know how to handle it. USAREUR is certainly entitled to this representation, and it helps complete the normal overt picture.
4. We agreed that it would be well for Colonel Clay, the new ODOPAL chief, to be briefed by POB and UPSWING. This visit may be combined with the visit of General Willems.
5. UTILITY thinks that the time has come to enter further into the BGFIGHTER picture under his new colors. This seems reasonable enough. It is a subject that might well be explored during UTILITY's Washington visit.
6. As recent cable traffic has indicated, UTILITY is anxious to see UPSWING, as a host service, begin to play a sponsoring and supporting role for the Allied services in their relations with the German authorities. This may be subject to interpretation as a desire to move in and cut us out. I am rather inclined to regard it as sincere and to believe that he would really help. This situation will not mature fast, however, if only because UPSWING's prestige is not thoroughly established among the Germans, and will not be for some time. Indeed, one of the objectives of the exercise is doubtless the boost to prestige that might be expected to derive from it.
7. UTILITY would like to meet the Ambassador. I think he should, and shall arrange.

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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8. As in all our recent meetings, UTILITY seemed confident, at ease, and at peace with the world. His great battle has been won, the primary objective achieved. Now comes the long program of consolidation. UTILITY knows that the worst mistake he could make would be to move too fast, to throw his weight around. Each step is exposed to the question: "Is the time right?" And unless the step is obviously timely, the answer is likely to be "No!"

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2-COS
2-POB

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1958
8 OCT 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Psychological and Paramilitary Staff
THROUGH: PP/C/OPS.
SUBJECT: General Gehlen Visit to the U.S.

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1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. General Gehlen, Chief of the German (Foreign) Intelligence Service (GIS), is scheduled to come to the U.S. on a CIA-sponsored trip during the first part of November.
3. You are aware that in the past General Gehlen and his organization and their relations with CIA have been exclusively within the sphere of interest of FI Staff. However, consideration is now being given in German Government circles to assigning clandestine paywar missions to the GIS and General Gehlen entertains considerable hope that he will enter this field of activity some time in 1957.
4. The GIS's final charter, and some other aspects of the GIS structure, are still unresolved on the German side. Nor has there yet, to the best knowledge of this Staff, emerged a specific concept on the part of EE Division as to what CIA attitude would or should be in the event that the GIS should actually take up PP operations. Since we do not yet know whether or when GIS will undertake PP operations and if so, what the scope or character of these operations will be and whether General Gehlen will request or accept our cooperation, it might yet be too early to decide our Agency's attitude towards that contingency.
5. However, in view of Gehlen's forthcoming visit here and considering the possibility that either he or DCI might raise the above questions during that visit, I consider it my duty to bring these matters to your attention, especially since you might wish to initiate a preliminary exchange of views with either G/EE, C/FI or DCI. In my opinion we are not interested in joint PP operations with the GIS, and we may not want to encourage Gehlen's expansion into the PP field for considerations contained in paragraph 6. Gehlen knows of our PP liaison with the West German Ministry For All-German Affairs and he has presumably a fairly good idea of our PP assets: we are therefore hardly able to refuse to negotiate with him on these matters, if he demands such negotiations.
6. In terms of

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6. In terms of policy objectives, there is no reason why we should oppose cooperation under the present circumstances: as long as Adenauer heads the West German Government and as long as U.S. foreign policy in Europe continues to coincide with Adenauer's policies, GIB-sponsored PP operations, especially into Eastern Germany, will presumably be in our interest. But this happy state of affairs is not likely to last: Adenauer will not remain chancellor forever and even now there are increasing policy differences in the making. It appears therefore desirable to maintain as many independent, unilateral PP assets in Germany as possible and to keep support of Gehlen's PP operations, if any, to the unavoidable minimum.

PP/OPS/C/PR

Atlet
PP/OPS/PR: F 1: gvt
8 October 1956

Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - PP/OPS/PR
1 - RI

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8. Oktober 1956

Beitrag Mögliche Propagandaaktionen des
"Anschluß für Deutsche Einheit"
gegen Allan DULLES

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1. Von einer Quelle, deren Glaubwürdigkeit noch nicht überprüft werden konnte, stammt nachstehende Gelegenheitseinformation, die im Rahmen einer zufälligen Gesprächserkundung bekannt wurde.
2. Der 2. Vorsitzende des "Anschluß für Deutsche Einheit", Karl RABDATS, soll sich im Sommer 1956 fünf Wochen in WARSCHAU aufgehalten haben. Er kehrte Anfang August 1956 aus Polen zurück. Seine Reise diente dem Zweck, aus alten Akten und Unterlagen Material zusammenzustellen, das sich zu Propagandaaktionen gegen westdeutsche Politiker eignet.
3. Dabei soll RABDATS angeblich auch in den Besitz von Unterlagen gelangt sein, aus denen hervorgehen soll, daß Beauftragte des damaligen Reichsministers HIMMLER vor Kriegsende Verhandlungen mit Allan DULLES geführt haben mit dem Ziel, die Kampfhandlungen im Westen einzustellen, jedoch den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion fortzusetzen.
4. Angeblich soll das Aktenmaterial hierzu vor längerer Zeit über die einseitige polnische Exil-Regierung in LONDON in den Besitz der hiesigen polnischen Regierung gelangt sein.

5. Der "Ausposten für Deutsche Einheit" will diese Unterlagen für eine intensive Propagandaaktion verwenden und damit nachweisen, daß schon während des Krieges die westlichen Alliierten mit dem Faschismus paktiert hätten und die Absicht hatten, ihren sowjetischen Partner in den Rücken zu fallen.

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ESM - 21113
C. L. A. - 21113
12 October 1956

Dear Mr. Dulles,

Attached I send you a report which may be of interest to you. It may be possible that the Eastern Propaganda tries to compose material against you (also false material). We try to get more about it.

We are looking forward to seeing you in November

Sincerely yours

g. 12 OCT 1956

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19 Oct 56

NAME: GEHLEN, Reinhard (ex-Brig. Gen.)

GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK, Reinhard: Occasional references to this name which would indicate that either Subject or his father combined their surname with that of Subject's mother -- fairly common practise in Germany.

ALIAS: Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER, b. 4 Mar 1905. Covername used within the Org.
Richard GARNER, b. 8 Apr 1902 *correct one*
Robert GONTARD, b. 4 Mar 1905.

(Subject has been issued at various times German identity papers in connection with the three aliases mentioned above).

Hans HOLBEIN, b. 21 Jan 1905. Issued AGO-card D-147996. This alias used only occasionally, for instance in travelling to Austria.

Dr. GROSS) These aliases used whenever special precautionary measures are
Dr. ERNST) warranted and wherever mistaken identity with another person of the same name is desirable.

Robert GRABER, b. 5 Jun 1904, Liegnitz, Schlesien. (Kaufmann).

BORN: 3 Apr 1902; Erfurt, Thuringia, Germany.

RELIGION: Protestant.

RESIDENCE: Berg a/Starnberger See, Waldstr 68. (near Munich, Germany).

PERSONAL DESCRIPTION: Photo.

Height: 174 cms Weight: 65-72 kg Eyes: blue Hair: dark blonde,
Face-shape: round Complexion: light Build: medium central baldness
Scars:

Prominent ident. features: military bearing, extremely young looking compared with chronological years, small mustache, wears glasses.

FATHER: GEHLEN, Walther; b. 24 Jul 1871 in Koblenz. Deceased 1943.
(Director of a Publishing Firm in Leipzig. Former Army officer, retired after WW I with the rank of Lt. Col. Re-activated in WW II, held unimportant administrative position).
Margarete

MOTHER: GEHLEN, Katharina/b. 12 Jun 1881 (nee von VAERNEWYCK). Deceased 1921.

WIFE: GEHLEN, Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene b. 17 Mar/Apr 1904, Leobschuetz, Silesia.
(the daughter of Friedrich-Wilhelm and Meta (nee EICHNER) von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH).

CHILDREN: GEHLEN, Katharina b. 19 Jan 34, Berlin.
GEHLEN, Christoph b. 11 Feb 37, Berlin.
GEHLEN, Marie Therese b. 4 Sep 40, Liegnitz.
GEHLEN, Dorothee b. 28 Feb 43, Liegnitz.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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OTHER RELATIVES: Subject is one of four children resulting from three marriages by his father, each following the death of the previous wife. One of these marriages resulted in two children and each of the others in one. At least one of the wives had been previously married and had children. Thus Subject has full, half, and step brothers and sisters.

GEHLEN, Giovanni b. 15 Mar 1901, Rome, Italy. *(full brother)*

GEHLEN, Walter (Dr) b. ca 1905, Germany. Book-editor. Killed during bombardment on Nuremberg on 20 Feb 1945.

GEHLEN, fnu (male). Died in the Orient (Shanghai) during the war.

von GEHLEN, Barbara (nee GEHLEN) b. 5 Jul 1912 Breslau, Germany. (Barbara married a distant relative, Walter Carlos von GEHLEN, ex-German Navy employee, trained lawyer, who had worked for the British on a Navy Project in Kiel, also listed as an accountant. He was transferred to Lisbon from Brazil where he is presently listed as the Counselor for Economic Affairs of the German Legation, Lisbon, Portugal).

SCHNEEMILCH, Hans Dietrich (Dr of medicine) b. 4 Jan 09 Schoppnitz, Krs. Kattowitz (Step-Br.)
fnu, fnu (Dr) also a step-brother.

SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, Joachim Hans Sigismund von b. 7 Dec 11 Loebeschuetz. Brother-in-law.

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ZIPPER EMPLOYMENT:

EOD: 1946 (USIS Co-operation)
 Payroll No: 3002. Jan 55 pr, from "S" to "P" category: DM 1845/2500.
 Emergency No:
 Position: Chief, Section 88 (ex-Section 30).
 Organization:
 Cover Unit: Industrial Research Unit.
 7924 Army Procurement Team.
 Subject is connected with Bavarian Light Metals Works.
 Special Connections : 20
 Housing Loan No. 8, dated 1 Apr 51.
 Bank: Bayerische Vereinsbank, Munich.

DOCUMENTATION:

Passport: Reinhard GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK, TTD # 0006485 (50-51).
 Reinhard GEHLEN: TTD 0006440 issued Stuttgart, 30 Sep 49 valid to 30 Mar 50 for USA.
 TTD 0006329 valid for Switzerland, Austria; Italy, Spain and France (50).
 TTD 0587767 issued 20 Jun 51 for UJDRACO purpose.
 Passport No. 849/51.
 Robert GONTARD: Passport No. 186070.
 Passport No. 49203.
 Robert GRÄBER: Passport No. 7203699, Reg. Nr. CA-1004/54 issued 5 Nov 54, Munich, profession: Kaufmann.
 Kennkarte: Reinhard GEHLEN: H 519712, 3 Mar 47, Police President, Frankfurt/M.
 B 03611.
 Richard SCHNEIDER: H 478955 (also listed as H 478055). Address: Munich, Seefelderstr 8.
 Pistol Permit: Reinhard GEHLEN: Automatic pistol permit GC 01082, 20 Mar 51.
 Pistol Permit, F & D, B 046419, 6 Feb 53, automatic pistol, Belg. Browning, Ser # 108877.
 Richard SCHNEIDER: Gun permit GC 01025, F & D, 1 Mar 51, automatic pistol German Walther PPK, Serial # 227066 K.
 7th Army E Letter: Issued 29 Jul 53.
 ZIPPER ID Card: B 03611.
 ZIPPER "E" Card:
 Gate Pass: Richard SCHNEIDER, # 1068.

REFERENCES: MGMA-870.

22 Sep 49 WASH-316.	15 Jul 50 PULLF-801.	11 Mar 52 MGLA-10713.	4 Oct 54, EGLA-
17 Nov 49 MGKW-3446.	17 Jul 50 WASHF-9915.	28 Mar 52 MSBA-5170.	10921.
5 Dec 49 MGHA-3780.	18 Jul 50 MGKW-5501.	11 Apr 52 MGQA-3402.	25 Jan 55 EGLW-
8 Dec 49 MGKA-12714.	19 Jul 50 MGKA-20774.	22 Apr 52 MGQA-3873.	1296.
9 Dec 49 MGKA-12751.	19 Jul 50 MGLA-2658.	17 May 52 MGLA-11678.	18 May 55 EGLA-
4 Jan 50 MGLA-1015.	28 Aug 50 MGKA-22030.	29 May 52 MGLA-11778.	14168.
7 Feb 50 MGKA-14279.	28 Aug 50 MGKW-6130.	17 Jun 52 PULLF-3715.	26 Aug 55 PULL-
7 Mar 50 MGLA-1419.	6 Sep 50 MGKW-6180.	19 Aug 52 MGLA-12873.	1464.
20 Mar 50 MGKA-14959.	20 Sep 50 WFPA-5751.	27 Aug 52 MGLA-12955.	2 Sep 55 PULL-
20 Mar 50 MGLA-1540.	19 Oct 50 PULLF-1195.	10 Sep 52 EGLA-113.	1723.
20 Mar 50 MGKA-15432.	23 Oct 50 WASHF-17828.	26 Sep 52 EGLA-323.	16 Dec 55 EGQA-
3 Apr 50 MGFA-3635.	30 Oct 50 MGLA-3904.	3 Oct 52 SPULL-4217.	72146.
3 Apr 50 MGFA-3636.	9 Nov 50 MGFA-4364.	6 Nov 52 ESBA-253.	28 Dec 55 EGNA-
17 Apr 50 MGFA-3657.	30 Dec 50 MGLA-4584.	13 Nov 52 SPULL-4439.	7844.
18 Apr 50 MGLA-1806.	17 Feb 51 MGLA-5260.	15 Jan 53 ESBA-542.	28 Mar 56 EGLW-
18 Apr 50 MGKW-4735.	10 Mar 51 MGLA-5608.	11 Feb 53 EGSA-1000.	2369.
9 May 50 PULLF-579.	4 Apr 51 PULL-1963.	20 Apr 53 SPULL-5474.	19 Oct 56, EGLA-
15 May 50 WASHF-4701.	14 Jun 51 MGLA-6849.	29 Apr 53 SROME-5677.	21104.
17 May 50 PULLF-612.	20 Jun 51 MGKA-30219.	30 Apr 53 SPULL-5554.	
3 Jun 50 MGFA-3800.	24 Jul 51 MGLA-7487.	8 Oct 53 EGNA-2918.	
9 Jun 50 PULLF-685.	30 Jul 51 MGLA-7582.	8 Oct 53 EGLA-5838.	
14 Jun 50 MGKW-5212.	8 Oct 51 MGLA-8460.	2 Nov 53 SBONN-1214.	
5 Jul 50 MGKW-5372.	5 Jan 52 MSZA-716.	6 Jan 54 EGLA-6975.	
7 Jul 50 MGLA-2524.	24 Jan 52 MASA-1237.	8 Jan 54 DIR-33337.	
10 Jul 50 MGLA-2603.	12 Feb 52 MGLA-10303.	9 Feb 54 EGNA-3748.	

SECRET

Page 3

GEHLEN, Reinhard.
b. 3 Apr 1902.

Chronological Information:

1900-20 Humanistisches Gymnasium Breslau. Graduated.
1920, Apr Entered military service (artillery).
1923 Commissioned Second Lieutenant.
1928 Promoted First Lieutenant.
1931, Oct Married Herta (nee von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH) GEHLEN on 11 Oct 1931, Glogau.
1933 Travelled to Rome, Italy (leave).
1933, Fall-
1935, Jan Attended War Academy, Berlin.
1934, May Promoted Captain.
1937 Travelled to Finland and Sweden (leave).
1937-38 First General Staff Officer 10 Department Fortifications.
1937-45 German Wehrmacht troop duty Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Russia.
1938-39 Battery Commander. - *18th Artillery Reg. (K/o 1939), 18th Div.*
1939, Mar Promoted Major.
39 Sep-Nov Ia (G-3) 213th Infantry Division.
1939, Nov-
1940, Jul OKH Gruppe Landesbefestigung (Chief, Fortifications Sect. General Staff).
40 Jul-Nov Aide (Adjutant) to Chief of General Staff, General HALDER.
1940 Nov-
1942 Apr Chief Gruppenleiter I, Ost (Sect Chief within Dept for Plans and Operations).
1941 Jul Promoted Lieutenant Colonel.
1942 Apr-
1945 Apr Chief ABT Fremde Heere Ost.
1942 Dec Promoted Colonel.
1944 Dec Promoted Brigadier General. (*Don Maj. in German (Germania)*)
1945 Apr Dismissed by Special Order of Hitler on 9th of April.
1945 May Prisoner of War, U.S. Forces, on 23 May.
1945 May Prisoner of War arrived at the 12th Army Group IC on 27 May.
1945 end Prisoner of War sent to USA by War Department.
1946 Jun Prisoner of War returned from the States on 5 June.
1946 Jul Since has cooperated with USIS.
1946 Reinhard GEHLEN
Profession: Merchant
Address: c/o Dr. ERHARDT
10 Guentherburg Allee
Frankfurt a/M.
1946 on Several trips to Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and France.
1946 Jul 12-
49 Nov 30 Subject documented as having lived in Washington, D. C. during this period.
55 Jan 19 German stamp.
" 19 London Airport.
" 22 Harwick, England.
" 23 Hook of Holland.
" 23 Kon. Marechaus Venlo stat. (Dutch border).
" 23 German stamp.
56 May 30 Dover.
" 30 Belgie-U Havenoostends.
" 30 Belgique-E Herbesihal 27.
Jun 1 Belgique-S Herbesihal.
" 1 Belgie-S Havenoostends Zeevaartpolitie 11.
" 1 Dover.

This Information
was extracted from
Robert GRABER's
passport,
(Immigration stampings).

SECRET

M/R: Only for the record info: compiled thru dredging, 19 Oct 56.

The following is info on one of Reinhard 'GEHLEN's alias:

@ GONTARD, Robert

b. 4 Mar 1905, Breslau, Germany.

Father: Franz GONTARD, German.

Mother: Elsa GONTARD, German.

174 cms, blue eyes, dark blond hair, wears spectacles.

1937-45 German Wehrmacht.

1945- Merchant, 10 Guentherburg Allee, Frankfurt a/Main.

2 Apr 48 Subject issued KK H 478039, Frankfurt/M by Police President.

27 Dec 48 D-2831. Subject had passport # 49203.

19 Jul 50: TTD # 186070 cancelled this date. (had expired).

Jul 50 TTD # 0347186 issued.

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"SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

GEHLEN, Reinhard
page -3-

1954 (Jul): The following info submitted by POB's []

Subject is one of 4 children resulting from 3 marriages by his father, each following the death of the previous wife. One of these marriages resulted in 2 children and each of the others in one. At least one of the wives had been previously married and had children; thus, Subject has full, half and step brothers and sisters. One brother died in the Orient (Shanghai) during WW II. One sister married an individual of the same name, i.e. GEHLEN, who, as a young man, came to live with Reinhard GEHLEN's family. This GEHLEN was a German Navy officer during the war, although he is a lawyer by training. At the end of WW II he worked for a time in the British Zone administering a Navy project for the British. Finally he emigrated to Brazil with his wife and there, with a former schoolmate, entered a business firm which encountered some initial difficulties but eventually got on its feet. When the German Embassy was reestablished in Brazil after WW II, this brother-in-law applied for a position; this application was acted upon by an AA (Aussen Amt: Foreign Office) official who had been assisted by this GEHLEN in the immediate postwar era in northern Germany; applicant GEHLEN was considered for position of top man in the commercial attache office since he is well trained and speaks fluent Portuguese; however his dual German/Brazilian citizenship precluded his holding this high post in a country of dual citizenship; he accepted a minor position and has now been transferred to Lisbon, Portugal, where he will, presumably, be the commercial attache. A brother, of the Portugal, GEHLEN is an employee of the Amt BLANK, but he is unrelated to Reinhard GEHLEN except by marriage; the name and relationship cause occasional confusion. Two of Reinhard GEHLEN's step-brothers are doctors; one of them is SCHNEEMILCH @ SCHLOEMEL, one of the ZIPPER staff doctors and the keeper of a special connection house near NICOLAUS Compound. Another, Brother Giovanni (V-11893) in Rome is, of course, well known; his own statements during his postwar interrogation provide a rather exact description of where he fits into the family and how he became the Italian wing of the family.

* SCHNEEMILCH, Gerhard (Dr), @ SCHLEGEL, Dr.
SCHNEEMILCH, Hans Dietrich, @ SCHLOEMEL, Dr.

1956, May: At UTILITY's request, [] is assisting Peter Christian GEHLEN in application for visa for immigration USA. Peter is son of UTILITY's deceased (1945) brother "Verlagsbuchhändler Doktor der Rechte Walter GEHLEN"; the young man intends to become US citizen, join army, go OCS and make career as US Army Officer. However, since he has been accepted into Tank Training unit in new German Army, he may change his mind.

1956, Mar: Maj. Gen. Willard Liebel, CG MAAG-Portugal, rptd that Counselor for Economic Affairs of the German Legation, Lisbon, Walter von GEHLEN, was a cousin of the German General von GEHLEN who had been charged with conducting intelligence ops against the Russians in WW II...that Walter von GEHLEN's wife is Gen. von GEHLEN's sister...Walter von GEHLEN is cousin to Gen. von GEHLEN. (POB note: accuracy of above statement cannot be confirmed).

"SECRET CONTROL"
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P. 4

Outline of career of Reinhard GEHLEN as presented in Der Spiegel, Vol VIII,
No 39, 22 Sep 1954, Hamburg, pg 12-25

Father: had been active officer in old army; retired early; became publication director at publishing house of Ferdinand Hirt in Breslau

- (18 years old; secondary-school graduate)
- 1920 Reinhard GEHLEN one of first officer candidates of new temporary Reichswehr (Reich Armed Forces) whose reduction to 100,000 men was still in future; joined First Battery of the Schweidnitz Artillery Regiment No. 6
- 1923, Dec 1 2nd
Commissioned/Lt., 2nd Battery of Schweidnitz 3rd Artillery Regiment, formed from the 6th Artillery Regt.
Three more years in battery service in the stables and in the barracks.
- 1926 GEHLEN, one of the most brilliant riders in the regiment, was ordered to Hannover cavalry school for 2 years (instruction of officers of mounted and horse-drawn troops in "the comprehensive training of the soldier's horse and its rider.")
- 1928 During cavalry-school tour of duty made 1st Lt., after 8 years of service.
- 1929-32 Battalion Adjutant (accord. to army register); had 12 years of of service; was married to daughter of old Hussar officer, nee von SEYDLITZ.
- 1933 ordered to
1st Lt. GEHLEN from AR 3, Military Area III, Berlin for training as "assistant chief of staff" ~~following selection~~ at military-area hqs following selection based on mandatory examinations which all Reichswehr officers had to take at military-area hqs in middle of the first-lieutenant stage; hardly ever were more than an average of 10 officer picked from each military area. There was no central war academy.
- 1934 Captain; 14th year of service
Military-area instruction courses transferred to the re-established Berlin War Academy. Reinhard GEHLEN belonged to first class which in 1935 completed the final grind at the War Academy, and was one of the selected ("red stripe" General Staff) officers ordered to the General Staff; after a probationary year he was definitely moved to the General Staff and allowed to wear the red stripe on his pants.
- 1935 Adjutant to Deputy Chief of General Staff I (Operations) on the General Staff of the Army, who was deputy of the Chief of Staff and also in charge of Section 1 (Operations); Capt. GEHLEN had no contact with Sec. 3 (Foreign Armies West) and 12 (Foreign Armies East) because they were under command of Deputy Chief of the General Staff IV (Intelligence). After a year as Adjutant, GEHLEN transferred to Operations Section under command of General von MANSTEIN; after a further year moved into Home Fortification Section which had been formed from Section 1.
- 1936
- 1937

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P. 5

Capt. GEHLEN, in his 18th year of service, had never commanded a unit of his own.

1938

General von MANSTEIN on 1 Apr 38 took command of 18th Infantry Division whose 18th Artillery Regiment had grown out of AR 3, GEHLEN's parent unit; Capt. GEHLEN assigned commander of the 8th Battery of the 18th Regiment at Liegnitz.

In Polish War, Major GEHLEN was First General-Staff Officer (Ia), 213d Div.

Recalled to General Staff of the Army; first functioned as liaison officer to various armies (16th of Gen. BUSCH "where so difficult a man as Gen. MODEL was C of S; and armored groups of HOTH and GUDERIAN).

Diplomatic talents exhibited by GEHLEN as liaison officer prompted Chief of the General Staff, General HALDER, to name him as his Adjutant.

After his tour as adjutant, GEHLEN called to Operations Section under command of then Colonel HEUSINGER; GEHLEN became director of Eastern Group in Operations Section.

Replaced Colonel KINZEL as chief of Section "Foreign Armies East"; Colonel GEHLEN for the first time came in contact with variant of intelligence service functions. GEHLEN promoted successfully, within a year, inclusion of intelligence-service duties and evaluation of results in Ic sections to extent that Ic officers of army-group high commands had so-called "front reconnaissance troops" at their disposal in regimental strength; front reconnaissance formations were divided up into Commands I (procurement of secret info), II (demoralization of enemy and sabotage) and III (counteract and render harmless the foreign intel. serv. and itself infiltrate the enemy services with its own undercover agents) and the newly organized group RII (Rüstungsaufklärung - armaments reconnaissance). As Admiral CANARIS's counterintelligence fell apart GEHLEN's own intelligence service took form; in May '44 CANARIS was removed and at this time GEHLEN had his own Army Intelligence Service standing in the East which could continue its work relatively undisturbed under protective cover of the General Staff and the Ic service of the high staffs; GEHLEN, according to classical pattern of his function on General Staff, should have been reviewing enemy's situation on eastern front but was in fact chief of counterintelligence in eastern theater of war.

1944

" , Dec 24 GUDERIAN, last Army Chief of Staff, gave situation briefing to HITLER based on General GEHLEN's statements; HITLER scoffed.

1945, Jan 9 GUDERIAN gave another situation briefing based on Gen. GEHLEN's data; HITLER demanded GEHLEN's replacement.

" , summer GEHLEN surrendered near Elendsalm (Schliensee) to American patrol flown to Washington with some of his officers and files. headed a German staff (resurrected Section Foreign Armies East of the German General Staff) of specialists to work on intelligence about Soviet union and its sphere of influence.

SECRET

AIR

SECRET

EOL-1-21113 ATT

GEHLEN 201

Chief, EE
(Attn: C)
Chief of Base, Pullach

22 October 1956

Info: COS
Penn

Operational/UPCWING

Transmittal of Letter for Director

Forwarded under separate cover is a personal letter from UTILITY to Director which transmits a report concerning possible propaganda action against Director by the "Ausbruch der Deutsche Einheit". The text of the letter was furnished to POB, a copy of which is forwarded to each addressee under separate cover.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DIST:

1-EE w/atts sep/cov (1-EE; 1-Director)
2-COS w/att sep/cov
2-Penn w/att sep/cov

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SECRET

COPY

32-6-7-6198

NAME: GEHLEN, Reinhard

(ex-Brig. Gen.)

Hqs C

GEHLEN, Reinhard

BIRTHDATE: 3 Apr 1902

ALIAS: Dr. SCHNEIDER

BIRTHPLACE: Erfurt, Thuringia

V:

RESIDENCE: Berg am Starnberger See

TELEPHONE:

Waldstr. 68 (near Munich)

VEHICLE:

RELIGION: Protestant

LICENSE #(s):

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AS OF 1958


HEIGHT: 5' 8 1/2"

WEIGHT: 145-160

EYES: blue

HAIR: dk blond, balding

PHOTO DATE: prob pr 51



BUILD: medium

TEETH:

OTHER: glasses, skull

mustache, military

bearing, looks

young for age.

FATHER: Walther GEHLEN, deceased 1943

DOB/POB: 24 Jul 1871 in Koblenz

MOTHER: Katharina GEHLEN, deceased 1921

DOB/POB: 12 Jun 1881

(NEE: von VASSENHOF)

SPOUSE: Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene GEHLENDORF DOB: 17 Mar/Apr 1904 in Leobschuetz, S.

(NEE: von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH)(who see)

CHILDREN: Katharina OVERHOLZER nee GEHLEN DOB/POB: 19 Jan 1934 in Berlin

(who see)

Christoph GEHLEN

DOB/POB: 11 Feb 1937 in Berlin

Marie Therese GEHLEN

DOB/POB: 4 Sep 1940 in Liegnitz

Dorothea GEHLEN

28 Feb 1943 in Liegnitz

OTHER RELATIVES W/UPSWING: Giovanni GEHLEN, brother, who see

UPSWING DEPLOYMENT

DOB: summer 1945

Jan 1946

RAIK:

POSITION: President

SECTION: BND

FROM: Origin TO:

Note: For details of GEHLEN's background and experience see following pages.

DATE TERMINATION OR SEPARATION:

NEW STATUS:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 38
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET
KAPOK

REST

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GEHLEN, Reinhard.
b. 3 Apr 1902.

Chronological Information:

1908-20 Humanistisches Gymnasium Breslau. Graduated.
1920, Apr Entered military service (artillery).
1923 Commissioned Second Lieutenant.
1928 Promoted First Lieutenant.
1931, Oct Married Herta (nee von SKIELITZ-KURZBACH) GEHLEN on 11 Oct 1931, Glogau.
1933 Travelled to Rome, Italy (leave).
1933, Fall-
1935, Jan Attended War Academy, Berlin.
1934 Promoted Captain.
1937 Travelled to Finland and Sweden (leave).
1937-38 First General Staff Officer 10 Department Fortifications.
1937-45 German Wehrmacht troop duty Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Russia.
1938-39 Battery Commander.
1939, Mar Promoted Major.
39 Sep-Nov Ia (G-3) 213th Infantry Division.
1939, Nov-
1940, Jul OKH Gruppe Landesbefestigung (Chief, Fortifications Sect. General Staff).
40 Jul-Nov Aide (Adjutant) to Chief of General Staff, General HALDER.
1940 Nov-
1942 Apr Chief Gruppenleiter I, Ost (Sect Chief within Dept for Plans and Operations).
1941 Jul Promoted Lieutenant Colonel.
1942 Apr-
1945 Apr Chief ABT Fremde Heere Ost.
1942 Dec Promoted Colonel.
1944 Dec Promoted Brigadier General.
1945 Apr Dismissed by Special Order of Hitler on 9th of April.
1945 May Prisoner of War, U.S. Forces, on 23 May.
1945 May Prisoner of War arrived at the 12th Army Group IC on 27 May.
1945 end Prisoner of War sent to USA by War Department.
1946 Jun Prisoner of War returned from the States on 5 June.
1946 Jul Since has cooperated with USIS.
1946 Reinhard GEHLEN
Profession: Merchant
Address: c/o Dr. ERHARDT
10 Guentherburg Allee
Frankfurt a/M.
1946 on Several trips to Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and France.
1946 Jul 12-
Nov 30 Subject documented as having lived in Washington, D. C. during this period.
Jan 19 German stamp.
" 19 London Airport.
" 22 Harwick, England.
" 23 Hook of Holland.
" 23 Kon. Warechaus Venlo stat. (Dutch border).
" 23 German stamp.
56 May 30 Dover.
" 30 Belgie-U Havenoostende.
" 30 Belgique-E Herbesihal 27.
Jun 1 Belgique-S Herbesihal.
" 1 Belgie-S Havenoostende Zeevaartpolitie 11.
" 1 Dover.

This Information
was extracted from
Robert GRABER's
passport,
(Immigration stampings).

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NAME: GEHLEN, Reinhard

(ex-Brig. Gen.)

Hqs [] []

GEHLEN von VAHNEWYCK, Reinhard: Occasional references to this name which would indicate that either Subject or his father combined their surname with that of Subject's mother -- fairly common practise in Germany.

ALIASES: Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER, b. 4 Mar 1905. Covername used within the Org.
Richard GARNER, b. 3 Apr 1902.
Robert GONTARD, b. 4 Mar 1905.
(Subject has been issued at various times German identity papers in connection with the three aliases mentioned above).
Hans HOLHEIN, b. 21 Jan 1905. Issued AGO-card #147996. This alias used only occasionally, for instance in travelling to Austria.
Dr. GROSS (These aliases used whenever special precautionary measures are warranted and wherever mistaken identity with another person of the same name is desirable).
Robert GRABER, b. 5 Jun 1904, Liegnitz, Schlesien. (Kaufmann).

BORN: 3 Apr 1902; Erfurt, Thuringia, Germany.

RELIGION: Protestant.

RESIDENCE: Berg a/Staraberger See, Waldstr 68. (near Jemlich, Germany).

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: Photo.

Height: 174 cms. Weight: 65-72 kg. Eyes: blue. Hair: dark blonde, central baldness.
Face-shape: round. Complexion: light. Build: medium.
Scars:
Prominent ident. features: military bearing, extremely young looking compared with chronological years, small mustache, wears glasses.

FATHER: GEHLEN, Walther; b. 24 Jul 1871 in Koblenz. Deceased 1943.
(Director of a Publishing Firm in Leipzig. Former Army officer; retired after WW I with the rank of Lt. Col. Re-activated in WW II, held unimportant administrative position).
Margarete

MOTHER: GEHLEN, Katharina/b. 12 Jan 1881 (nee von VAHNEWYCK). Deceased 1921.

WIFE: GEHLEN, Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene b. 17 Mar/Apr 1904, Leobersdorf, Austria.
(the daughter of Friedrich-Wilhelm and Meta (nee KICHERER) von STEINLITZ-BREITBACH).

SIBLINGS: GEHLEN, Katharina b. 19 Jan 34, Berlin.
GEHLEN, Christoph b. 11 Feb 37, Berlin.
GEHLEN, Marie Therese b. 4 Sep 40, Liegnitz.
GEHLEN, Dorothea b. 28 Feb 43, Liegnitz.

OTHER RELATIVES: Subject is one of four children resulting from three marriages by his father, each following the death of the previous wife. One of these marriages resulted in two children and each of the others in one. At least one of the wives had been previously married and had children. Thus Subject has full, half, and step brothers and sisters.

GEHLEN, Giovanni b. 15 Mar 1901, Rome, Italy.

GEHLEN, Walter (Dr) b. ca 1905, Germany. Book-editor. Killed during bombardment of Nuremberg on 20 Feb 1945.

GEHLEN, Anna (sister). Died in the Orient (Siam) during the war.

GEHLEN, Barbara (nee GEHLEN) b. 5 Jul 1912 Breslau, Germany. (Barbara married a distant relative, Walter Carlos von GEHLEN, an ex-German Army employee, trained lawyer, who had worked for the British as a spy project in Italy, also listed as an accountant. He was transferred to Lisbon from Brazil where he is presently listed as the Counselor for Economic Affairs of the German Legation, Lisbon, Portugal).

SCHNEIDER, Hans Dietrich (Dr of medicine) b. 4 Jan 09 Gumbinnen, Prussia. (Dr) also a step-brother.

KURZBACH, Joachim Hans August von b. 7 Dec 11 Liebenberg. Brother-in-law.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BOO: 1946, JNIS Co-operation;
Payroll No: 3002. Jan 55 pr, from "S" to "P" category: LW 1215/250.
Emergency No:
Position: Chief, Section 28 (ex-Section 30).
Organization:
Cover Unit: Industrial Research Unit.
7924 Army Procurement Team.
Subject is connected with Bavarian Light Metals Works.
Special Connections No: 20
Housing Loan No. 8, dated 1 Apr 51.
Bank: Bayerische Vereinsbank, Munich.

DOCUMENTATION:

Passport: Reinhard GEHLEN via VARENEWICK, TTD # 0006485 (50-51).
Reinhard GEHLEN, TTD 0006440 issued Stuttgart, 30 Sep 49 valid to 30 Mar 50 for USA.
TTD 0006329 valid for Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and France (50).
TTD 0587767 issued 20 Jun 51 for UDRACO purpose.
Passport No. 849/51.
Robert GORTARD: Passport No. 186070.
Passport No. 49203.
Robert GRAHER: Passport No. 7203699, Reg. Nr. CA-1004/54 issued 5 Nov 54, Munich, profession: Kaufmann.

Karte: Reinhard GEHLEN: H 519712, 3 Mar 47, Police President, Frankfurt/M.
B 03611.

Richard SCHNEIDER: H 478959 (also listed as H 478055). Address: Munich, Seefeldstr 8.

Pistol Permit: Reinhard GEHLEN: Automatic pistol permit GC 01082, 20 Mar 51.
Pistol Permit, F & D, B 016419, 6 Feb 53, automatic pistol, Belg. Browning, Ser # 108877.
Richard SCHNEIDER: Gun permit GC 01025, F & D, 1 Mar 51, automatic pistol German Walther PPK, Serial # 227066 K.

7th Army R Letter: Issued 29 Jul 53.

ZIPPER ID Card: B 03611.

ZIPPER "E" Card:

Gate Pass: Richard SCHNEIDER, # 1048.

REFERENCES: MOWA-870.

27 Jul 49	WASH-316.	15 Jul 50	PULLF-801.	11 Mar 52	MOLA-10713.	2 Oct 54, MOLA-
27 Jul 49	MGM-3446.	17 Jul 50	WASH-9915.	28 Mar 52	MOLA-5170.	10921.
27 Jul 49	MGM-3780.	18 Jul 50	MGM-5501.	11 Apr 52	MOLA-3402.	25 Jan 55 EGEN-
27 Jul 49	MOLA-12714.	19 Jul 50	MOLA-30774.	22 Apr 52	MOLA-3873.	1296.
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27 Jul 49	MOLA-1015.	28 Aug 50	MOLA-22038.	29 May 52	MOLA-11778.	14168.
27 Jul 49	MOLA-14279.	28 Aug 50	MGM-6130.	17 Jun 52	PULLF-3715.	26 Aug 55 PULL-
27 Jul 49	MOLA-1419.	6 Sep 50	MGM-6180.	19 Aug 52	MOLA-12873.	146.
27 Jul 49	MOLA-14959.	20 Sep 50	MOLA-5751.	27 Aug 52	MOLA-12955.	2 Sep 55 PULL-
20 Mar 50	MOLA-1540.	19 Oct 50	PULLF-1195.	10 Sep 52	MOLA-113.	1773.
20 Mar 50	MOLA-15432.	23 Oct 50	WASH-17828.	26 Sep 52	MOLA-323.	16 Dec 55 MOLA-
3 Apr 50	MOLA-3635.	30 Oct 50	MOLA-3904.	3 Oct 52	SPULL-4217.	72148.
3 Apr 50	MOLA-3636.	9 Nov 50	MOLA-4364.	6 Nov 52	MOLA-253.	28 Dec 55 MOLA-
17 Apr 50	MOLA-3657.	30 Dec 50	MOLA-4584.	13 Nov 52	SPULL-4439.	7814.
18 Apr 50	MOLA-1806.	17 Feb 51	MOLA-5260.	15 Jan 53	MOLA-542.	28 Mar 56 MOLA-
18 Apr 50	MGM-4735.	10 Mar 51	MOLA-5608.	11 Feb 53	MOLA-1800.	2369.
9 May 50	PULLF-579.	4 Apr 51	PULL-1963.	20 Apr 53	SPULL-5474.	19 Oct 56, MOLA-
15 May 50	WASH-4701.	14 Jun 51	MOLA-4849.	29 Apr 53	SPULL-5551.	21104.
17 May 50	PULLF-612.	20 Jun 51	MOLA-30219.	30 Apr 53	SPULL-5551.	
3 Jun 50	MOLA-3873.	22 Jul 51	MOLA-7487.	8 Oct 53	MOLA-2918.	
9 Jun 50	PULLF-685.	30 Jul 51	MOLA-7582.	8 Oct 53	MOLA-5818.	
14 Jun 50	MGM-5212.	8 Oct 51	MOLA-8460.	2 Nov 53	SPULL-1214.	
5 Jul 50	MGM-5372.	5 Jan 52	MOLA-716.	6 Jan 54	MOLA-6975.	
7 Jul 50	MOLA-2524.	24 Jan 52	MOLA-1237.	8 Jan 54	DIR-33337.	
10 Jul 50	MOLA-2603.	12 Feb 52	MOLA-10303.	9 Feb 54	MOLA-3748.	

SECRET

Outline of career of Reinhard GEHLEN as presented in Der Spiegel, Vol VIII, No 31, 22 Sep 1954, Hamburg, pg 12-25

Father: had been active officer in old army; retired early; became publication director at publishing house of Ferdinand Hirt in Breslau

- (18 years old; secondary-school graduate)
- 1920 Reinhard GEHLEN one of first officer candidates of new temporary Reichswehr (Reich Armed Forces) whose reduction to 100,000 men was still in future; joined 1st Battery of the Schweidnitz Artillery Regiment No. 2nd
- 1923, Dec 1 Commissioned/Lt., 2nd Battery of Schweidnitz 3rd Artillery Regiment, formed from the 6th Artillery Regt. Three more years in battery service in the stables and in the barracks.
- 1926 GEHLEN, one of the most brilliant riders in the regiment, was ordered to Hannover cavalry school for 2 years (instruction of officers of mounted and horse-drawn troops in "the comprehensive training of the soldier's horse and its rider.")
- 1928 During cavalry-school tour of duty made 1st Lt., after 8 years of service.
- 1929-32 Battalion Adjutant (accord. to army register); had 12 years of service; was married to daughter of old Hussar officer, nee von REXDLITZ.
- ordered to
- 1933 1st Lt. GEHLEN from Ar 3, Military Area III, Berlin for training as "assistant chief of staff" ~~following~~ at military-area has following selection based on mandatory examinations which all Reichswehr officers had to take at military-area has in middle of the first-lieutenant stage; hardly ever were more than an average of 10 officer picked from each military area. There was no central war academy.
- 1934 Captain; 14th year of service
- " Military-area instruction courses transferred to the re-established Berlin War Academy. Reinhard GEHLEN belonged to first class which in 1935 completed the final grind at the War Academy, and was one of the selected ("red stripe" General Staff) officers ordered to the General Staff; after a probationary year he was definitely moved to the General Staff and allowed to wear the red stripe on his pants.
- 1935 Adjutant to Deputy Chief of General Staff I (Operations) on the General Staff of the Army, who was deputy of the Chief of Staff and also in charge of Section 1 (Operations); Capt. GEHLEN had no contact with Sec. 3 (Foreign Armies West) and 12 (Foreign Armies East) because they were under command of Deputy Chief of the General Staff IV (Intelligence). After a year as Adjutant, GEHLEN transferred to Operations Section under command of General von Manteuffel; after a further year moved into Home Fortification Section which had been formed from Section 1.
- 1936
- 1937

SECRET

SECRET

Capt. GEHLEN, in his 18th year of service, had never commanded a unit of his own.

1936

General von MANSTEIN on 1 Apr 35 took command of 18th Infantry Division whose 18th Artillery Regiment had grown out of JAG 3, GEHLEN's parent unit; Capt. GEHLEN assigned commander of the 8th Battery of the 18th Regiment at Liegnitz.

In Polish War, Major GEHLEN was First General-Staff Officer (Ia), 113th Div.

Recalled to General Staff of the Army; first functioned as liaison officer to various armies (16th of Gen. EUSCH "where so difficult a man as Gen. MODEL was C of S; and armored groups of HOTH and SCHERER).

Diplomatic talents exhibited by GEHLEN as liaison officer prompted Chief of the General Staff, General HALDER, to name him as his Adjutant.

After his tour as adjutant, GEHLEN called to Operations Section under command of then Colonel HEUSINGER; GEHLEN became director of eastern group in Operations Section.

Replaced Colonel KRIEGER as chief of section "Foreign Armies East"; Colonel GEHLEN for the first time came in contact with variant of intelligence service functions. GEHLEN promoted successfully, within a year, inclusion of intelligence-service duties and evaluation of results in Ic section: to extent that Ic officers of army-group high commands had so-called "front reconnaissance troops" at their disposal in regimental strength; front reconnaissance formations were divided up into Commands I (procurement of secret info), II (demoralization of enemy and sabotage) and III (counteract and render harmless the foreign intel. services and itself infiltrate the enemy services with its own undercover agents) and the newly organized group AII (Rüstungsaufklärung - armaments reconnaissance). As Admiral CANAL's counterintelligence fell apart GEHLEN's own intelligence service took form; in May '44 CANAL was removed and at this time GEHLEN had his own army intelligence service standing in the East which could continue its work relatively undisturbed under protective cover of the General Staff and the Ic service of the high staffs; GEHLEN, according to classical pattern of his function on General Staff, should have been reviewing enemy's situation on eastern front but was in fact chief of counterintelligence in eastern theater of war.

GEHLEN, last Army Chief of Staff, gave situation briefing to HITLER based on General GELT's statements; HITLER scoffed.

GEHLEN gave another situation briefing based on Gen. GELT's data; HITLER demanded GELT's replacement.

GEHLEN surrendered near (Lüneburg - Lüneburger) to American patrol flown to Washington with some 100 officers and files. GEHLEN's German staff reorganized section Foreign Armies East of the German General Staff to specialists to work on intelligence about Soviet union and its sphere of influence.

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M/R: Only for the record info: compiled thru dredging, 19 Oct 56.

The following is info on one of Reinhard 'GEBLEN's alias:

- GONTARD, Robert
b. 4 Mar 1905, Breslau, Germany.

Father: Franz GONTARD, German.
Mother: Elsa GONTARD, German.

174 cms, blue eyes, dark blond hair, wears spectacles.

1937-45	German Wehrmacht,
1945-	Merchant, 10 Gaentherburg Allee, Frankfurt a/Main.
2 Apr 48	Subject issued KK M 478039, Frankfurt/M by Police President.
27 Dec 48	D-2831. Subject had passport # 49203.
19 Jul 50:	TTD # 186070 cancelled this date. (had expired).
Jul 50	TTD # 0347186 issued.

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SECRET

GEHLEN, Reinhard
 & Dr. SCHNEIDER

27 Nov 56, MR C [] In a recent discussion re UPSWING Staff Personnel UTILITY stated that although he had given up over 20 individuals to the Defense Ministry and elsewhere he had since legalization been successful in recruiting some 200 new (mostly young) Staff members. He further stated that slots and money were no problem for him regarding personnel. The main difficulty was finding the suitable people, not only from a point of view of their ability and promise but from a security standpoint as well.

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SECRET
 KAPUK

HM/MRL

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT : EE/Plans
EXT : 8206
DATE : 6 Nov 56

757

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3	Nov	6	011056

TO : FRANKFURT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : EE 1-6

INFO : DCI 7, D/DCI 8, COP 9, A/DD/P/P 10, PAG 11-12, CI 13, CI/OPS 14,
CI/IC 15, CI/SP 16, FI 17, FI/OPS 18, FI/RI 19-20, PP 21-22, PP/OPS 23,
PP/ICD 24-25, NEA 26-29, SR 30-32, ME 33-36, S/C 37-38

OUT 99576

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

CITE DIR

38738

TO FRAN

FOR E 7

GIVE FOLLOWING ORALLY TO UTILITY ON HIS ARRIVAL FRAN
AS BEING KUBARK VIEW. EMPHASIZE VIEWS MAY HAVE CHANGED
TIME (IN VIEW CEASE FIRE)
BY ~~THIS~~ THIS RECEIVED, FYI: THIS IS APPROXIMATION ODAGOG
SPECIAL ESTIMATE AND IS ODYOKE POSITION.

1. BULGANIN LETTERS READ AS STRONG BUT IMPRECISE
THREATS USE SOV FORCES IN UN FRAMEWORK BUT CARRYING
IMPLICATION SOVS MAY RPT MAY ACT ALONE.

2. SOVS WOULD WISH TAKE STRONG ALARMING STAND TO:

A. REASSERT POSITION AS CHAMPION EGYPT AND ANTI-
COLONIAL COUNTRIES;

B. DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM HUNGARY;

C. DAMAGE INTERESTS AND PRESTIGE UK AND FRANCE AND
DIVIDE WEST ALLIANCE.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 30 JUL 1957	

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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DECLASSIFIED IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :
FROM :
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE TWO

DIR 38738 OUT 99576

PRECEDENCE

D. POSSIBLY REESTABLISH FEAR USE SOV MILITARY FORCE
AS KEY FACTOR WORLD AFFAIRS.

3. BELIEVE PREVIOUS ESTIMATE SOVS WISH AVOID GENERAL
WAR STILL VALID.

4. PRESENTLY ESTIMATE SOVS:

A. WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT ATTACK METROPOLITAN
UK OR FRANCE SINCE THIS WOULD START GENERAL WAR;

B. UNLIKELY USE FORCES ON LARGE SCALE IN MED SINCE
CAPABILITY DO SO SOON IS LOW AND RISK GENERAL WAR WOULD
BE GREAT;

C. MAY MAKE SMALL SCALE AIR OR SUBMARINE ATTACKS
AGAINST FRENCH/UK IN EAST MED TO CREATE PRESSURE TOWARD
UN SETTLEMENT SATISFACTORY TO THEM;

D. WILL CONTINUE SUPPLY MATERIEL AND TECHNICIANS TO
ARABES PROBABLY ON INCREASED SCALE. WILL PROBABLY SEND
VOLUNTEERS;

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ROUTING

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2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM :
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE THREE

DIR 38738 OUT 99576

PRECEDENCE

E. AT MINIMUM WILL TRY CREATE ALARM IN WEST BY
CONTINUED THREATS.

5. DO NOT BELIEVE SOVS WILL EMPLOY NUCLEAR GUIDED
MISSILES IN EGYPT ISRAELI WAR ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE CAPABILITY.

6. SOVS AIR ATTACKS WESTERN MED WOULD REQUIRE USE ACFT
LONG RANGE AIR FORCE OR ONE WAY IL 28'S. IL 28 ^{BASES} ~~BASES~~ SYRIA,
JORDON OR IRAQ POSSIBLE BUT WOULD INVOLVE MAJOR LOGISTICS,
DEFENSE PROBLEMS.

7. POSSIBLE BUT NOT PROBABLE CHICOMS MIGHT EXPLOIT SUEZ
FOR ATTACK HONG KONG.

8. FORGOING VIEW ~~FORGOING VIEW~~ AS OF 1100 HOURS 6 NOV. FLOW EVENTS WILL BE
EFFECTED BY DAY TO DAY DECISION AND ACTIONS ALL CONCERNED
AND SOVS' ESTIMATE PROBABLE COURSES BIG THREE ACTIONS.

DCI

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COP
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

C/EE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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Der Leiter des Bundesnachrichtendienstes

Munich, Nov. 12th, 1941

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Dear Mr. Dulles,

After my sudden return to Germany I wish to thank you very much for this trip which unfortunately had to be interrupted due to the international situation. I think my decision to go back was right, although the international tension has relieved a bit. I was happy to hear from my government that it was satisfied with our work during the hot days.

I hope you will agree that I shall repeat my visit as soon as the situation will get clearer. I suppose however it will not be before January.

My intention was to use my first official visit to give you a little souvenir from our organisation. All members of our service, who belonged to the service as ordinary members on April 1st receive as a sign to remember a little souvenir showing the fight of St. George with the dragon as a symbol of our work against bolshevism. May I give you too one of the medals as a sign of our appreciation and of the close alliance of our services. I take this opportunity to send you also our best Christmas wishes and the best wishes for a happy New Year which as we hope may not be too turbulent.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

YOURS

SECRET

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EGL-A-21447

AIR

: Chief, EE
Attn: ☐
: Chief of Base, Pullach

16 November 1956

Info: COS
Bonn

Operational/UPSWING

Transmittal of Letter and Medal
from UTILITY to Robert A. Ascham

ACTION REQUIRED: None

1. Separate cover attachment contains personal letter from UTILITY to Ascham expressing his thanks for his recent but ill-fated trip to the States and his regrets at failing to meet with Robert A. Ascham as planned because of the international situation. You will note that UTILITY still looks forward to resuming the trip probably sometime after the Christmas holidays. I might add that at such time the trip should be planned with air transportation both ways and should probably include only such time as is necessary in Washington to carry out the planned briefings and discussions.

2. The gold medal that is submitted is explained in UTILITY's letter. It should be noted that this medal which is numbered (1) on the reverse side is the first to be given by UTILITY outside of UPSWING. It differs from those given to the members of UPSWING only in that it is gold whereas theirs are bronze.

3. I asked UTILITY if there was any special significance to the selection of St. George for the medal since he is the Patron Saint of England. UTILITY replied that this had not occurred to him at all but assured me that there was no special significance and then added with a twinkle that it was probably a better choice, anyhow, than would be St. Patrick, the Patron Saint of Ireland which, after all, is a neutralist state.

4. Incidentally, UTILITY has several other medals for distribution to former KUBARK friends and supporters of UPSWING previously stationed with the German Mission. So far none of these mementos have been given to any other Service.

DIST:

3-EE w/sep cov att. (Medal & Letter for Ascham)
(cy of letter for EE)
2-COS w/sep cov att. (cy of letter & medal)
2-Bonn w/sep cov att. (cy of letter & medal)

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

240-GENLEN, Reichen

DEC 6 1956

Dear General Gehlen:

Thank you for your good letter of November 12th enclosing the souvenir symbolic medal given to members of your service. It is a pleasure and an honor indeed to be the recipient of this fine token.

I, too, was distressed that your visit here was foreshortened by recent unfortunate world events and you may be sure that your return will be welcomed by all of us whenever you find it convenient.

With every best wish for a Merry Christmas and a happy and peaceful New Year to you and all of the members of your staff.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

O/DCI/ [] :jmf (5 Dec 56)
Dist:

Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI
✓ 1 - Chief, EE
1 - FMC
1 - ER w/basic
1 - Reading

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

GENLEN 201

AIR

EE 1614
EGLW-3003

32-6-7-

: Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: Chief of Station, Germany

: Chief, EE

: Operational

: Transmittal of Letter for UTILITY

Forwarded under separate cover is a letter from the Director to
UTILITY.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Attachment: As Stated under s/o
Distribution:
3-Pullach (DIRECT) w/att
3-Frankfurt w/o att
1-RI
2-EE/G/U
ES:lam
12 December 1956

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EE/G/U

SECRET

EE/G/U

E-zhln - 201

AIR

EE 104
EGLW-3020

DECLASS 1966 ✓

: Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: Chief of Station, Germany

: Chief, EE

: Operational

: Transmittal of Christmas card to UTILITY

It is requested that the attached greeting card, enclosed under separate cover, be delivered to UTILITY.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Attachments: As Stated under a/o

Distribution:

3-Pullach (DIRECT) w a/o att

3-Frankfurt w/o att

1-RI

2-EE/G/U

17 December 1956

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EE/G/U

SECRET

EE/G/U

Gehlen-201

AIR

EGLW-3031

: Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: Chief of Station, Germany

: Chief, EE

: Operational

: Transmittal of Letter

Please deliver the attached Christmas letter to General GEHLEN.

Attachments: As stated
Distribution:
3-Pullach w/att (DIRECT)
3-Frankfurt w/o att
1-RI
2-EE/C/U
ES:lam
19 December 1956

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EE/C/U
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EE/C/U

Gehlen-201

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

244

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 20 DEC 56

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTINE

1	AF 9	4	Chase PW
2	AF 1	5	e. 100
3	Chase	6	Chase

TO : DIRECTOR

DEC 20 1956

FROM : FRANKFURT

IN 26316

ACTION: EE T-6

INFO : DCI 7, D/DCI 8, COP 9, A/DD/P/P 10, CI 11, CI/OPS 12, CI/IC 13, FI 14, FI/OPS 15, FI/RQM 16-18, FI/RI 19-20, PP 21-22, PP/OPS 23, PP/ICD 24-25, SR 26-28, S/E 29-30
SUSPENSE DD/1

TO DIR

INFO PULL

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

CITE FRAN 4058

UPSWING INTEL

CONVERSATION NOTES UTILITY/ 217 DEC.

1. RECENTLY HALLSTEIN ASSURED UTILITY THAT UPTHRUST NOT UPSET WITH OR SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. POLICY. HIS OUTBURSTS ARE OFTEN BASED ON ERRONEOUS ADVICE DUE TO TENDENCY TO REACT QUICKLY AND POINT OF VIEW CHANGES EQUALLY RAPIDLY WHEN ACCURATE PICTURE EXPLAINED. HAS HIGHEST REGARD AND CONFIDENCE IN ASCHAM AND BROTHER SO THAT BOTH HALLSTEIN AND UTILITY BELIEVE WHATEVER IMPRESSIONS INDIVIDUAL REMARKS MAY CREATE UPTHRUST BASIC ATTITUDE VERY PRO-U.S. UTILITY ADDED THAT AS PRACTICAL MATTER SUCH ATTITUDE INEVITABLE AS CONSIDERS CONSTRUCTIVE FUTURE FOR EUROPE ONLY POSSIBLE WITH U.S. FRIENDSHIP. MOREOVER DEALINGS WITH RUSSIA ONLY POSSIBLE FROM POSITION OF STRENGTH WESTERN EUROPE WHICH MUST CONTINUE BE PUSHED.

2. HALLSTEIN ACCORDING UTILITY RECOGNIZED POSSIBLE NEED U.S.-SOV TALKS. SINCE TOUCHY POINT DID NOT PRESS WITH TOO MANY QUESTIONS BUT VERY INTERESTING IT MENTIONED AT ALL. IMPORTANT RECOGNIZE NO TIMING STATED AND CONSIDER SUCH TALKS ONLY CONTEMPLATED IN FUTURE WHEN WEST ACHIEVES POSITION STRENGTH, MEANING MILITARY STRENGTH.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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65411-201

UTILITY

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

1	ROUTINE
2	
3	

PAGE -2-

FRAN 4852 IN 86316

DISSEMINATION

3. REGARDING EAST GERMANY UTILITY FEELS ONLY POSSIBILITY ACTUAL UPRISHT
WOULD BE IF FIRM EVIDENCE WESTERN HELP GIVEN. DOES NOT EVEN BELIEVE THAT
UPRISINGS IN POLAND WOULD CHANGE THIS.

4. SOVS HAVE JUST RETURNED UPSWINGER FIELD LEADER WERNER HAASE WHO
PROMISED IN RETURN FOR CZECH FREED BY GERMANS. SOVS FAILED FULFILL PROMISE
FOR SOME TIME. UTILITY BELIEVES PERFORMED REACTIONS NAGY CSC WHICH MAKE SOVS
ANXIOUS NOT BE ACCUSED OF FAILING TO LIVE UP TO AGREEMENT.

5. UTILITY ANXIOUS HAVE UPSWING BECOME MILITARY ORG IN CASE WAR THOUGH WITH
SPECIAL STATUS. APPARENTLY WANTS COMBINATION FOURTH FORCE CONCEPT WITH
SPECIAL MILITARY STATUS FOR HIMSELF PURSUANT WHICH HE POLITICAL ADVISOR TO UPTHURST
AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR AND COLLECTOR FOR J-2 OR MILITARY CHIEF. THIS HE
BELIEVES WOULD RETAIN AUTONOMY HIS SERVICE GIVING BEST RESULTS PLUS PROVE HIM WITH
PROPER STATURE AND POSITION TO ENABLE HIM PERFORM MOST EFFECTIVELY. HAS DISCUSSED
WITH [] WHO ASKED "WHAT ARE AMERICANS PLANNING TO DO?" MAY WANT US TO
DISCUSS FURTHER WITH
(PORTION GARBLED BEING SERVICED) [] ON HIS BEHALF THOUGH FOR MOMENT SATISFIED
WITH MY STATEMENT OF US POSITION AS BASIS ANOTHER DISCUSSION HIMSELF.

6. NATO CPC MEMBERSHIP WILL BE FINALIZED WHEN WESSEL TAKES EX-BEN WINTER
TO CPC MEETING IN JANUARY AND INTRODUCE HIM AS GERMAN REP.

7. TOLD HIM MIL INTEL MAINLY USAFE RECEIVED RUMORS RECENTLY OF HEIMWEHR

S-E-C-R-E-T

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copy of
all is from 7 L.F.F.M/G

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE :

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4
2		5
3		6

TO :

FROM :

PAGE -3-

FRAN 4852 IN 88316

ACTION:

INFO :

RECEIVED

FOR POSSIBLE USE AGAINST EAST GERMANY. UTILITY STATED MUCH DISCUSSION OF SUCH ELEMENTS COMPOSED OF WEST GERMANS AS DEFENSIVE NOT OFFENSIVE UNITS TO BE AVAILABLE UNTIL GERMAN ARMY REBUILT. STATUTORY AUTHORITY HOWEVER REQUIRED AND NOTHING DONE YET.

8. HAS NOT WORKED OUT [] RELATIONS YET DUE APPOINTMENT STRAUSS AND WHILE AWAITING DEF MIN CHANGES. NOT SURE WHETHER WILL BE PREPARED DISCUSS SAME ON TRIP US THOUGH WILL LET US KNOW BEFORE HE LEAVES. TOLD HIM IT IS A SUBJECT IN WHICH MUCH INTEREST IN UN MILITARY AS WELL AS OURSELVES.

9. INDICATED HE NOW HAS PRIVATE COMMO CHANNEL TO WASH WHICH HE MAY USE FOR SPECIAL MESSAGES TO ASCHAM ON RARE OCCASIONS BUT WOULD ALSO LIKE ADVISE [] WHEN ADVISED [] ALSO HAS PRIVATE CHANNEL ASCHAM STATED WOULD PROBABLY USE THAT RATHER THAN HIS RECOGNIZING AMONG OTHER THINGS ADVANTAGE FOR POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES OF HAVING SOMEONE GERMAN STATION INFORMED.

10. HAS NO ANSWER YET ON SATELLITE PAPER PRODUCED BY [] BUT PROMISED WOULD GIVE ONE SOON.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : 527
 UNIT : JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
 EXT : DC/EE
 DATE : 3288
 29 DECEMBER 1956

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

~~SECRET~~

DEC 29 18 54 56

TO : BONN, FRANKFURT, PULLACH

REC'D UNDER SECRET.

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : EE 1-6

OUT 64107
OUT 34107INFO : DCI 7, D/DCI 8, COP 9, A/DD/P/P 10, CI 11, CI/OPS 12, FI 13, FI/OPS 14, FI/RI 15-16,
S/C 17-18

o GEHLEN, Reinhold

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO BONN

INFO FRAN PULL

CITE DIR

46028
46028

RE BONN 1915 (IN 28626)

1. WE ANTICIPATE UTILITY WILL NOT WANT TO HAVE HIS TRIP COINCIDE WITH THAT OF C 2 AND DO NOT FEEL HE SHOULD BE URGED ACCEPT THIS SOLUTION.
2. C 1 HAS URGED UTILITY DELAY HIS VISIT UNTIL MARCH AT EARLIEST WHEN RUMORED AND PLANNED TRIPS OF ADENAUER, BRENTANO, GLOBKE ET AL WILL NOT COINCIDE.

END OF MESSAGE

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 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
 DC/EE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX

DATE 8 JAN 1957

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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EXTRACT FR

MEMO

SUBJ: CONVERSATION

EXTENDED FILE

WITH (2) WINTERSTEIN

AT 204A-22597

16 JAN 1957

GEHLEN 201

2. GWINTERSTEIN said that we should have every faith in UTILITY's continuing support of close relations. He also broadened his remarks about UTILITY to indicate that it was his same conviction that UTILITY would defend to all corners his past and present connections to KUBARK. At every conference which UTILITY has with members of the press, GWINTERSTEIN is present. He said the most frequent question from the press is "Don't the KUBARKers know everything about you and your organization?" UTILITY replies, always in the same vein, "An intelligence service is always constructed in such a way that no individual from the outside can have a picture of all the details of the inside." He states that the

understanding approach of KUBARK to this problem has greatly assisted him. He affirms that KUBARK does not know his sources and that those things which must be kept secret have been kept secret from KUBARK as well as anyone else.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

GEHLEN 201

EGNA-11,043

4 February 1957

INFO: COS
POBE

Some Problems Looming for UTILITY in Bonn

3. The Foreign Office is reported to be peeved about the UPWARD-UPPERMOST political reporting channel, and those of UPWARD's reports which received dissemination in the Foreign Office are not highly regarded. UTILITY's position in this sector is not strong, and it may be further weakened if von Robert succeeds in moving himself in between C and UPPERMOST, as appears to be his intention. A scheme of working out national estimates along the American model might remove some of the difficulties. But as long as UPPERMOST has an appetite for them, UTILITY must contribute political reports, and as long as he does so, there will be resentment from the Foreign Office.

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

D.F.S.T.	Action Date
805	2
829	14
144	100

24/9/1900
Heinhardt

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSM-3945

SECRET

TO : Chief []

DATE 4 FEB 57 10 33z

FROM : Chief, WE

INFO: Chief []

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/UPSWING
SPECIFIC Travel by UTILITY

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for information

1. According to present plans, UTILITY will make a KUBARK-sponsored visit to PBPRIME the last two weeks of March. His return routing is being arranged at his request to provide one-day stopovers at Lisbon, Madrid and Rome to "pay courtesy calls on the chief of the local services." Since UTILITY will be traveling under an alias, he will be accompanied on the entire trip by a KUBARK officer []. However, [] will not join in the meetings at Lisbon or Madrid and does not plan any contact with KUBARK

2. The purpose of this dispatch is merely to alert you to these plans, which as at present set up do not envisage any participation by either Station. Since KUBARK relations with UPSWING are rather widely known, it is not felt that any security problem results from the fact that KUBARK sponsorship of this trip may be fairly obvious to the liaison services.

3. It is possible that if time permits [] may plan some social affair in connection with this visit, to which [] in view of []'s past interest in introducing [] and the [] UPSWING representative) may be invited. Although our position as stated in OSM-3693 has not changed, we do not feel that it is an important enough issue to emphasize by a refusal of such an invitation if such a refusal would be in any way embarrassing.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

30 January 1957

Distribution:

3 - []
1 - []
1 - RI
1 - EE/G/U

2 - WE/5 (Authenticating officer)

EE/G/U (Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

WE/5

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

C, C/WE

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

WE/5

VIA AIR
Priority Air or Sea Route

DISPATCH NO. BOJ4-22516

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE 8 February 1957

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: COS
Bonn

SUBJECT: GENERAL Operational/USWING
SPECIFIC Roman SCHILLERBERG

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 3.

1. By way of a fishing expedition [] brought up Subject with UTILITY as a person not engaged in various business approaches to the Soviets. UTILITY was told that Subject is reported to visit the Soviet Embassy in Bonn regularly and to associate with an individual in the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. (NOTE: This information is the result of long-standing GDSO coverage. However, in presenting it to UTILITY it was put in the framework of reports from unidentified sources.) Due to UTILITY's former interest in SCHILLERBERG, he was asked if the latter's activities were not connected with or known to USWING since it might prove embarrassing to UTILITY should they become known elsewhere.

2. UTILITY denied any connection directly with SCHILLERBERG for approximately three years. He does see UTILITY's friend, Carl GEIST, occasionally, however. On the other hand, UTILITY does know of a fairly close tie between LEOPOLD and SCHILLERBERG (which, incidentally, LEOPOLD has failed to report to UTILITY). UTILITY then tied in the connection between LEOPOLD and SCHILLERBERG to the then-current visit to West Germany by [] and then cutely topped it all off with a request to [] that we institute intercept coverage on SCHILLERBERG to see what might turn up.

3. Incidentally, UTILITY stated that although he feels that GEIST is a person he can trust, still, by the very nature of his business, however, he comes into contact with all sorts of unsavory and sinister figures. In this respect he requests any and all information which we can furnish him regarding GEIST's activities and contacts in order to assist UTILITY in keeping his nose clean where possible. By the way, GEIST's USWING cryptonym appears to be "SPIRITUS".

DIST:
3-EE
2-COS
2-Bonn

FORM NO. 51-23
Rev 1949

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

009 CT/DB/WS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 14 FEB 57

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FEB 14 0448Z 57

FROM : BONN

IN 46523

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

UTILITY

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

CITE BONN 5108

TO DIR FROM PULL

UPSWING

EMBASSY PRESS ATTACHE QUERIED BY UNITED PRESS WHETHER IT TRUE UTILITY VISITING STATES. WE ADVISED HIM ANSWER EMBASSY AWARE OF TRIP BUT THAT IT UNOFFICIAL. THIS SEEMED PREFERABLE TO DENIAL SINCE WE KNOW THAT CALLIAS HAD LEARNED FROM FOREIGN OFFICE SOURCE THAT LATTER HAD PROCESSED PASSPORT FOR TRIP. WE MUST ASSUME THAT UNITED PRESS HAD SAME TIP. UNITED PRESS CORRESPONDENT, AS CALLIAS BEFORE HIM, WISHED KNOW IF UTILITY TRIP RELATED TO CAUSA'S AND WHETHER THEY WOULD GET-TOGETHER.. WE SAID NO CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

C	1
ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 15 FEB 1957	

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Special or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~OSINT-1005~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief []

FROM : Chief, 48

SUBJECT { GENERAL **UPPERING/Operational**
SPECIFIC **Travel by UTILITY**

DATE 21 FEB 57 11 08 z

DEFO: Chief E

REFERENCE: 0000-3925

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

1. The revised itinerary for UTILITY's return from PAPHOS eliminates the Madrid stopover.

2. The reason given by UTILEY is deciding against stepping in Madrid after Lisbon was that the services of these two countries do not get along too well. He invites the comments of L. on this suggestion.

18 February 1957

Distribution:

3 - F 2
2 - F 16
2 - WE/5
1 - RI
WE/5/E 3/0

RESTRICTED

(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CM:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

ED AND RELEASED BY
TELLIGENCE AGENCY
HODS EXEMPTION 9828
IMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2005

Vol: GEHLEN-207

714 15/00/000
ORIG: E J
UNIT: WE/FI/D
EXT: 2171
DATE: 12 MARCH 57

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	
MAR 14 22 06 '57 REC'D CABLE SECT.			
PRIORITY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	<input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS
OUT 85877			

TO:
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WE 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EE 4, S/C2

TO: E J INFO CITE DIR 07305

UPSWING

FYI UTILITY WILL ARRIVE ROME 30 MARCH FROM BERMUDA AFTER TEN DAY VISIT

U.S.

END OF MESSAGE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD 005 EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

✓ locate Clerk

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE	8 APR 1957
C/RE/4	

C/RE/4

EE/G/U

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

15 MAR 1957

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Visit of GIB Officers to the United States

1. Reference is made to our memorandum (CS CI 8890) dated 1 November 1956 concerning the visit of General Reinhard Gehlen, Chief of the German Intelligence Service, and two of his senior staff officers to the United States. Inasmuch as the November visit of General Gehlen and his group was not completed owing to the international situation, the same group is returning to the United States this month.

2. General Gehlen is traveling under the name Robert Graber. He will be accompanied by Messrs. Eberhard Blum and Kurt Weiss (true names). The group will arrive in New York on Sunday, March 17th, and will proceed directly to Washington. Following four days of discussions with officials of this Agency and meetings with the intelligence chiefs of the military services, they plan to return to New York. They will depart from New York on March 26th. With the exception of a possible one-day trip by Mr. Blum to Boston, no travel outside the New York and Washington areas is planned.

3. During their entire visit, the visitors will be escorted by representatives of this Agency.

CS CI - 3,743,904 //

EE/G/U.E. J :lan
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI
1 - RQM/RC
2 - EE/G/U
✓ 1 - RI

15 March 1957

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

RECEIVED

SECRET

Extract of Memo of Conversation between J. Critchfield and R. Gehlen, 25 March 1957, New York City. Copy filed in UJ DRACO 8.

5. In a philosophical view Gehlen figuratively stepped back from his current problems to note that he had neither military nor political aspirations and asked nothing more of the future than success in developing the GIS into a professional service capable of making a contribution to the cause of the Western World to which Gehlen continues to be dedicated. Noting that the years slip by rapidly and that eventually he would be faced with retirement and the problem of a successor, he stated that Colonel Wessel, his wartime deputy and the last WW II chief of Foreign Armies East, has been and remains his candidate for the position.

(Comment: Gehlen is only 54 years of age; looks younger; appears to be in excellent health in spite of a sensitive gall ailment dating back 13 years. Wessel is approximately 10 years younger than Gehlen.)

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

FILE: R. GEHLEN - 201

SECRET

5/0 - 78/3

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Fouch)

DISPATCH NO. OPIL-1324

61-2-1

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

15 MAR 57 11 56z

TO : Chief

DATE

FROM : Chief, WE

SUBJECT { GENERAL
SPECIFIC

URGENT/
Travel by UTILITY

REFERENCES: OP

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for information

1. The identity of UTILITY is being forwarded under separate cover.
2. Since the writing of references UTILITY's visit to has been cancelled, apparently due to some hitch between URGENT and the German Embassy in

20 March 1957

Enclosure: UNDER SEPARATE COVER
Identity

Distribution:

3 - WE, W/anal

2 - WE/5

1 - RI

WE/5/5 1/61

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1 C/WE

(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

AC/WE/5

(Authenticating officer)


SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Der Präsident
des Bundesnachrichtendienstes

München, den 4 April 1957



Dear Mr. Dulles:

May I extend to you my heartiest and most sincere wishes for your birthday and wish you health and continuing success for your responsible task during the next years of your life.

I would like to take this opportunity to enclose my kindest thanks for your cordial hospitality my co-workers and I enjoyed during our stay over there. The excellent briefings revealed to me an impressive picture of the manifold tasks and the successful work of your service. As a result of the given insight and the various discussions I received instructive suggestions for the further extension and build-up of the Bundesnachrichtendienst.

I do hope to have the pleasure to welcome you, dear Mr. Dulles, as my guest in the same spirit of friendship here in Munich at a time which is convenient to you.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

Sincerely yours,

R. Schlenker
(Schlenker)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1957 10 3 15 14 21

16 APR 1957

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Letters received by General Reinhard GEHLEN
from Jack HEARNE

1. General Reinhard GEHLEN, Chief of the German Intelligence Service, has for some time been receiving letters signed by one Jack HEARNE and post marked from Los Vegas, Nevada. These letters appear to be the work of a person not completely in control of his senses. It is believed that the contents of these letters will be of interest to your Bureau, especially since in one letter HEARNE makes an accusation of possible treason against an unidentified alleged member of the U. S. Air Force. A picture which HEARNE claims is of the alleged airman is attached to this letter. The complete collection of letters as received from General GEHLEN is attached for your retention.

2. General GEHLEN has stated that he knows nothing about HEARNE other than through this one-way correspondence. GEHLEN has requested traces on HEARNE.

3. Files of this Agency contain the following information on a John M. HEARNE. On 28 February 1944 the Office of Strategic Services requested the services of one John M. HEARNE, Pvt., Serial Number 39612691, Army Air Corps, to be used as a lithographer. Correspondence from the Air Corps showed that HEARNE was not available as he had been released from active service on May 29, 1943. Air Corps records indicated that HEARNE was accepted into the Air Corps while residing at 1963 Lowell Ave., Butte, Montana.

4. It is requested that the Bureau furnish this Agency with any information which may be developed on HEARNE. Please indicate which portions of this information may be passed to General GEHLEN.

CS CI - 3,744,396

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS INDEXING

Attachment: Letters to General GEHLEN
from Jack HEARNE

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - CI

1 - RI

1 - RQM/RC

2 - EE/G/U

RI COPY SECRET

EE/G/U/L

11 Apr 57

NO INDEXING

FILE-IN

100-002-0821

169448

~~SECRET~~

FRAN INFO: DIR BONN

ROUTINE

PULL

7465

6 MAY 57

PLT

UPSWING

GEHLEN PHOTOGRAPH TO APPEAR THIS WEEK'S WELT BILD. ALIAS WINTERSTEIN
TRYING TO KILL.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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WFO

SECRET

240-8. GEHLEN, Reinhard

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Route)

DISPATCH NO. EGLW-3359

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

32-2-1
1 MAY 1957

TO : Chief of Base, Pullach

DATE

Info: Chief of Station, Germany

FROM : Chief, EE

SUBJECT { GENERAL : Operational
SPECIFIC : UTILITY Request for General Sibert's address

During UJDEACO 8 [] asked that we find out General Sibert's address for UTILITY. The address is: (Major General) Edwin L. Sibert, RFD 23, Vineyard Haven, Mass.

MICROFILMED

FEB 14 1962

DOC. MICRO. SER.

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SOURCE METHOOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Distributions:
2-Pullach (DIRECT)
2-Frankfurt
1-BJ
2-E/G/U
ES:lan
15 May 1957

(Releasing officer)
EE/G/U

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)
EE/G/U

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Attach EG-2A 23960

7 June 1957

M/R

SUBJECT: UTILITY Visit to BRUECKE

1. On 9 May 1957 [] invited UTILITY to make his first official visit and inspection of BRUECKE. He was given a complete tour of the entire establishment and surrounding grounds. I am happy to report that his reaction was enthusiastic from the time he entered through the electrically operated door (he immediately told @ HARTWIG to duplicate it for UPSWING in the Nikolaus Compound), through his inspection of the conference rooms, the library-theater, the dining, living and barrooms, to the Sauna (incidentally paid for by UPSWING as their contribution) and Reports Reproduction offices. I took the occasion to have a discussion with UTILITY over lunch in conference room #1 after which separate briefings on Security and ELINT were held with [] and [] and @ BERNHARD and @ SCHWARZ joining us.

2. UTILITY found the lunch most appetizing (we arranged a light menu reflecting his personal preferences) and the atmosphere ideal for discussions. He was completely relaxed and articulate. What he especially liked about it, he said, was the proximity to his office but the freedom from interruptions even from telephone calls as well.

3. Regarding the social side he recalled that his daughter had thoroughly enjoyed herself at our New Year's Eve Party held at BRUECKE and went on to say that he thought it was an ideal place for larger scale entertaining of his people with maximum security. He carefully inspected the Sauna, recalled the comfort it used to bring in wartime, and declared he hoped to avail himself of its use.

4. He was particularly pleased with the Reports Reproduction facilities.

5. Speaking of the place as a whole he stated that everything appeared to be secure, appropriate and useful and that there was no reason in his mind why we could not maintain the place as a meeting point for several years to come.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DIST:
2-UPSWING Desk
1-COS
1-001
1-File

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SECRET

COPY

File:
201 R. Geller

SECRET

Filed ECLA 23960

7 June 1957

M/R

SUBJECT: UTILITY's Foto in Weltbild

1. UTILITY reports that UPSWING learned that originally it was planned to publish his foto in Quick magazine. After @ WINTERSTEIN conveyed the idea to Quick that the High Court might regard this as an insecure if not treasonable act, Quick decided to forego publication in favor of its affiliated tabloid, Weltbild's publishing of a somewhat blurred version.

2. Subsequently, it was learned that the photographer was one Inu WOLLER, approximately 26 years old, who is a member of the Junge Union of the CDU. The negatives, they believe, are on file at the editorial offices of Quick.

(NOTE: According to L J, Quick and Weltbild share editorial offices.)

3. In the meantime, L J, at L J's request, had been discreetly investigating the matter through some personal journalistic connections. His findings had not been conclusive. They included three possible culprits as the picture-takers, one of whom has the same last name as a secretary in the Bundeskanzleramt. UTILITY was very interested in this possibility and, mentioning that CAUSA was disturbed at the idea of the foto having been made in the BKA, he stated confidentially that the security of the BKA is a matter for UPSWING and not CAVATA.

4. UPSWING's findings disclosed that an alleged Associated Press representative is dickering for the purchase of the negatives. L J told UTILITY that we might be able to purchase them. UTILITY jumped at this prospect. Actually, it may be that the alleged AP purchaser represents L J's clandestine attempt. We shall wait and see.

5. Incidentally, apart from the security of the BKA involvement (since it is probable that some leak exists there which tipped off UTILITY's presence the day the fotos were snapped) and apart from what would be the normal, sanguine attitude of most Americans (including KUBARK) on this matter, UTILITY's strong feelings are somewhat understandable. For one thing, his "mysteriousness", "elusiveness", "publicity-shy", "thousand-faces" aura are part of his stock-in-trade with Bonn and the Federal Ministries. He claims it has stood him in good stead and strangely or otherwise has contributed to the degree of respect with which they treat him. For another, he feels that ~~there is~~

DIST.
2-UPSWING Desk
1-COS
1-801
1-File

SECRET

COPY

FILE

201 R. Gellows

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SECRET

- 2 -

his position is quite unlike that of Robert A. Ascham who represents a Giant KUBARK compared to a Pigmy UPSWING and who does, by the very nature of the FBPRIME world commitments and size of its intelligence community, play a public and overt role. In addition, Ascham enjoys the moral strength of the FBPRIME might to protect him as well as a superior security service and secure transportation facilities. On UTILITY's part, however, the situation is far different. It boils down to the fact that there is a price on his head; he is a target for enemy assassination and being located in Europe as Chief of a service in a divided nation, he is most vulnerable to physical danger. In keeping with this, and since he has to travel incognito frequently by public transportation he is desirous that he not be readily recognizable by every Thom, Richard and Heinrich. Also, it is not just the enemy he worries about but also the freedom-loving West German press representatives who might easily stumble across him in the many trains and Bahnhofs he utilizes in his travels.

6. Further information will be reported as learned.

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SECRET

SECRET
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CABLE NOTE

TO: FRAN []

FROM: PULL []

CONFIRMATION:

INFORMATION:

PRECEDENCE:

DATE:

MESSAGE OUT NUMBER:

TYPIST'S INITIALS:

PRIORITY
20 JUNE 57

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60A-AR-380

1. UTILITY WILL ARRIVE AT SCHIERSTEINERSTRASSE MAIN GATE TO LINDSAY AIR BASE CIRCA 0945 HOURS IN BLACK 220 MERCEDES WITH LICENSE NUMBER AB-634291.
2. HE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS "DR SCHNEIDER". HE WILL HAVE A DRIVER ^{who} WITH HIM. ~~HE~~ SHOULD ALSO BE FED IF LUNCH ON THE SCHEDULE.
3. UTILITY'S EATS LIGHT LUNCH WITHOUT WINE PREFERS MINERAL WATER OR JUICE WITH MEAL AND SANKA NOT COFFEE AFTER. IF COCKTAILS SERVED HE DRINKS JUICE OR COCA-COLA. LIKES A GOOD CIGAR. (SO DO I).

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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AWC-002478

SECRET

TOD:

DE-000000

OWC

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

IT IS PROHIBITED TO MAKE OR POUCH COPIES OF THIS CABLE

240/GEHLEN, REINHARD

SECRET

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CABLE NOTE

To: FRAN ☒ WIES ☐

PRECEDENCE:

PRIORITY

From: PULL ☐ ☒

DATE: 20 JUNE 57

CONFIRMATION:

MESSAGE OUT NUMBER:

INFORMATION:

TYPIST'S INITIALS:

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle at

Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60 A AR-380.5

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

IMMEDIATE HANDLING

1. PER ☐ ☒ REQUEST FOLLOWING THUMBNAIL SKETCHES (PARAS 2, 3 AND 4) SHOULD BE PASSED TO COL ROGERS TODAY BY WIES IN CONNECTION WITH TOMORROW'S MEETING. PARA 5 IS FOR ☐ ☒ INFO ONLY AND SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE PASSED TO COL ROGERS BY WIES.

2. GEN REINHARD GEHLEN, PRESENT CHIEF AND ORGANIZER WEST GERMAN FEDERAL INTEL SERVICE (BND) IS PROFESSIONAL ARMY OFFICER SERVING IN SENIOR CAPACITY IN INTEL SINCE 42. COMMISSIONED 23 AS ARTILLERY LT. GRADUATED WITH FIRST CLASS AT WAR ACADEMY BERLIN IN 35 AND ASSIGNED GERMAN GENERAL STAFF. SERVED POLISH CAMPAIGN AS MAJOR. SHORTLY AFTER BEGINNING RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, GEHLEN ASSIGNED AS CHIEF FREMDE HEERE OST OKH. INTERNECINE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ABWEHR AND RSHA CREATED NECESSITY FOR FREMDE HEERE OST TO SHIFT FROM EVALUATIONS TYPE UNIT TO UNIT ENGAGED IN COLLECTION. WITH DISINTEGRATION GERMAN POSITION IN EAST, GEHLEN ORDERED FILES EVACUATED TO REAR AREAS AND FINALLY CACHED IN BAVARIAN ALPS. SENIOR STAFF MEMBERS ORIENTED AND PLANS FOR REACTIVATION MADE. AT APPROPRIATE MOMENT AFTER GERMAN SURRENDER, GEHLEN ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF U.S. INTEL AND FINALLY INVITED TO U.S. SUMMER 45. UNOFFICIAL GEHLEN ORG ESTABLISHED IN FRANKFURT AFTER GEHLEN'S RETURN BUT EVENTUALLY MOVED TO PULLACH. BASICALLY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TO:

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

IT IS PROHIBITED TO MAKE OR POUCH COPIES OF THIS CABLE

240/GEHLEN, REINHARD *Ret to 801*

SECRET

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TO:

PRECEDENCE:

FROM:

DATE:

CONFIRMATION:

PAGE 2

MESSAGE OUT NUMBER:

INFORMATION:

TYPIST'S INITIALS:

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60 A AR-380-5

ORG WAS HELD IN TRUST BY U.S. UNTIL WEST GERMAN GOVT COULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY OVER. THIS EVENT OCCURRED APRIL 56 WHEN ORG LEGALIZED AS BND WITH GEHLEN AS CHIEF. CORRECT CURRENT TITLE IS: PRAESIDENT DES BUNDESNACHRICHTENDIENSTES, GEN MAJOR, A.D.

3. COL WERNER BOIE, PRESENT CHIEF WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE INTEL AND FORMER LUFTWAFFE MAJOR. SERVED GERMAN ARMED FORCES 1936 TO 45, FIRST IN ARTILLERY AND THEN AS A COMBAT PILOT RUSSIAN FRONT AND FINALLY ON STAFF OF FREMDE HEERE OST FOR AIR INTEL. BRIT PW. REJOINED GEHLEN ORG 47, SERVED AS CHIEF, EVALUATION SECTION FOR AIR INTEL UNTIL HE REENTERED WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE IN 55. SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH AND SOME FRENCH. FRIENDLY DISPOSITION AND DEMOCRATIC TOLERANT ATTITUDES. RELEASED BY GEHLEN TO TAKE PRESENT JOB AT REQUEST OF THEN DEF MIN BLANK. STILL ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH BND AND IN FACT IS NOMINAL CHIEF OF BND AIR EVALUATIONS.

4. ALBERT PRAUN, FORMER LT GEN AND COMMANDING GEN OF GERMAN ARMY SIGNAL CORPS. ENTERED GERMAN ARMY 1913 AND MAINTAINED CONTINUOUS SERVICE TIL 45. HOLDS RITTER KREUZ DECORATION. COMMANDED INFANTRY DIVISION 42. JOINED BND LATE SUMMER 56 AS CHIEF, COMMO DIV. REPLACED FORMER CHIEF, COMMO DIV, BND, WHO CURRENTLY COMMANDING GENERAL GERMAN ARMY SIG CORPS, BRIG GEN HEF1. BETWEEN 51-56 PRAUN ENGAGED IN MIL PLANNING FOR SIG CORPS NEW WEST GERMAN ARMY. SPEAKS NO ENGLISH.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

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SECRET

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO: PRECEDENCE:
FROM: DATE:
CONFIRMATION: PAGE 3 MESSAGE OUT NUMBER:
INFORMATION: TYPISTS INITIALS:

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle at Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60 A AR-380

IS TAKING BERLITZ COURSES.

POSSIBLY UNDERSTANDS SOME./ APPARENTLY CONGENIAL BUT HANDICAPPED BECAUSE HARD
OF HEARING. IS CONSIDERED VERY HIGHLY BY FORMER GEN STAFF OFFICERS, AS "GRAND-
DADDY" GERMAN SIG CORPS. AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER HAD LEADING GERMAN MILITARY
FIGURES UNDER HIS INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDING HEPP, GEHLEN, AND POSSIBLY KAMMHUBER.

5. FOR []: RE LINE TO BE TAKEN BY ROGERS AS DISCUSSED WITH ME. GEHLEN
HAS NO OBJECTION. TOLD HIM WE COULD ADVISE ROGERS NOT DO SO IF GEHLEN PREFERRED
BUT HE FEELS THIS WILL FIT IN NICELY WITH HIS PRESENCE AT MEETING AND WILL
HANDLE IT IN MANNER AIMED AT EFFECTING PROPER COORDINATION AND PREVENTING UN-
NECESSARY FRICTION. WE SHALL SEE. INCIDENTALLY VIS-A-VIS OUR (KUBARK) AND OUR
JOINT (KUBARK-BND) ROLE AT MEETING CONCURS IN FOUR POINTS YOU AND I DISCUSSED.

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SECRET

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOD:

OWC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	
FROM BONN 5625	PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
TO PULL INFO FRAN DIR	DATE 10 JULY 57
ACTION	MESSAGE IN NO. 1535
INFORMATION	TYPIST'S INITIALS GAF

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5.

AMB WILL SEE UTILITY PRIVATELY AT RESIDENCE 1800 HOURS 19 JULY.
 I TO ACCOMPANY. SUGGEST I PICK UP UTILITY AT PLACE
 YOU DESIGNATE. PLS ALSO GIVE ME ESTIMATE WHAT TOPICS UTILITY MAY
 WANT DISCUSS WITH AMB.

DECLASSIFICATION

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DIST.	Action	Info
801		7
829		
CAUTIONED: File: 1875		

S-E-C-R-E-T

TOR

10/0800Z

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BORN

ROUTINE

PULL

INFO: FRAN DER

18 JULY 57

8051

UPSWING

REF: BORN 5625

1. UTILITY HAS NOTHING PARTICULAR DISCUSS HOWEVER WILL BE PREPARED
CHAT ABOUT FOLLOWING:

- A. FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS.
- B. CPSU CHANGES AND MEANING.
- C. CONTACT WITH RUSSIAN COMMUNITY BORN.

2. WOULD LIKE US TELL AMB HE AVAILABLE AS SPECIAL CHANNEL TO CHANCELLOR
IF AMB SHOULD PREFER NOT USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL ON ANY OCCASION.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

File

SECRET

OWC

OWC

Ref 109

DIR INFO: FRAN BONN

PULL 8069

ROUTINE

19 JULY 57

UTILITY REQUESTED ☐ ☒ EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL GRATITUDE FOR KIND AND
ENCOURAGING REMARKS MADE ABOUT UPSWING BY ASCHAM IN LATTER'S RECENT TALK WITH
UPTHRUST IN STATES.

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SOURCE/MET 1076 EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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SECRET

OWC


OWC

FILE: 240 GEHLEN

Reinhard

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
GERMAN I.S. RELATIONS TRIP TO WEST GERMANY <i>EE/118</i>		2. RI FILE NO.	043	005	009
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE	
		OIRA-14376		22 JUL 57	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
14. UPON THE INVITATION OF GENERAL GEHLEN, HEAD OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SERVIZIO FEDERALE D'INFORMAZIONI), WENT TO MUNICH FROM THE 20 TO THE 23 OF MAY 1957 WITH FOR A CONTACT WITH THE GERMAN SERVICE. SOME DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD WITH GEN. GEHLEN AND SEVERAL OF HIS ASSOCIATES IN THE GENERAL'S PRIVATE HOME, AND OTHERS WERE CONDUCTED BY VARIOUS EXPERTS OF THE GERMAN SERVICE AND FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSIONS, IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE. SEE DOCUMENT FOR RECAP OF DISCUSSIONS.					
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 					

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SOURCE SWET 1316 EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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SECRET

Extract from EGQA 91199, 23 July 1957, []

Letter from [] to []

3. Finally an essentially EE point but being an expression of a SMOOTHER view I am including it here. Please discuss it with [] along with the previous point. SMEDDUM stated that the SMOOTHERS continue to have some worries about UTILITY's capacities in the area of management within the executive department or as I have written [] "jungle warfare". He mentioned having watched UTILITY during a dinner in Bonn attended by SMOOTHER representatives and a few Germans including CAUSA. He said that UTILITY's attitude toward CAUSA was somewhat like that of the small schoolboy in the presence of a potent headmaster. Needless to say, this was hardly encouraging. Despite this, however, the SMOOTHERS decided, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, since they feel that UTILITY is the best available bet.

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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File

Reinhardt Geller 201

SECRET

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGLA 24 558

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 31 July 57

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COS

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of letter to Robert A. Ascham
from UTILITY

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a sealed letter from UTILITY to Robert A. Ascham. A copy of the text was furnished for C and C's information.

2. Regarding the second paragraph therein C was queried by UTILITY as to when Ascham might next be coming to Europe, specifically Germany. C replied he had no information (the truth) but recalled to UTILITY that Ascham, during the course of UJDRACO VIII, had remarked that there was a possibility of a visit this fall.

ATT: 1
Envelope for Ascham

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DIST
3 EE, w/1 att under s/c - To C
2 COS, w/1 att " "

per Bull Manifest #12

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

BEST COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE :

249 HM/JM/SW / *RA*

20 SEP 57

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 20 1804Z 57

ROUTINE

IN 12792

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ☐ ☐

ACTION: * EE 6

INFO : COP, A/DD/P/P, FI/RI 2, NEA 4, S/C 2

TO DIR

INFO

PULL

CITE

E 3206 *SW*

RE PULL 8570 (IN 11667) **

UTILITY

REF RECEIVED E 1700Z HOURS 19 SEPT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Sum* ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR NYXIS USED.
 O**UTILITY SUMMONED TO MEET WITH KING SAUD 1700 HOURS 18 SEPT.

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 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

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PS 6 SEP 1957

1	2
3	4
5	6
DATE 20 Sep 57	

S-E-C-R-E-T

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C-32539

Form No. **831** Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

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CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. 25247

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 9 October 1957

FROM : Chief, Munich Base

INFO: COS
Bonn

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/UPSWING

SPECIFIC— 1958 UTILITY Visit to Headquarters

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 4

1. In keeping with the ASCHAM/UTILITY desires mutually expressed in their last two meetings, UTILITY is already beginning to talk about his 1958 visit to Headquarters. He speaks tentatively of February or March as a most suitable time from his point of view. This is partly influenced by his need to be on hand in Germany at the start of the new fiscal year on 1 April. In this connection and as part of his overall buttering-up of the Bundesrechnungshof he asks that the President of that monied body, Dr. Hertel—former chief of the Customs Police— be allowed to accompany him. All expenses for both parties would be paid by UPSWING. Possibly, wives would accompany.

2. Although it is too early to speak of any firm agenda at this time, such a visit would be centered chiefly around talks with Robert A. ASCHAM, []
[], Fletcher M. Knight and []. Specific topics for discussion will probably jell between now and then, but will undoubtedly include ME cooperation, PP Activities, PM proposals, and the political situation in general. Certainly an item of value would be to arrange for UTILITY to meet with one or two high level ODACID or other important governmental officials as a means of broadening and influencing UTILITY vis-a-vis PBPRIME.

3. Regarding Hertel, it is not so easy to speculate. Judging from the difficulties involved in the proposed von Streit visit, Hertel's accompanying UTILITY may make the latter's visit to a large extent unmanageable. Please let us know your views on this so that we can inform UTILITY sufficiently ahead of time.

4. Despite UTILITY's intention to pay his own way as he goes it is deemed necessary that he be escorted especially in view of his continuing desire to travel under an assumed name and just for security reasons in general. For this purpose it is recommended that Headquarters agree in principle to this visit at least by UTILITY and that [] be named the escort officer in view of []'s previous trip (s), his dropping out of the Liaison picture shortly after UTILITY will have returned, and []'s continuing ability to follow up on what may transpire during such a trip.

Distribution:

13 - EE
2 - COS

2 - Bonn

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DATE 2005

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Report of Meeting Between General Gehlen and King Zahir of Afghanistan

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. On 23 September 1957 General Gehlen, President of the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst, was received in audience by King Zahir of Afghanistan. We have been requested by General Gehlen to provide the DCI a copy of Gehlen's report on the audience. A translation of the report is attached.

15/
JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
Chief, Eastern European Division

ATTACHMENT:
General Gehlen's report

cc: DDCI

16 October 1957 EE/G/U/ ict

DISTRIBUTION:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI w/o att.
1 - C/EE w/o att.
~~1 - EE/G/U~~
2 - EE/G/U

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTED
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

SECRET

EE/G/U

20 Oct 57

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Letter from General Gehlen and Report
of Gehlen's Recent Meeting with King Saud

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. Transmitted herewith is a letter from General Reinhard Gehlen, President of the West German Federal Intelligence Service, concerning his recent interview with King Saud of Saudi Arabia. Attached to the letter is a copy of the report on the meeting made by General Gehlen to the West German Federal Chancellor. A translation of the report is also provided.
3. Inclosure 2 contains a series of questions provided in a KURARK brief which unfortunately only arrived subsequent to the interview between General Gehlen and King Saud. The answers were supplied afterwards on the basis of the meeting discussion by General Gehlen's adjutant, who was present at the meeting.
4. The essence of the attached report was previously received by cable and received appropriate limited dissemination.

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
Chief, Eastern European Division

ATTACHMENT:
Letter from General Gehlen

cc: DDCI

24 October 1957 EE/G/U/C JHolt

30

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FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ONCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

AL Monthly Report of Liaison to Official West German Agencies
Month of November 1957

4. (SECRET) Miscellaneous

a. Cooperation and Coordination Between FRG Police, Security and Intelligence Agencies

(1) A meeting to foster better relations between the various levels of criminal police involved with cases of "political significance" was held in GOSLAR on 24, 25 and 26 October 1957. The prime objective was to supply officials of the various agencies with the opportunity to discuss mutual problems of cooperation and coordination.

(2) Lectures were given by Dr. Ernst BRUECKNER, SG chief, President SCHRUEBBER of the BfV, BfV officials Dr. KOLLAU and Lorenz BESSEMER, General GEHLEN of the BND, Lt Col Armin FOX of MAD, LFV Chief HOFFMAN and others. Each spoke primarily on his own organization and problems confronted in its operations.

(3) Invitations to attend the meeting were extended by the Federal Interior Minister to the State Interior Ministers, who are responsible for internal security affairs within the several states. In most cases, representatives from the State Interior Ministries, the State Criminal Police Agencies and the State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution attended the gathering. In addition, Federal representatives were present from the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal Intelligence Service and the Military Counter Intelligence Service.

(4) A police official stated that he did not think the meeting had really accomplished the purpose he felt it had been set up for. He felt that it was to be a meeting for operational personnel to iron out problems of mutual assistance on the routine and everyday level. It was felt that the presence of so many highly-placed officials ("Bonzon") had discouraged a "working-level" meeting. Nevertheless, the gathering did give the various officials the opportunity to outline the roles of their various organizations and their views on cooperation and coordination between the services. The officials were also given the opportunity to mingle with one another on "neutral" ground, which may have tendered a better acquaintance and understanding of one another.

b. Release by Criminal Police and the State Criminal Offices of Information to American Agencies

(1) At a regular meeting of the Landeskriminalamt ("LKA") chiefs it was decided that a more detailed and far-reaching distribution of information to American agencies is needed to insure military security.

(2) Discussion concerned the types of information to be included in releases to allied agencies. Three general categories evolved, including:

(a) information which would normally appear on the Strafregister (register of punishments.)

Page 10 of 16 Pages

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

K. GEHLEN-207

DATE 351/HM/JM /BV
8 NOV 57

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 8 2036Z 57

PRIORITY

IN 32763

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HEIDELBERG

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, FI/RI, S/C 2

TO (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE) INFO (PRIORITY) FRAN (PRIORITY) BRLN CITE
PULL DIR

HEID 1891

RE PULL 8981 (IN 32598) *

1. G 2 HAD NOTHING CONFIRM OR DENY REPORT PULL 8958 (IN 31261) AND
SO INDICATED TO [] MORNING 6 NOV. HE HAD SENT SAME REPORT ONLY
EARLIER AND IN GREATER DETAIL.

2. G 2 PUT REQUIREMENT ON FIELD UNITS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS TO
DATE.

END OF MESSAGE

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CS COMMENT:

*PULL ADVISED THAT UTILITY PERSONALLY MOST CONCERNED OVER COMPLETE LACK
RESPONSE TO HIS REPORT THAT PREPARATIONS WERE BEING MADE FOR LARGE SCALE
MOVEMENTS IN BRLN AREA.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

INITIALS	
DATE PRO	
ENCLOSURE	
DATE OF DOCUMENT	INDEX

S-E-C-R-E-T

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA _____
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ECMW-5271
201-19358

CLASSIFICATION

DEC 11 1957

TO Chief of Base, Munich
ATTN: Liaison Section
FROM Chief, EE

DATE _____

INFO: COG, Germany

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/UPSWING
SPECIFIC 1958 UTILITY Visit to Headquarters

REFERENCE: EGIA-25247

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 4.

1. The wedding date for [] would appear to be the fact ultimately governing the timing of a 1958 UTILITY visit to the U.S. The date of her return to Germany was indefinite when I last saw her in New York City. In a recent telephone conversation with me she confirmed her intention of spending the entire Christmas holidays with us but made no further statement regarding her travel plans. She knows that I am traveling to Europe at the end of January and at one point talked about timing her own trip to coincide with mine. UTILITY may have more recent information on this point.

2. I can personally work up no enthusiasm at all for the idea of Hertel accompanying UTILITY --- particularly since we expect to pretty well use up our ammunition on the comptroller question on the @Kuehne, @Wendt and von Streit visit in January.

3. I will not be back until the end of February according to my tentative plan and would not recommend an early March date for UTILITY's trip. In fact, since he saw Ascham so recently in Germany, I have hoped that we could delay UTILITY's next visit until late spring at the earliest. I suspect that at this point a good deal of this iceberg remains hidden below the water, since [] once murmured something about UTILITY coming to New York prior to her departure. All of this leaves us very much up in the air, but I will write you again after I pin [] down on her plans.

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(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

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SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

ECGW-5271

4. If UTILITY pursues the idea of bringing Hertel with him, would you elicit from UTILITY his very specific and detailed ideas on briefings and entertainment that he would consider suitable in terms of both the protocol and professional factors. By the latter I mean simply the fact that there are many things that KUBARK will openly discuss with UTILITY which we would not undertake to discuss with anyone outside of the profession --- and this has nothing to do with security.

4 December 1957

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD

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- 2 - GCS, Germany
- ✓ 1 - RI
- 1 - C/EE
- 1 - EE/G/UPSWING

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EE/G/UPSWING

C.E.P.
my

C/EE/Germany

SPW

C/EE

S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS : [redacted] NAME : GEHLEN, Reinhard
BIRTHDATE : 3 Apr. 1902 ALIAS : UTILITY, Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER,
Richard GARNER, Robert CONTARD,
Hans HOLBEIN, Dr. GROSS, Dr. ERNST
BIRTHPLACE : Erfurt, Thuringia, V # : [redacted]
RESIDENCE : Berg a/Starnberger See TELEPHONE # : (Sep. 1967) (STARNBERG) - 08151-5819
Bonn, Koblenzer Str. 139-141 (Jan 63) VEHICLE : gray Mercedes 220 SE - lic. MPT - 283
RELIGION : Protestant LICENSE #(s) : [redacted]

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AS OF 1958

HEIGHT : 1.74 m. (5'8 1/2")
WEIGHT : 72 kgs. (ca 159)
EYES : blue
HAIR : dark blond
balding
PHOTO DATE: ca. 1957



BUILD: medium
TEETH: [redacted]
OTHER: glasses - small
mustache - mil. bearing -
looks young for age

Reinhard Gehlen

FAMILY BACKGROUND

FATHER : Walther Gehlen DOB/POB: 24 July 1871, Koblenz - dec. 1943
MOTHER : Katharina Gehlen nee von DOB/POB: 12 June 1881 - dec. 1921
Vaernewyck
SPOUSE : Herta Gehlen (married 31) DOB/POB: 17 Apr. 1904, Leobschmetz/Silesia
(nee: von Seydlitz-Kurzbach)
C : Katharina DOB/POB: 34 (19 Jan) Berlin
[redacted] DOB/POB: 37 (11 Feb) [redacted]
[redacted] DOB/POB: 43 (28 Feb) [redacted]

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGMA 31509

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 20 January 1958

FROM : Chief, Munich Base

INFO: COS,
Bonn

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/UPSWING/UJDRACO

SPECIFIC— 1958 UTILITY Visit to Headquarters

Reference: EGMW 5271; ECLA 25247

1. UTILITY is postponing his visit to the middle of June 1958. He would still like to have Herr Hertel ☐ (Guido HERTEL, president of Bundesrechnungshof) accompany him for his own reasons. Apparently UTILITY has committed himself (and us). However, he feels that the briefing for Hertel need only be a one day affair on the problems of an intelligence agency that should be of concern to the top governmental finance official. The remainder of Hertel's time should be devoted to sightseeing--perhaps a tour of the U.S. Treasury, Münt, etc., if possible, accompanied by a KUBARK Admin type. If not, MB/LD would suggest @MERKER.

2. In any event, since the trip has been postponed until June, we will discuss the details together with UTILITY during ☐ 's visit to Munich in February next.

APPROVED man

Distribution:

3 - EE
2 - COS
2 - Bonn

OWC:bck

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Executive Registry
10-2217

-Der Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes

February, 5, 1958

Dear Mr. Dulles,

The members of my staff, Herr Kühne and Herr Wendt, as well as Ministerialrat Dr. Freiherr von Streit of the Bundesrechnungshof, having safely returned from their trip to the United States, I would like to thank you sincerely not only for the kind reception extended to these gentlemen, but in particular for the valuable briefing given by the gentlemen of your staff.

This special knowledge received made it possible to give a number of interesting hints and suggestions to our various departments such as personnel, training, organization, budget etc., which will all serve to improve our service.

Herr von Streit too has asked me to convey to you his sincere thanks for the interesting briefings on budget-matters.

In concluding my letter I would like to ascertain the fact that this journey has undoubtedly again furthered the understanding between our services.

With kind regards I am, dear Mr. Dulles,

sincerely yours,

Reinhold Gillen

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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047 CWT/WCJ/
DATE 31 MAR 58

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	<i>file</i>	4	<i>Bd</i>
2	<i>file</i>	5	
3	<i>Ch rods</i>	6	

APR 1 0828Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 10781

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MUNICH

ACTION: DCI

INFO .D/DCI, COP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, S/C 2

TO DIR

INFO

CITE

MUNI 6448

UPSWING

ASCHAM MAY WISH SEND GEHLEN BIRTHDAY CONGRATULATIONS 3 APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

Done - file 201 Gehlen

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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581 LB/S *ch/fom web/o*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : *E* *(Rewritten by C/EE)*
 UNIT : *EE/q/u*
 EXT : *528*
 DATE : *1 APRIL 1958* *281*

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	<i>EE/G</i>	4	
2	<i>EE/G</i>	5	<i>CEE</i>
3	<i>Cham</i>	6	<i>CSP</i>
<p><i>Apr 2 20 1425U</i> REC'D CABLE SECT.</p>			
ACTION	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	<i>X</i> ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS
			<i>OUT 61898</i>

TO : *MINICH, FRANKFURT*
 FROM : DIRECTOR
 CONF : *EE 6*
 INFO : *DCI, D/DCI, COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2*

Liaison/RF

TO *MINI* INFO *FRAN* CITE DIR *15572*

UPSWING

1
 REQUEST YOU CONVEY TO UTILITY CONGRATULATIONS ON OCCASION HIS BIRTHDAY
 1
 AND BEST WISHES FOR FUTURE FROM ASCHAM AND UTILITY'S MANY OTHER FRIENDS HERE AT
 HQS. ASCHAM LOOKING FORWARD WITH GREAT PLEASURE TO COMING VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

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 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

E *E*
 CHIEF, EE DIVISION
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

R. Gellman 201
 AUTHENTICATING *Logg*

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174 LMG/KAC/12/12
DATE 05 APR 58

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 5 1905Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 13050

TO DIRECTOR
FROM MUNICH
ACTION: DCI
INFO * D/DCI, COP, C/EE 3, S/C 2

1) ~~10076~~
2) ~~10076~~

TO DIR (ASCHAM)
UPSWING

INFO

CITE

MUNI 6575

FOLLOWING RECEIVED UTILITY TO ASCHAM:

"I WISH TO EXTEND MY BEST CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU ON OCCASION OF YOUR BIRTHDAY WITH THE WISHES FROM ALL OF US. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEE YOU SOON. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR CABLE AND YOUR WISHES."

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

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file 201 Zehle

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

S-E-C-R-E-T

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SECRET

EXHA-34010

Chief, EE

29 April 1958

Chief of Base, Munich

INFO: COS

UP3WDN3/Operations

Transmittal of Announcement

Attached USC, for Robert A. ASCHAM, is an announcement of the wedding of UTILITY's daughter, which is scheduled for 8 May 1958.

APPROVED: _____

Attachment:

Wedding Announcement USC

Distribution:

- 3 - EE w/att USC
- 2 - COS w/o att.

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file

SECRET

~~240-UTILITY~~

240. GEHLEN, Reinhardt

(When Filled In)

FORM NO. 772 USE PREVIOUS
1 AUG 56 EDITIONS.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

S E C R E T

Chief, WE
 Attch: Chief, Italian Branch
 Chief, C

6 August 1958

INFO: Chief, EE
 JCS, Frankfurt

Operational/CE

Inu*GHELEN

Source: [] 19 July 1958

1. On 17 July 1958, Ingeborg WIEGAND, a physiotherapist now in Rome and a friend of [] and of his wife, told Source that, about the early part of July 1958, she saw Johann GHELEN's brother in Rome. He was under cover of a business man. Although WIEGAND knew GHELEN's brother, whose first name is not known, in Germany, and they apparently were on speaking terms, GHELEN chose not to recognize her and she was somewhat mystified and possibly a little hurt at being snubbed. This was the first time she had seen him in Italy.
2. Later, WIEGAND learned from her friend, Lydia DOLMITCO, a German nurse who has been living in Rome for many years, that she, too, had seen GHELEN who requested that she not greet him or recognize him in public.
3. According to WIEGAND, GHELEN is very close to his famous brother, Johann, who always sends the former on special missions, under cover of engineer, and under a long list of various aliases, when there is something very important afoot, either as supervisor or inspector, it is presumed, of German IS activities in certain areas of Europe.

Distribution:
 Wash-3
 Frankfurt-2
 Files-3

hww

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 DATE 2005

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ORIGINAL FILED IN []

SECRET

EGMA-36781

27 August 1958

Chief []

Chief of Base, Munich

UPSWING/Operations

Secretary to Dr. Heinz-Gunter ANGER

INFO: COS, []
COS, Germany
EE
SE

REFERENCES: A. EGMA-30505 (not to []) 4/501- Angew. Heinz
B. EGMA-20818, 27 Sep 56 (not to [])

ACTION REQUIRED: Attempt to establish identity per para 2.

1. Reference B identified a newly hired secretary for UTILITY's brother in Rome as Frau DIEFFENBACH. She allegedly was born in Bolzano and had Italian citizenship but was pro-German and anti-Italian; speaks five languages (Italian, German, English, French and Russian(?)) and could take dictation in four of them. To the best of []'s recollection, she had worked for Pan-American in Rome prior to her employment by UPSWING; he believes she was known to the then Deputy Chief []

2. Request that any traces which will assist in establishing identity of DIEFFENBACH be forwarded to Chief []

3. For []: We believe the DIEFFENBACH who accompanied ANGER is the one hired by UPSWING in Rome rather than the one reported in Ref A.

APPROVED: []

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - COS, []
2 - COS, []
2 - COS, Germany
2 - EE
2 - SE

(1 copy to SE/FI & multiple routed to SE/T)
(1 copy to SE/T)

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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CS COPY

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-37500
TO INFO	Chief of Base, Bonn EE, COS	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. []	
FROM	Chief of Base, Munich	DATE 26 September 1958	
SUBJECT	UPSWING UTILITY's Bonn Residence	RE: "43.3" -- (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	Bonn procure further information on Bonn apartment.		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)			
<p>1. During a ride in UTILITY's car from Frankfurt to Bonn on 10 September 1958, [] invited to drop by UTILITY's Bonn residence which is located on the III Stock of a four-floor modest walk-up apartment building located at 29 Koblenzer (Allee? Strasse?). The name on the door of UTILITY's apartment is [] and one of his downstairs' neighbors on the I Stock is [], which he pointed to as we climbed and is undoubtedly that of his chief of the Central Agency for Cryptography.</p> <p>2. For our files we would be appreciative of learning through Bonn Base the names of the other residents in this building on the chance that they too may belong to UPSWING. Unfortunately, without being clumsily obvious, [] had not the opportunity to pick up these names either on entering or departing the building since he was accompanied both ways.</p> <p>3. The apartment itself is rather plain and obviously lacks the woman's touch, which is probably a good thing since Mrs. UTILITY seldom, if ever, visits Bonn. A few handsome items, however, are a table lighter furnished as a gift on one occasion by []; another, a table lighter (UTILITY has a desk and a table in the living room); and a transistorized desk clock furnished as gifts by []. UTILITY drew attention to these items and stated the clock has been functioning continuously and without adjustment since Christmas 1956. He called it a fine example of American workmanship that he was proud to have in his apartment.</p> <p>4. UTILITY was kind enough to look up the location and phone number of the Park Hotel, Bad Godesberg for [] and while he did so it afforded the opportunity to note a number jotted down on the outside of a private telephone listing book, viz. "8-68713" followed by "Rudes 13 IIS." Does this mean anything to Bonn Base? Possibly it has some operational significance if it can be figured out. On the other hand, it may refer only to his tailor or candlestick maker.</p>			
APPROVED: []		<i>Qua</i> <i>Prob. Rudesheimerstr. 13,</i> <i>II Stock</i>	
Distribution: Bonn--2 COS--2 ✓EE--2		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT EIE 2005	
[] AVAILABLE COPY			

FORM 10-57 52b
(40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
REPLACES FORMS
51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

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IS COPY

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DRAFT/GM Stewart/17 Oct 58

114 J

GEHLEN BRIEFING - 22 OCTOBER 1958

I am asked to discuss the special legislation concerning CIA which would also be recommended to insure the effectiveness of the German Intelligence Service. With your indulgence, I shall not restrict myself to the relatively few provisions in the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 which bear on personnel administration. The desirable elements in the legal framework in which we operate are by no means restricted to these few paragraphs. The Director of Central Intelligence, as head of a federal agency, enjoys broad powers and profits by a system of legislation which provides great support to the work that he has to do. The special provisions which have been drawn up for CIA use are in a sense exceptions to limitations which have been placed on the chiefs of departments and agencies in this government over the years. I shall speak more to this point later.

In introducing my subject, I should like to propose that there are two elements in law which are essential to the personnel management of an intelligence agency. The first is the power of discretion, that is the power to exercise free decision, individual judgment or free choice unhampered by administrative or judicial review. The second is the power to control, which is the power to direct, guide, restrain and reward personnel assigned to the agency.

The head of an intelligence agency, working within the framework of a democratic and republican government such as we have, would not expect to enjoy these powers to an unlimited degree. In the first place, he is saddled with

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certain responsibilities which necessarily have a direct bearing on the way in which he exercises the freedom which is given to him. Among these are: (a) the responsibility to protect official secrets, (b) the responsibility to administer the personnel in his agency in accordance with established standards of justice and fair play and (c) the responsibility to spend the monies given to him economically.

Within these broad limitations, the Director of Central Intelligence derives wide powers of discretion and control from three sources: those which evolve on the heads of independent offices and establishments in our government, those which are specifically granted to departments and agencies that place personnel overseas and, finally, those that have specifically been written into law to apply to the Central Intelligence Agency only.

Let us begin with a review of the authorities the Director has as head of a federal agency. These have their origin in the Constitution.

The American Civil Service is sometimes described as the battleground in the struggle for power between the President and the Congress. Our Constitution was devised in such a way as to insure that one branch of the government would not wrest away a disproportionate share of power from the other branches. In order to prevent the President from using his power to make appointments to build a personal political machine that would enable him to overwhelm the legislative branch, the Constitution located in the Senate the function of confirming appointments of ambassadors, ministers, consuls, Federal judges and all high executive personnel. For all other personnel in the executive branch, the Constitution authorized the Congress to place the appointing power in the President alone, in the federal courts or in the heads of the separate departments. In the early nineteenth century, it became common practice for each

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new administration to fire most of the key employees who had served before and to hire into these positions members of their own party. It was believed that government operations were of such a simple nature that any man who could read and write could fulfill the duties of almost any position. It was also believed that a turnover of personnel in the various departments in Washington had the healthy effect of keeping the populace in touch with government and of preventing entrenched interests from becoming established at the seat of power. The American citizen of the early nineteenth century took pride in his system of free democracy and regarded the governments in Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin and London as petrified bureaucracies. After the Civil War and in recognition of the growing complexities of ^{government and the ill effects of the} spoils system, Congress undertook to limit the powers which it had generously granted to department and agency heads. In 1883 Congress passed the Civil Service Act. Under this act the President was empowered to determine which agencies of the government were to be required to appoint personnel according to civil service examination procedures. A Civil Service Commission was established to conduct nation-wide examinations of applicants for vacant positions in the departments which the President decided should be placed under the Civil Service Act. The Federal courts had already ruled that since the appointing power was located with the department heads, no outside group such as the Civil Service Commission could dictate the particular individual who would be appointed in a department. However, it was considered appropriate to define limitations on how the appointing power is exercised; thus, it was determined that a body such as the Civil Service Commission could be designated by the Congress to hold competitive examinations and to refer to a department head the three or four highest candidates whose names appeared on the roster of passing applicants at the time it was desired to fill a position.

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This had the effect of limiting the power of discretion of an agency head.

In 1912 Congress imposed the first restrictions that were ever imposed on the authority of a department head to fire an employee, *thereby, to some degree, weakening the power of Congress.*

As the result of two world wars and the very powerful influence of veterans organizations, Congress has further restricted the authority of heads of departments and agencies with regard to the termination or downgrading of veterans.

Finally, Congress dictates the pay that will be given to every federal employee from the President down, *with the exception of certain laborers & craftsmen.* This is done in two general ways. From time to time the Congress passes an Executive Pay Act which establishes salaries of all senior executives in the Government including the President. It also from time to time revises what is known as the Classification Act in which the principles of job classification are set forth and the General Schedule of pay is specified. It is important to understand the relationship between the salaries set forth in these two types of legislation and the salaries that Congress pays to itself. Congress does not dare to increase the salaries of Senators and Congressmen *representatives* above a level that would be generally acceptable to the public. This is our point of departure in the consideration of salary levels in our government. Once it is established what these are (*\$22,500 - Speaker gets \$35,000*), *then all are measured*

and with this knowledge in the backs of their minds, Congress then sets up the salaries for executives. When these two levels are taken care of, the upper limit of the General Schedule can be set and the salaries for the 18 grades in this schedule are then worked out.

Salaries for military officers, officers of the Foreign Service Corps and other commissioned officers of the government are related to these various pay systems.

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We have briefly reviewed the powers that the Director enjoys as the head of a federal agency and have touched on the legislation which has been passed over the last 80 years and which has the effect of limiting these powers. Now, very briefly, let me describe the authorities which we use as an Agency which places personnel overseas. I shall use the post differential as my example. Post differential is a payment made to government employees assigned to posts involving extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive physical hardship or notably unhealthy conditions. Part I of Executive Order No. 10,000 delegates to the Secretary of State the authority vested in the President to designate places, fix rates and prescribe further regulations governing the payment of additional compensation to be known as foreign post differential to employees in foreign areas of executive departments and independent establishments of the United States government. In addition to this specific allowance there are dozens of others pertaining to the cost of housing, the transportation of an employee's possessions overseas, the provision of allowances for education of employees' children and medical care. As a generalization allow me to say that, although there have been written into CIA law certain specific provisions in the field of medical care, these benefits have been extended to other persons serving overseas and it is becoming our common practice to treat our people very much as others are treated. We feel that this is entirely adequate.

Now let me turn to the specific provisions that have been written into law in support of our organization.

We are exempted from the provisions of the Civil Service Act. This means that the Director may hire in staff status anyone who meets the federal standards of security for appointment to a sensitive position and

who meets those established by the Director himself. He does not draw his candidates from Civil Service rosters and the Civil Service Commission does not know the names of the persons he hires. He is, thus, free to exercise discretion in the assembling of his staff.

Secondly, the Director can remove any employee from the Agency without reference to any other authority in the government. His authority to do this is contained in Section 102 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947.

"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

This section provides that irrespective of all statutes governing the termination of federal employment, the Director of Central Intelligence may terminate the employment of any employee with CIA whenever in his discretion he determines it to be necessary in the national interest. Termination in such manner does not affect the right of such employee to seek employment elsewhere in the Federal Government if the Civil Service Commission declares him eligible therefor. "

Third, the Director may establish the rate of pay for any position in the Agency except his own and that of the Deputy Director (which are included in the Executive Pay Act) as he sees fit. To put it in a different way, CIA is excluded from the provisions of the Classification Act of 1949.

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Now I think it is important to say a word about our practices in this regard. CIA makes use of the principles of job classification as set forth in the Classification Act of 1949 and as elaborated by the Civil Service Commission in establishing the pay for all positions which are easily *directly* comparable with positions that exist elsewhere in government: Secretaries, accountants, draftsmen, warehousemen and the like, ~~are easily compared.~~ Furthermore, CIA classifies the positions of intelligence officers as a result of careful study of the pay granted to persons doing more or less comparable work elsewhere in the government: economic analysts, scientists, statisticians, foreign service officers and the like. CIA uses the General Schedule rates of pay as established by the Classification Act. It does so voluntarily.

In its expenditure of money for personnel costs, CIA is subject to review by two important authorities. The Comptroller General is head of the General Accounting Office. This agency is an arm of Congress established to keep a continuing check on the executive departments to determine whether federal funds are spent in the way that Congress intended when it appropriated the funds. Those functions of CIA which are considered common to all federal agencies fall under the cognizance of the Comptroller General. For example, members of the General Accounting Office regularly audit payroll expenditures for regular CIA personnel stationed in the United States. To the extent that the Agency pays salaries and expends money on personnel services overseas, the only review that is made is by the Agency's own Audit Staff.

The Bureau of the Budget, which undertakes its reviews on behalf of the President, concerns itself with numbers of full staff employees and average grade. Although it subjects the Agency to very stern inquiry, it does not in any way limit the Director's authority to pay ^{individual} salaries as he sees fit.

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Finally, there is one type of legislation which we do not have and which we seek. That is early retirement legislation. We are at present authorized to separate people who do not meet Agency standards. There are, however, men and women on duty in CIA who began their work in intelligence during the Second World War or shortly thereafter and who sometime in the next ten years for one reason or other will have become excess to our needs. At that time they will be in their fifties. CIA has no way of providing for a retirement annuity except as it is provided for all government employees under general legislation which is administered by the Civil Service Commission. Normally, an employee with 20 years or more service can retire at age 62. I have a chart here which shows the rate of his entire retirement income. If the employee wishes to work until he is 70, he may do so unless he is removed for cause by the Agency. Seventy is the age of mandatory retirement in this government. We want legislation which will permit us to retire our people at age 50 with 20 years of government service, 10 years of which have been spent overseas. We are asking that such personnel be paid an annuity based on two percent of their high five years multiplied by the number of years of service. Thus, for example, a man who has been paid, let us say, \$10,000 a year for his high five years and who has worked for thirty years when he is retired will receive \$6,000 per year annuity. This is not easy to get. We are asking the Civil Service Retirement Fund to pay \$72,000 to that man over a period of 12 years in addition to the annuity that he will draw for the number of years that he lives past age 62.

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGNA 16186
TO INFO	Chief of Base, Munich COS, EE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. C J
FROM	Chief of Base, Bonn		DATE 24 November 1958
SUBJECT	UPSWING UTILITY's Bonn Residence		RE: "43-3" -- (CHECK "X" ONE) - MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	None		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

EGMA 37500, dated 26 September 1958 *ROUTED & SENT TO R/KH - no filing*

1. The residence in question is located at the corner of Koblenzerstr. and Erste Faehrgasse. The building actually contains three apartment houses (numbers 29, 31 and 33) all of which front on Koblenzerstr. Apartment #29 is the corner apartment and has a side entrance on Erste Faehrgasse which does not appear to be in frequent use. There is no front entrance directly to apartment #29, the entrance for #31 serving for both. Apartment #33 does have a separate entrance. There is a sign affixed to the front of the building near the #31 entrance-way but on the #29 side which reads as follows:

INDUSTRIE und HANDELSKAMMER
des SAARLANDES
Bonner Vertretung.

2. The names which appear at the entrance-way of apartment #31 which apparently belong to apartment #29 are as follows:

KRUEGER
KOENIG
HUETTENHAIN
MONSHAUSEN and WENDLAND.

a. The Bonn Address Book published in 1956 contains the following information about three of these individuals:

KOENIG, Alfred, Dipl.-Landwirt, Koblenzerstr. 31, telephone 2 42 16

HUETTENHAIN, Erich, Dr., Koblenzerstr. 31, telephone 5 27 21

WENDLAND, Horst, Koblenzerstr. 31, telephone 5 27 08

b. In the section of the Address Book which lists residents according to street number, we find the following listing for number 29 Koblenzerstr. (in this section there is no listing for #31):

PERRAR M. (also owner of house)
GEHLEN v. Gesandtsch Rat
HOEFINGHOFF, Hellmuth, Aussenhandelsbeauftragter
HUETTENHAIN, E. Dr.
KOENIG, Alfred, Dipl.-Landw.
SPRATTEN jr. K. (Textilhaus Cronenberg)
WENDLAND, Horst, Kfm. Angest.
WENDLAND, Ilse

3. The 1958 Bonn Telephone Book lists the Industrie u. Handelskammer at Koblenzerstr. 31 and gives a phone number of 3 52 59. The 1958 phone book also lists the following individuals who are apparently identical with those mentioned in paragraph 2 above:

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FORM 53b

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REPLACES FORMS
SI-28, SI-28A AND SI-29
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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KOENIG, Alfred Dipl.-Landw, Leiter d. Landwirtschaft-
lichen Beratungsstelle
Rheinland d. Ruhr-Stickstoff Aktiengesellschaft
Bluecherstr. 16. 2 42 16

HUETTENHAIN, Erich Dr. Koblenzerstr. 31. 5 27 21

WENDLAND, Ilse, Koblenzerstr. 31. 5 27 08

4. On 19 November 1958, a brown Volkswagen with the license number BN S 63 was observed parked on Erste Faehrgasse by the side entrance to apartment #29.

5. In regard to the notation on the outside of the private telephone listing book mentioned in paragraph 4 of reference, we offer the following speculation: If one is calling from a Bonn exchange, the prefix 8 is dialed to reach Bad Godesberg. The number series 68000 is quite common in Bad Godesberg. "Rudes 13 IIS" might possibly refer to Ruedesheimerstr. 13 in Bad Godesberg. We verified the existence of such an address and find that it is located in an area of recently constructed, better-class apartment dwellings. The address is not, however, listed in the 1957 Bad Godesberg Address Book.

Distribution:

2 - MOB
2 - COS
2 - EE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		2. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		8. DATE OF INFO.	
				9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
14. <div style="text-align: center;">Reference Document Filed Here</div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 20px;"><div>GEHLEN, REINHARD /GEN./ DOB 03 APR 02 ERFURT, GERMANY CIT WEST GERMANY E</div><div>32W-002-013/04 EGFA-24577 16 DEC 58 #9122</div></div> <div style="margin-top: 20px;">PRES. OF THE BUNDESNACHRICHTENDIENST, BELIEVES THAT DOUBLE AGENTS OPS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BND. IN THIS HE IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE BEV SUBJ. HAS DRAWN SUPPORT FROM HIS CLOSE FRIEND ADOLF EHLERS /E</div> <div style="margin-top: 40px; text-align: center;">DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3826 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</div> <div style="margin-top: 50px; text-align: center; font-size: 2em; transform: rotate(-10deg); opacity: 0.5;">BEST AVAILABLE COPY</div>					
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		<div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;"><div style="margin-right: 10px;">➔</div><div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; font-family: monospace; font-size: 1.5em;">[]</div></div>			

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : OWC/asb
UNIT : LD
EXT : 54
DATE : 18 December 1958

SECRET

03/18

TO : FRAN ☒ ☒
FROM : MUNI ☒ ☒

INFO :

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

CABLE NOTE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION UTILITY HAS A CHRISTMAS GIFT FOR YOU. ETCHED
MAP OLD GERMANY. IF YOU WISH RECIPROCATE SUGGEST SOMETHING FOR HOUSEHOLD
OR BOX CIGARS.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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240 - GENLEN, Reinhardt
Dossier

COB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

C/LD

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Copy No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

696/BD/CG/10/11/VE C/BAS
ORIG : J. H. CRITCHFIELD/mg
UNIT : C/EE
EXT : 3288
DATE : 23 DECEMBER 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : MUNICH, FRANKFURT
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: EE 6
INFO: DCI, D/DCI, COP, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	LEE	4	
2	5	5	LEE
3	6	6	LEE
P R E C E D E N C E	DEFERRED	DEC 23 23	41 258
	X ROUTINE	SEND CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

01156828

TO : MUNI
1
UTILITY FROM ASCHAM

INFO FROM

CITE DIR

05924

I WISH TO EXTEND WARMEST PERSONAL GREETINGS TO YOU AND YOUR ORGANIZATION
AT THIS CHRISTMAS SEASON. IN SPITE OF THE CURRENT SOV THREATENING POSTURE
REGARDING BERLIN AND THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF INTEREST TO BOTH OF US IN OTHER
PARTS OF THE WORLD, I FEEL THERE IS AMPLE REASON TO BE OPTIMISTIC OF THE
COMMON EFFORTS
NEW YEAR IN WHICH OUR ~~SEVERAL~~ THEY HAVE WILL PLAY AN INCREASINGLY
IMPORTANT ROLE AS ~~IN THE PAST~~ IN THE PAST.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

CHIEF, EE DIV.
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

581 BD/LB/LR ~~W~~ D/BAS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : J. H. CRITCHFIELD/mg
UNIT : C/EE
EXT : 3288
DATE : 2312 DECEMBER 1958

SECRET

ROUTING

1	CEE	4	
2	G	5	CEE
3	CE	6	CE

TO : MUNICH, FRANKFURT
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: EE 6
INFO : DCI, D/DCI, COP, S/C 2.

P R E C E D E N C E	DEFERRED	DEC 23 21 00 358
	X ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT56684

TO MUNI INFO FRAN

CITE DIR

05795

1
FROM

PLEASE PASS UTILITY MESSAGE FROM ME ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

THIS CHRISTMAS SEASON MARKS END OF DECADE OUR PERSONAL ASSOCIATION
WITHIN FRAMEWORK KUBARK AND UPSWING. LOOKING BACK ON 10 YEARS OF VAST
ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND CONSTANT POLITICAL TURMOIL RESULTING
FROM UNABATED COMMUNIST ATTACK ON FREE WORLD, FEEL SENSE SATISFACTION
OUR COMMON EFFORTS SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION IN GERMAN AND ODYOKE UNDER-
STANDING AND THUS STRENGTH WESTERN ALLIANCE.

ALSO EXTEND WARMEST GREETINGS TO HIS FAMILY AND BEST WISHES FOR NEW
YEAR WHICH PROMISES TO PLACE NEW DEMANDS ON ALL OF US AS SOVS TEST
STRENGTH OF OUR SOLIDARITY ON BERLIN PROBLEM.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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J. 201 Gschlen, R.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

11107

ROUTINE

DR. SCHNEIDER

24 DECEMBER 1958

801

THIS MORNING WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING CABLE FROM THE GENTLEMEN:

DEAR DR. SCHNEIDER:

ONCE AGAIN I WISH TO EXPRESS MY VERY BEST WISHES TO YOU, YOUR WIFE AND YOUR FAMILY, AS WELL AS YOUR STAFF FOR A MOST HAPPY CHRISTMAS AND A THOROUGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. IN THIS WISH YOUR MANY FRIENDS HERE ON MY STAFF JOIN ME AND LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUANCE OF OUR MUTUAL COOPERATION, WHICH HAS BECOME TO ME A MOST SIGNIFICANT AND SUCCESSFUL ARRANGEMENT.

2. MESSAGES ALSO WERE RECEIVED FROM MR. MARSHALL AND HERR BENLEHR, BOTH OF WHOM WISHED THAT THEIR HEARTLEST GREETINGS TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY AND STAFF SHOULD BE EXTENDED. MR. MARSHALL'S MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:

THIS CHRISTMAS SEASON MARKS THE END OF A DECADE OF OUR PERSONAL ASSOCIATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EOS AND GAMMA. LOOKING BACK ON TEN YEARS OF VAST ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND CONSTANT POLITICAL TURMOIL RESULTING FROM THE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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DOSSIER
FILE: 240 GEHLEN
REMITTANCE

PAGE 2

UNABATED COMMUNIST ATTACK ON FREE WORLD, I FEEL A SENSE OF SATISFACTION IN OUR COMMON EFFORTS AND A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING AND THUS STRENGTH IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

I ALSO WISH TO EXTEND MY warmest GREETINGS TO YOUR FAMILY AND BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR, WHICH PROMISES TO PLACE NEW DEMANDS ON ALL OF US AS THE SOVIETS TEST THE STRENGTH OF OUR SOLIDARITY ON THE BERLIN PROBLEM.

3. FROM OUR HQS IN FRANKFURT WE ARE HAPPY TO TRANSMIT ALL THE BEST WISHES FOR CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEARS FROM [] JOINING HIM IN THESE WISHES AUS BERLIN UND AUS HAMBURG ARE MR. HARVEY AND MR. POLGAR UND STERN GEBURT AUS HONG KONG WIRD GEMELDET WEIHRACHTS BRUSSE CON MR. SICHEL.

801

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658 ER/JG/127/18
ORIG: E
UNIT: NEA/4
EXT: 2809
DATE: 10 FEBRUARY 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

FILE NO. E 3

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3	<i>in memo</i>	6	
DEFERRED		FEB 10 22 59z59	
X ROUTINE		REC'D CABLE SECT.	
PRIORITY		INITIALS	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS	

OUT 71337

TO: E 1
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: NEA 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☒
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: E

TO: E 3 INFO: CITE DIR 12221
REF: E 3 1942 (IN 17828)*

RHEINHARDT
REINHARD GEHLEN ~~SECRET~~ DIRECTOR WEST GERMAN FED INTEL SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

* STATION REQUESTED IDENTITY OF INDIVIDUAL (CRYPT) WHO IS PLANNING VISIT TO E 3

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	<i>huc</i>
RI/TY	
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

218 ES/BJ AW gk/oj
 DATE 2 APR 59

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
 S-E-C-R-E-T

TO DIRECTOR
 FROM MUNICH
 ACTION EE 6
 INFO DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, COP, CI, C/CI, S/C

RIE Filing (check one):
 No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
 RI file this copy as indicated ☒
 If Indexing (check one):
 Marked ☐
 Signature: ☐

ROUTING
 1 4
 2 5
 6

APR 2 1830Z 59

PRIORITY
 39698

TO DIR INFO FRAN CITE MUNI 3575

UTILITY BIRTHDAY 3 APRIL. HE WILL BE SENDING HIS GREETINGS TO ASCHAM FOR
 7 APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

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 SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2E
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	B
RI/TY	YJG
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 1389

Use PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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Copy No.

(35)

547/BD/JJW/ [initials]
ORIG: [initials]
UNIT: EE/G/L
EXT: 528
DATE: 2 April 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: MUNICH OPERATIONS BASE

FRANKFURT HEADQUARTERS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: EE 6

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

RECEIVED
NO CS (Record) Mark. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐
Signature: [initials]

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE

OUT 89107

OUT 89107

TO

MUNI

INFO

FRAN

CITE DIR

19800
19830

RE MUNI 3575 (IN 33698)*

PLEASE CONVEY ASCHAM PERSONAL BIRTHDAY CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES TO UTILITY. ALSO WISH USE OCCASION EXPRESS TO UTILITY AND HIS STAFF ASCHAM AND KUBARK APPRECIATION FOR CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT ESPECIALLY DURING PRESENT CRITICAL PERIOD.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comment: * Advised that UTILITY'S (1) birthday is 3 April.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	Bm
RI/TV	ll
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

C/EE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1389a

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. (35)

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DL. ATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-45277
TO INFO	Chief, EE Chief, WE, Chief of Station, <input type="checkbox"/> Chief of Station, <input type="checkbox"/> Chief of Station, Germany		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. Unknown
FROM	Chief, Munich Base	DATE	15 October 1959
SUBJECT	UPSWING/Operational UTILITY Visit to Athens and Rome	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED	For Information	<input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S) MUNI 6530 cyg. Kubaik/Upswing			
1. Attached is a chronological report prepared by Lt. Col. Clark on the flight to Rome and Athens. Prior to Clark's departure we were informed that Otto MORS would not make the trip as stated in reference. We did not consider the withdrawal of MORS of such significance as to warrant a cable.			
2. Although not so stated in the cable traffic on the flight, all of our information was obtained from Col. Clark since our UPSWING contacts made no effort to fill us in on the details of this trip.			
3. Prior to Clark's departure we had made arrangements to keep posted on the progress of this flight through Flight Service., at Neubiberg Airfield. This turned out to be most unsatisfactory since word of the arrival of the plane usually was 10-12 hours late.			
4. UTILITY apparently departed Rome on 11 October since he was in his office on the morning of the 12th.			
<div style="text-align: right;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 100px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> </div>			
Approved 			
Attachment: h/w Report on Flight			
Distribution: 2 - EE w 2 cys. att. 2 - WE w 1 cy. att. 2 - Rome w 1 cy. att. 2 - Athens w 1 cy. att. 2 - COS/G w 1 cy. att.			
<div style="text-align: right;"> DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005 </div>			
1 - ENCL.			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">BEST AVAILABLE COPY</div>			
COPY FILED IN <u>3242-2-28</u> / <u>1</u> CS COPY			
FORM 10-57 (40)	53b	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET
		<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

HQ COPY

HQ COPY

SECRET

120ctober 1959

REPORT ON FLIGHT - ROME TO ATHENS

Sunday, 4 October 1959

The flight departed Neubiberg for Rome as scheduled at 0900L. @RENNER and METZ arrived at the airport at about 0830, being driven there by Metz's daughter and son-in-law (?) who live in Munich. METZ, himself, had only arrived a few hours earlier by train from Bonn. The flight terminated in Rome about 1200. Roman customs officials stamped the passports without seeing either the baggage or people. @RENNER and I stayed at the Hotel Nord, while METZ stayed in a pension for which reservations had previously been made from Munich. We toured the city with a sightseeing tour during the afternoon and had dinner together in the evening.

Monday, 5 October 1959

I departed the hotel at 0800 to prepare the necessary flight clearances and refueling for the flight to Athens. METZ and @RENNER remained behind to meet UTILITY, who was arriving at 1010 by train from Bern. The three arrived at the airport at 1100 and we departed at 1200 for Athens. The flight was uneventful, with one exception, and that was that UTILITY flew the airplane from the co-pilot's seat for about an hour and apparently was very pleased to have the opportunity. We were met by a small delegation in Athens, including Giovanni, UTILITY's brother, and several members of the Greek Intelligence Service who assisted in expediting the customs controls. UTILITY and METZ went with the receiving party and were quartered at the Grande Britannia Hotel. @RENNER and I stayed at the Hotel Nationale.

Tuesday, 6 October 1959

@RENNER and I were on our own and spent the day sightseeing.

Wednesday, 7 October 1959

@RENNER and I were again on our own. I called Wiesbaden from the U. S. Air Attache office to inform the DC3/Intelligence that UTILITY had agreed to postpone his planned travel during the first week of November to receive General Smith, CinC, USAFE, and party during that period. I was contacted in the afternoon by an English-speaking Greek who said that UTILITY would like, if possible, to leave at 1000 the following day.

Thursday, 8 October 1959

@RENNER and I departed our hotel to make flight preparations at 0700. At 1000 UTILITY and party arrived for take-off. I later learned that members of the party accompanying him included an Army Lt. Col. who was Chief of the Greek Counter Intelligence Service. During our return flight, UTILITY asked if I could make preparations for a later flight to take him to Ankara and Teheran. No specific date was set for this flight, but I assured him it could be made and would attempt to obtain a larger, faster aircraft for this proposed trip.

CS COPY

SECRET

SECRET

Page 2

We were met at the Rome airport by UTILITY's niece, the daughter of Giovanni, who drove the four of us into the city. During this ride UTILITY stated that he had obtained the use of his brother's home in Rome and intended to make his visit with the Chief of the Italian Intelligence Service partially social and expected to entertain him on Saturday afternoon. He also did not know when he expected to depart Rome for Munich and therefore urged me to return the following day, stating that he had used an old trick of making several sleeper reservations for this trip by rail. He said that he then could cancel the unneeded ones when he learned when he would be departing.

This evening METZ, GRENNER, and I had dinner together and later spent some time in a night club. During this time, METZ said that he was very impressed with the briefings received in Greece. He was especially impressed with the charts and target folders shown to them by the Greek armed forces representatives. He also stated that UTILITY was provided a 24-hour body guard and had made numerous sight-seeing trips accompanied by these guards.

Friday, 9 October 1959

METZ, GRENNER, and I departed Rome at 1200 for our return flight to Munich. During this flight METZ discussed, in part, his work in Bonn, stating that nearly 100% of their requests from the Bonn government were for either political or economic information.

Lt. Col. Jack W. Clark

SECRET

CS COPY

1. On 12 November 1979 Mrs. Clark and I hosted a dinner party at our home. HARTWIG was among the guests, having come without his wife who was out of the city. HARTWIG remained after the other guests had departed and since he is an old acquaintance, the conversation ran first to personal subjects and then later to matters of business. The main points of that part of the conversation were as follows:

2. HARTWIG at first discussed the desirable traits of WAGNER in his position of Vice President. He stated that WAGNER was the first man who was ideal in that position. He based his opinions on the fact that WAGNER made no decisions on his own and carried out the Doctor's desires exactly in the manner in which the Doctor wished them to be accomplished. HARTWIG also stated that WAGNER's personality was pleasing but in no way overshadowed or competed with the Doctor's own personality.

3. From this beginning, HARTWIG then discussed a few of the previous deputies, namely Gen. WESSEL, and General von Mollathin. His opinion of WESSEL was that he was an outstanding personality but with a very limited scope. He remarked repeatedly on the narrow field of interest possessed by Gen. WESSEL. According to HARTWIG, Gen. von MOLLATHIN's problem was that he took it upon himself to make too many decisions without first consulting the Doctor. This trait eventually led to his being transferred to the States.

4. At this point the conversation turned to KUEHN and his present assignment as Gen. von Mollathin's replacement. HARTWIG had nothing but the highest praise and admiration for KUEHN as a man and for his professional capability. He said that KUEHN was transferred because of his growing power within the organization. He said this power came about through no effort on KUEHN's, but rather because personnel from the entire organization relied upon him and trusted him to present their various problems to the Doctor. HARTWIG spoke as if it were a well-known fact that the Doctor could not tolerate anyone in his executive staff who might at some time gain enough personal power to threaten or even compete with his own position.

5. The conversation at that point drifted naturally into the speculation on which of the deputies, past or present, would take the organization over as its President upon the death or retirement of the Doctor. HARTWIG discussed the relative merits of each former deputy and then stated that he was of the firm opinion that the Doctor's choice would be KUEHN. He also stated that KUEHN was by far his own personal preference. The conversation then turned once more to reaffirming the apparently countless virtues of KUEHN, all of which favorably impressed HARTWIG.

6. A highlight on KUEHN's character was supplied by GLENN earlier in the evening. He related that at the war's end KUEHN commanded a tank division (or battalion) which was among the last German units to surrender to the Allies. His unit apparently operated to the very end of the war in and behind Allied lines, causing more than considerable destruction and worry for Allied commanders in the front line area.

CONFIDENTIAL 4/6/82

File []
GLEN, REINHARD

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In the course of the evening's conversation, HARRIS brought up another related, but somewhat interesting subject. It seems that during one of our earlier meetings some years ago I had suggested that HARRIS, having the position he holds within the organization, send future generations of Germany a daily history of the present URSAL. He informed me that he had attempted for some time to keep a daily record for the propagation of such a history but that recently his work was so great that he was unable to continue. He had, however, undertaken compiling a summary for the specific purpose of resuming the daily events which might result in decisions or acts which would in the future contribute to the history of URSAL.

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TF/2-369
DISPATCH FOLLOWS

Chief, EE (Conf.)

DISPATCH VIA TELETYPE		CLASSIFICATION C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-47982
TO INFO	CHIEF, EE ATT- <i>E</i> CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. UNKNOWN
FROM	CHIEF, MUNICH BASE <i>mbl</i>		DATE 17 MARCH 1960
SUBJECT	UPSWING/GENERAL UTILITY'S BIRTHDAY		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
			<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	FOR INFORMATION		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

THIS IS JUST TO REMIND YOU UTILITY'S BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY
DUE AGAIN ON 3 APRIL. YOU MAY WANT TO INITIATE CUSTOMARY
GREETINGS FROM ASCHAM AND OTHERS.

APPROVED-
mbl

DISTRIBUTION-
BY POUCH-

- 1 - EE
- 1 - COS/G

BY TELETYPE

- 1 - EE
- 1 - COS/G

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

TOT - 17 MAR/0915
TOR -

END OF TF/2-369 /EGMA-47982/

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*Reviewed by
Cable 304 31 March
File: Gehlen, Kunkel*

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
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
US COPY

11/2-308
DISPATCH FOLLOWS

DISPATCH VIA TELETYPE		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-48382
TO INFO	CHIEF, EE, ATIN- CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY, CHIEFNE. CHIEF OF STATION, 2 1 1 1		<input type="checkbox"/> UNKNOWN
FROM	CHIEF, MUNICH BASE		DATE 5 APRIL 1960
SUBJECT	UPSWING		

Der Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes

31. März 1960



Sehr verehrter, lieber Mr. Dulles!

Zu Ihrem Geburtstag möchte ich Ihnen, auch im Namen unseres Dienstes, meine allerherzlichsten Wünsche aussprechen. Mögen Ihnen noch viele Jahre erfolgreiches Wirken in Ihrem Aufgabenbereich beschieden sein.

Wir wünschen dies umso mehr, als unsere amerikanisch-deutsche Zusammenarbeit gerade durch Ihr Verständnis für die beiderseitigen Probleme, das sich dann auch allen Ihren Mitarbeitern mitgeteilt hat, eine stete Förderung und Vertiefung erfahren hat. Es wird uns dies in der weiteren Aufbauarbeit das Gefühl geben, in den politischen Kampf- und Unruhejahren, die Ende dieses Jahrzehnts und Anfang des nächsten kommen und über das weitere Schicksal der Welt bestimmen werden, auf festem Grund zu stehen. Hoffentlich können Sie Ihren Geburtstag in einiger Ruhe im Kreise Ihrer Familie feiern.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen bin ich in freundschaftlicher Verbundenheit - wenn ich das als Jüngerer so ausdrücken darf -

Ihr sehr ergebener

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

2. J. J. J.

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGOT-7448
TO INFO	Chief, EE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany		DATE 15 April 1960
SUBJECT	Letter from General Gehlen		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
			<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	For your information		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

The attached is General Gehlen's reply to []'s birthday greetings and present. The second paragraph is in reply to the following comment:

"I'm sure you must be very sorry to have heard the news of Jim Critchfield's assignment to another area this summer. But I notice that the old German hands keep coming back, as [] and I have done already and as Gordon Stewart will be doing shortly, so I doubt that Jim will be lost to us indefinitely. Meanwhile it will be good to have your and my old friend Gordon with us."

Attachment:

Letter dated 4 April 1960 from General Gehlen

Distribution:

2 - Chief, EE w/2 atts.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DECLASSIFIED

201
J. GEHLEN
Rein K2d

FORM 10-57 53 (10)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
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SECRET

DER PRÄSIDENT DES BUNDESNACHRICHTENDIENSTES

4. April 1960

Sehr geehrter, lieber Mr. []

Ich möchte Ihnen sehr herzlich danken für Ihr freundliches Gedenken zu meinem Geburtstag, Ihre Glückwünsche und die schönen Zigarren. Ich habe mich sehr darüber gefreut.

Wir bedauern natürlich sehr, das Jim Critchfield im Sommer einen anderen Bereich übernimmt. Vielleicht ergeben sich auch da Möglichkeiten einer noch engeren Zusammenarbeit. Auf der anderen Seite freuen wir uns selbstverständlich auch sehr, das Mr. Stewart Jims Aufgabe übernimmt. Wir kennen ihn ja schon lange Zeit und ich schätze ihn persönlich ganz besonders.

Mit nochmaligem Dank und herzlichen Grüßen bin ich

stets Ihr
/s/
Gehlen

SECRET

SECRET

TT/3-74/WASH-78-FRAN
DISPATCH FOLLOWS

1/EE (CONF)

DISPATCH VIA TELETYPE		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-49179
TO INFO	CHIEF, EE CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY. CHIEF I CHIEF I		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. UNKNOWN
FROM	CHIEF, NE CHIEF, MUNICH BASE	DATE 13 MAY 1960	
SUBJECT	UPHILL UTILITY VISIT TO TURKEY AND IRAN		RE: "43-3" (CHECK "X" ONE) <input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	FOR INFORMATION		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

EGMA-48282 5 APRIL 1960

UTILITY HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE HIS TRIP TO IRAN AND
TURKEY. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT NEW DATE IS CONTEMPLATED BUT
REFERENCE HAS BEEN MADE TO "LATER IN THE SUMMER".

APPROVED-

DISTRIBUTION-
BY POUCH-

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- 1 - COS/G
- 2 - C
- 2 - NE
- BY TELETYPE-
- 1 - EE
- 1 - COS/G

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-78, 51-78A, AND 51-79 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
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CS COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 337
27 MAY 60

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	<i>6</i>	4	<i>6</i>
2	<i>6</i>	5	<i>6</i>
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TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MONTCH

ACTION: EE 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

MAY 27 2008Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 45133

TO:

DIR

INFO

FRAN

CITE

MUNI. 0366

REF: FRAN 3308 (IN 44861)

UTILITY HAS NOW TENTATIVELY SUGGESTED 22 JULY. CAN BE CHANGED IF NOT CONVENIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REFERENCE IS RYBAT.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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Copy No.

FEHLEN, Remy had

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 104
27 MAY 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/EE 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
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3	h	6	

MAY 27 1228Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 44861

DIR INFO MUNI CITE FRAN 3308

RYBAT

REF DIR 30925 * NR

FOLLOWING FROM L

"UTILITY WILL BE AVAILABLE. HE WILL BE ON LIAISON AT TIME BUT EXPECTS MAKE OCCASIONAL TRIPS OFFICE AND BONN. WE DID NOT ATTEMPT PIN DOWN ANY FIRM DATE. LOCATION MEETING MUST ALSO BE LEFT OPEN."

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * REFERENCE IS RADNOTE.

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DATE 2005

SECRET

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Copy No.

201
GEHLEN Reinhard

22 June 1960

TO : Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of Navy
Attention: Mr. R. W. Loomis

FROM : []

SUBJECT: GEHLEN, Reinhardt

1. Reference is made to your machine run request of 7 March 1960, file M-288, subject as above, whose name you desired checked against the files of this office.

2. Subject is an official of the Bundes Nachrichten-dienst (BND), the West German Federal Intelligence Service, which is in liaison with this Agency. Lt. Commander BROWNE, GENCEIM, Munich, represents the Department of the Navy in liaison with the BND, and he is in contact with Subject.

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DATE 2005

ISRM-977

SECRET

30 December 1960

The President of the Federal German Intelligence Service

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Spurred by the recent founding of the Moscow Friendship University, private interests in the Federal Republic plan the foundation of an international institute of higher learning under the name "International University of Human Rights."

The interests in question feel that while the academic institutions of the non-Communist World are making a substantial contribution to the East-West spiritual struggle, that contribution does not measure up to the danger of ideological infiltration. This danger may be expected to increase as the result of the Communist Declaration and Appeal to the Nations of the World published following the December 1960 Moscow World Conference of Communist Parties. Since the spiritual attack of World Communism is essentially directed at the posture and image of the non-Communist World, the sense of values, especially of the world's youth, is ever more seriously threatened. The sponsors of the proposed university are persuaded that only a united effort on the part of the leading non-Communist nations can arrest this development, and that only an academic institution of international scope is capable of successful counteraction. Particular attention must be given to the youth of the developing countries, toward whom the Moscow University exerts a strong power of attraction. It is true that these young people receive specialized training in the greatest variety of non-Communist institutes of learning. Nevertheless, the prerequisites for a systematic saturation of the conscience of these young people with the values of the Atlantic Culture are usually missing.

It's West German sponsors conceive the proposed international institute in the following terms:

1. Goal of the International University of Human Rights is the preparation of the citizenry of all non-Communist states of the world for the spiritual struggle with World Communism.

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2. This goal requires a curriculum concentrated in the discipline of philosophical anthropology. At the same time, practical considerations require specialization in the field of administration and economics.

3. The University should be founded and endowed by an international Foundation and thereby considered an international institution.

4. The administration of the University should be in the hands of a small directorate designated by the Foundation.

5. The seat of the University should be in one of the smaller European states.

6. The University should be financed through donations.

7. The faculty should be composed of noted academicians from the non-Communist world.

8. Initially, students at the University should be financed exclusively through stipends of the Foundation.

Since this planning may coincide with activity of similar circles in your country, I want to call your attention to it.

Particularly in view of indications that financial support may be available from German industrial sources, I am inclined to support the proposal outlined above in broad terms. However, I would lend my support only in the event you have no basic objection to such a project.

I should be very appreciative if you could let me have your views of the idea.

With best greetings and wishes for the New Year, I remain,

Respectfully,

/s/ Gehlen

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Dear General Gehlen:

I am delighted to hear of the German plans for a University of Human Rights, and I wholeheartedly encourage you to support the project, if in your view the sponsoring group is entirely capable and reliable. The need is great, so no question of conflicting interests is likely to arise.

Permit me to suggest that West Berlin would be an excellent site for the proposed University. An appropriate form of association with the Free University should simplify certain organizational and administrative problems. The plan should carefully avoid provocation, so as not to constitute a vulnerable target to Communist propaganda. The presence of an international faculty in West Berlin at a free institution of recognized academic stature would in itself constitute a deterrent to ill-considered Soviet action in Berlin. On the other hand the Berlin scene should provide a useful close-up contrast between east and west for students from the emerging areas.

I do not wish to give the impression that Berlin should be chosen without full consideration of the serious physical security problems inherent in the vulnerability of West Berlin to Communist subversive operations. Careful selection of faculty and student body, the provision of academic supervision and social services, the maintenance of high morale and discipline among a student body including a large underdeveloped area contingent, would be no easy task in any event. Organizing such an institute and affording it adequate protection in West Berlin would be even more difficult. However, problems are at the same time challenges. A first rate effort in Berlin would probably yield greater results than those attainable at any other site.

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If it is your intention that the BND play an actual supporting role in this project, it is altogether possible that certain U.S. interests would seriously consider making ☐ American teachers to participate on a visiting basis.

I am looking forward to your April visit with great pleasure.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

cc: DDCI

Signature Recommended:

Deputy Director
(Plans)

DDP/EE/G:C ☐ spc (24 January 1961)

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SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



with 1200
10/10/1961
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GEHLEN

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DATE 2005

SECRET

19 April 1961

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
THROUGH: CI/OA
SUBJECT: Admission of Foreign Nationals to Agency Premises

1. In accordance with CSI No. 50-7, 29 July 1960, permission is hereby requested to admit three members of the West German Intelligence Service to Agency premises during the week of 24-28 April 1961 for conferences and meetings.

2. The individuals concerned are: 201

a. General Reinhard GEHLEN, President of the West German Intelligence Service (BND).

b. [] Deputy to General GEHLEN in charge of operational matters. A Covert Security Check has been requested on [] and he has been assigned file number C-90433.

c. [] the Washington representative of the BND. Reference is made to File C-66708.

3. The contemplated schedule of conferences and meetings, including locations, is as follows:

Monday - April 24 - A.M. Meeting with Gordon Stewart, Chief IE in 2010 K Bldg.

P.M. Briefing for [] on CIA organization, Room 117 Central Bldg.

Meetings with:

Mr. Helms, Chief of Operations
1038 L Bldg.

Mr. Dulles, DCI, his office
Mr. Amory, DDI, his office

Tuesday - April 25 - A. M. Conference with Dr. Scoville, Chief SI,
P. M. his office, Barton Hall

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DATE 2005

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- 2 -

Wednesday - April 26 - A.M. Briefing (SR) 117 Central Bldg.
P.M. Briefing (RE) 117 Central Bldg.

Thursday - April 27 - A.M. Briefing, Mr. Harvey, Chief Div. D.
K Bldg., Conference Room or
Mr. Harvey's office.

Friday - April 28 - A. M. Briefing (Africa) - 1500 L Bldg. or
East Bldg. Conference Room.

FRIDAY A P 28 PM

11:30

3:00

136

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Ext. 4976

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SECRET

SECRET

EE/G/L

24 APR 1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Presence of members of the West German Intelligence in
the United States

1. This is to advise you that from 19 April until approximately
7 May 1961 the following members of the West German Intelligence Service
(BND) will be visiting the United States.

a. General Reinhard GEBLEN, born 3 April 1902, Erfurt,
Germany, who is the President of the BND.

b. [] born [] 1903, Berlin,
Germany, who is a deputy to General GEBLEN.

c. [] born [] 1924, Luebeck,
Germany, Security Officer for the BND.

d. [] born [] 1922, Koeslin,
Germany, Administrative Assistant with the BND.

2. The visitors are travelling under the auspices of this Agency
and will be escorted by representatives from this Agency.

CS CI 3/765,070

DDP/EE/G/L: [] hj 21 April 1961

Distribution:

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- 1 - RI

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GEN

GEHLEN

201

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DATE 2005

SECRET

27 APR 1961

64-3169

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Deputy Director (Plans)

Drop copy furnished

SUBJECT:

Visit of General Gehlen

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. General Gehlen arrives in Washington on 24 April for his first visit in about eighteen months. After a week of briefings here he will depart for SAC Headquarters on the 30th where he will be briefed on 1 May. A copy of the agenda for the visit is attached for your information.
3. We plan to concentrate in the talks we hold with him on two principal themes:
 - a. Soviet military and scientific and technological intelligence targets, emphasizing the utilization of the German civilian community (businessmen, scientists, etc.) as a means of collection against these Soviet targets;
 - b. Intelligence and political action objectives in Africa and the Near East, with emphasis upon direct cooperation in certain areas.
4. The principal officers with whom he will be in touch during his visit will be: from the DDP - [], Mr. Helms, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Critchfield, [], [], Mr. Lucid, [] and the undersigned; from the DDI - Mr. Amory and [] and area specialists who will present substantive briefings on the Soviet Union, the Near East and Africa.

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DATE 2005

cc. [unclear]

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5. General Gehlen will be welcomed by you on Monday, 24 April, at 1530 hours. On Thursday evening, 27 April, he will be your dinner guest at the Alibi Club, and then on Friday, 28 April, at 1500 hours, an hour has been set aside to enable you to have more substantive conversation with him. There follows a list of subjects that you may wish to touch on during your conversation with him:

a. The increased strength and stature of his organization:

The Federal Government has authorized General Gehlen to proceed with a five-year plan of expansion and development. Thus in 1965 when the plan is completed, the BND should be one of the strongest intelligence agencies in the Western world.

b. Continuing need for military intelligence from the Sino-Soviet Bloc:

We have been gratified to note that the Army in Germany has recently expressed its considerable satisfaction with the BND's military reporting. This remains one of the most useful and important tasks performed by the German service and should have our wholehearted support.

c. Our interest in African and Near Eastern operations of the BND:

The Federal Government has authorized the expenditure of 7,000,000 DM in support of pro-Western elements in the Congo. We feel that Germany as a power with no recent colonial connections can make a contribution in assisting and guiding underdeveloped countries.

d. Berlin:

We attach great importance to the effort that the Germans can make singly and in concert with the U.S. and our allies to contribute to a stable and normal life for the populace in Berlin. We will continue to require early warnings of a most accurate and specific nature concerning planned Soviet or East German moves against the population or communications of West Berlin.

SECRET

e. Cuba, Laos, South Vietnam, and the Congo:

General Gehlen will undoubtedly appreciate very much hearing from you any statement that you think appropriate concerning any or all of these trouble spots.

f. Eichmann trial:

Chancellor Adenauer has apparently given General Gehlen the task of following the Eichmann trial as closely as possible. He would probably be pleased to give you his evaluation of its probable course and effect, as well as an opinion as to whether anything particularly surprising is likely to emerge which might have an effect on the Western psychological position.

g. University of Human Rights:

It would be useful to hear from General Gehlen what progress has been made by the group with which he was associated in the organization of a University of Human Rights, about which he wrote you a letter early in the year.

h. IL-18 Crash:

The BND was extremely efficient in handling the recent IL-18 crash in Bavaria for the benefit of the intelligence community. Through the BND we received one of the motors for Air Force technical analysis. It would be appropriate to express appreciation to General Gehlen for this assistance to the U.S. intelligence community in Germany.

i. Counterintelligence:

One of the officers who will accompany Gehlen to Washington, [redacted], is spending the week with us in very detailed conversations concerning leads from the high-level Polish intelligence defector we are now debriefing with respect to possible hostile penetration of the BND. This is not a subject to be gone into with General Gehlen in depth; however, we have been pleased by his determined approach to this security threat. He appreciates our having provided the leads and supporting data to him.

SECRET

6. A copy of this memorandum less subparagraph 5 (i) has been forwarded to the DDI, C/NE, C/AF, C/SR, and C/FI/D.

[]
GORDON M. STEWART

Chief, Eastern European Division

cc: DDCI

Attachment:

Agenda for General Gehlen

SECRET

FOREIGN VISITOR PASS RECEIPT

1. I hereby acknowledge receipt of Special Privilege Security Pass #334, 335, 336 issued to me to facilitate the entrance into Agency buildings of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen ☐ and ☐ for the period 21 to 29 April 1961.

2. This Special Privilege Security Pass will be retained in my custody or in the custody of a responsible staff employee at all times and will be shown to the building guards on behalf of the subject individual. When not in official use this pass will be kept in a 3--way combination safe cabinet, and will be returned by hand to the Physical Security Division, OS, Room 1401 "I" Building on or before 1 May 1961.

3. I agree to accept responsibility for the conduct and security of this visitor while on Agency property. Any classified Security Information made available to him will be handled in accordance with the provisions of Agency Regulation 50-7 and Regulation 60-110 which outlines the President's Directive of 25 May 1953 pertaining to the release of classified Security Information to foreign nationals.

21 Apr 61
DATE

☐
RECEIVED

Returned:

5/1/61
DATE

☐
PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

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DATE 2005

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1 June 1961

Dear Doctor Schneider,

After our long years of close association and mutual cooperation, allow me to presume that you will have an interest in the new direction that my career will be taking this summer. After careful consideration and consultation with Mr. Stewart, it has been decided that I be made available for a while to our Far East Division for an assignment to our

As you know our service, while aiming to develop specific area specialists, intends wherever possible to provide the opportunity for officers to branch out occasionally into other fields and activities. In this way it is felt that horizons can be broadened and experiences of other personnel and staffs in both similar and different situations sampled with long-range beneficial results.

So it is that I am 'lent out' so to speak by EE to FE for a period of time. Eventually I shall return to EE (I will look forward to it) and once more to the business of our situation in Germany and the German problem (if it is not solved before then). In doing so I hope I shall be a wiser, more experienced, and more knowledgeable person than I am today and as such perhaps capable of contributing in a special way to what I trust will still be a fruitful cooperation between our two services.

In closing please allow me to express my gratitude for your past (and continuing) friendship, understanding and encouragement. Till we meet again.

Sincerely,

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201 GEHLEN, R

SECRET

Chief, Munich Liaison Base

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, EE

Transmittal of Letter

Forwarded under separate cover is a letter for transmittal to
UTILITY.

Attachment:
Letter u/s/c

Distribution:
2-MLB w/att
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17 July 1961

ECMS-3023

SECRET

C/EE

Gordon M. Stewart

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Hqs Distribution:
1-C/EE
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D/EE/G/CA 17 July

C/EE

Gordon M. Stewart

Attachment
to EGMS-303

17 July 1961

My dear General Gehlen:

May I take this opportunity to convey to you our genuine appreciation for the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest with Mr. Herre during the course of his recent visit to the United States. We trust the discussions were as valuable to him and to the BND as they were to us. One item, the matter of our overt contacts program, was the subject of a particularly stimulating discussion in terms of the possibility that the BND might initiate such a program, and I promised Mr. Herre I would write to you personally to express some of my views.

The background of this subject is, of course, not new to you since we have briefed you and several of your staff members about our contacts operations on several occasions. I do wish to reemphasize that we feel our overt contacts program has been a very substantial success. We believe that with modifications, the idea could be equally successfully employed by your organization in spite of the special problems which you face in Germany. The completely non-clandestine aspect of our contact with the business and professional world has been our guarantee that such operations can be carried out on a large scale without significant embarrassment. In fact, positive benefits are reaped entirely aside from the intelligence product. We demonstrated to Mr. Herre how this program has contributed significantly to our store of basic intelligence in the economic, scientific, geographic and sociological fields. We feel that in addition to receiving intelligence concerning the Communist orbit, we have been able through this program to acquire much useful data concerning the underdeveloped areas of the world. The value of this material in planning and validating our government aid programs cannot be exaggerated.

It appears to my colleagues and myself that with Germany playing such a key role in world affairs, and with German businessmen and professional people travelling to all corners of the earth, an overt operation of this sort would add very substantially to the intelligence potential of your organization. In addition, such a program might serve you well over a period of time by establishing and fostering a feeling of good will toward the BND among the members of the German business community which would make itself felt in terms of improved opportunities for clandestine operations.

RESTRICTED COPY

SECRET

Should you undertake to organize a contacts program, please do not hesitate to call upon me for any assistance or information you feel might aid in the solution of the many problems such an operation necessarily incurs.

Faithfully,

Gordon M. Stewart

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SPY AND COUNTER-SPY

The first of a series of articles on the world's intelligence services

How, in the ashes of the Nazi defeat, a German intelligence organisation was saved for the West by the man who now heads Bonn's Secret Service

Germany's Secret Phoenix

By SEFTON DELMER

DO you know who is head of the British Secret Service? You do not? Neither do I. Nor do more than a handful of top officials in Whitehall.

And even those who do know his identity never refer to him by name. By them, as by the few hundred officers of his own service, the Cabinet Ministers, and the civil servants and Service officers on the distribution list of his reports, he is talked of only as "C," the coldly impersonal cypher inherited from his predecessors by each successive head of Britain's Secret Service.

Such discretion is not, however, practised by the Secret Service heads of other countries. When the Americans set up the Office of Strategic Services during the last war, it soon leaked out that its chief was that flamboyant character "Wild" Bill Donovan. The Central Intelligence Agency which later took the place of O.S.S. was equally unwilling or unable to hide that one of the United States' most successful operators in the fields of intelligence and underground diplomacy had taken charge of it—Allen Welsh Dulles.

As for the Germans, the identity of their Secret Service Chiefs was so well known to us during the war that at least one branch of Britain's propaganda service was able to make great play of the cut-throat intrigues and rivalries between Hitler's secret men, from Admiral Canaris and Heydrich, to Schellenberg, Kaltenbrunner, and "Gestapo" Müller. Only one of Hitler's spy chiefs escaped publicity, a quiet methodical young staff officer named Reinhard Gehlen, who from 1942 to the end of the war, as chief of the Army High Command department "Foreign Armies East," was in command of all anti-Soviet operations.

In the Limelight

Alas for this quiet Prussian. Now that he has become the head of Chancellor Adenauer's Secret Service the 59-year-old ex-General Gehlen has not been able to keep out of the limelight.

Mind you, I have little doubt that General Gehlen himself would prefer the anonymity of his British opposite number. He takes Garbo-like precautions to remain hidden. In his own organisation the name Gehlen is never allowed to be mentioned. His 6,000 subordinates call him "Number Thirty" or more simply "the Doctor." (Is it evidence of a subconscious hankering after academic distinction that this studious intelligence chief invariably affixes a "Dr." to the aliases he assumes on his travels? Two examples known to me: "Dr. Schneider" and "Dr. Fritz Wendlandt.")

And never, but absolutely never, has "the Doctor" in all the years that have gone by since the collapse of Hitler wittingly permitted a photograph to be taken of himself. Such pictures as exist of him today all date back to the old days under Hitler. Pictures showing him addressing his men on the Führer's birthday, sitting in a group with his staff, or receiving the report of a Russian officer fighting for Hitler.

The purpose of this photographic blackout, I presume, is to safeguard him from attempts on his life. For Gehlen, like everyone else in West Germany, has to do all his work in close proximity to the Iron Curtain and he is very conscious that his Soviet or Soviet-German antagonists might try to rub him out, or kidnap him in the same way that they have already succeeded in abducting some of his men. He never uses the same car two trips running (although he indulges a give-away passion for variations of the Mercedes 300). He carries a gun himself and wherever he goes he is accompanied by two bodyguards—even, as I discovered for myself, when he calls at Adenauer's office in Bonn.

But even if they had a good photograph of him I fancy the agents of Soviet-German spy chief Erich Mielcke would have a tough job memorising his face. For the fact is that Gehlen has one of those expressionless faces of which there are thousands sitting behind desks in German government offices.

I met him once, seven years ago, when we both of us happened to be calling on Dr. Hans Globke, Chancellor Adenauer's Chief de Cabinet. And, although I was fully aware of Gehlen's job and its importance, his features made so little impression on me that I find it hard to recall them today.

All I can remember is a lean and whippy little civilian in a light, sporty-looking grey suit—height about five foot seven—who struck me as a typical cavalry officer in mufti. Deep-set light blue eyes looked out at me from a smooth, sallow, thin-lipped face. The most distinctive thing about him were two enormous ears which stuck out from his head like jug handles.

But although there is a dearth of Gehlen photographs there is no lack of other details to make up the picture of the man who is not only one of the most influential and powerful Germans active today, but also, in the view of Washington, the West's most successful operator in collecting and evaluating intelligence from the Soviet world.

Take only the amazing story of how Gehlen at the end of the war not merely escaped the trials and internment which were the fate of Hitler's other generals, but even managed to salvage his espionage organisation from the wreck and get it working again within a few months of the collapse. Only a genius of diplomacy and psychology could have brought off that miracle. No story could be more revealing of the character of this soldier whom Adenauer affectionately calls his "lieber General"—his dear general—because of his services in restoring Germany to military power and importance.

Remember 1918

Consciously or subconsciously Reinhard Gehlen must have had at the back of his mind in those desperate last weeks of the war the memory of how the German generals of 1918 successfully played on Western fears of Bolshevik expansion to preserve their army and their power as a caste. He must have remembered it all the better as he himself took part as a young officer in the army's clandestine come-back at that time. For Gehlen, the son of a Prussian officer turned publisher, had in 1920 at the age of 18 entered the new Reichswehr as an ensign.

Gehlen's 1945 plan for German military resurgence also relied on his being able to exacerbate and exploit the coming breach between Stalin's Russia and the Western allies. Not that he was alone with this idea. Many German leaders were thinking and even talking on these lines, from the leaders of the Conservative Resistance to men like Himmler and Security Chief Walter Schellenberg.

What was original about Gehlen's concept was that he planned to use the know-how of his anti-Soviet intelligence unit as his stake in the game. He planned to offer his services to the victorious Americans. For his own work had shown him that O.S.S. had not even begun to function in the Soviet Union. He reckoned that Washington would jump at the chance of

obtaining the help of an expert agency like his. And he was right.

As early as January 1945 he took the first steps to put his plan into effect. Shortly after having been received by the Führer for what was to be his last personal report—the date was January 9, 1945—Gehlen summoned the key members of his staff to a conference. They met in his room in the underground steel and concrete shelter of the Army High Command's "Maybach" H.Q. at Zossen, near Berlin.

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How to Surrender

Gehlen addressed his experts. "We shall shortly have to leave here," he told them. "We shall be on the run and unable to take our files with us. I therefore want you to make a rapid but thorough review of all our material while there is still time. Everything that is of real value to future operations—and I include in this operations which we may undertake in a Germany which is defeated and occupied—you will now have micro-filmed in three copies. The original documents will all be destroyed. The microfilms you will place in three waterproof canisters, one set in each."

Then he split his men up into three parties, each of which contained at least one expert in the various fields covered by the organisation. To each party he assigned one canister. These canisters had a defence mechanism which exploded them if anyone tried to open them by force.

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That was important for them, both as private individuals, and as members of a nation which at that time was jobless and hungry. But more important was the significance of this development in history. For Gehlen and his staff officers now went into action again against the Russians.

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The Americans accepted Gehlen's terms, granted him a fixed budget of 3½ million dollars a year (they increased it soon after) and provided for him, his staff, and their families a special compound of their own at Pullach, near Munich, where they could live and work in secret. Ironically the compound which was allocated to Hitler's former spy chief was the Rudolf Hess settlement, a housing estate consisting of a score of one- and two-family houses, which had originally been built to house Nazi Party functionaries with large families. It had been used as a secret staff headquarters by Hitler during the war and a number of prefabricated huts had been added which came in most useful now.

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But Gehlen, whose Flemish family motto *Laet vaeren nytt* ("Never give up") now hung once more on the wall of his private sanctum, had got where he wanted. For not only was he able to turn his unit into a shadow German General Staff but more important still he was now in a position to supply the Americans with the kind of intelligence which would make them feel that it was essential to re-create the German Army to help in the defence of Europe against the Russians.

And he was doing so at exactly the same time as the German Communist spy corps sent into the West from the Soviet zone of Germany, in order to demonstrate their indispensability to the Kremlin were reporting to their Russian masters the allegedly nefarious Allied plotting against Moscow in the Western zones of Germany.

Among the staff officers whom he recruited for his organisation was his old chief at the High Command, Lieut.-Gen. Adolf Heusinger, later to become the first Inspector-General of the new West German army. Heusinger is today chairman of N.A.T.O.'s standing military committee, a position which, like his previous command of the Bundeswehr, he owes very largely to the good words put in for him with the Americans by the influential Gehlen.

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But while Gehlen was taking former generals and staff-officers on to his pay-roll in the higher echelons of his new intelligence unit (and even today most of the officials who represent him in his more important liaison functions with government and industry are old staff officers of "sound" conservative background) his operatives were also recruiting at a lower and more secret level many former members of Himmler's S.D. and Gestapo.

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Of these I will tell in my next article.

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A forged Communist identity document produced by Gehlen's organisation.



Wartime picture of Gehlen. His appearance today is little changed except that he has a moustache.



Gehlen, on left, on wartime visit to interrogation camp for Russian prisoners-of-war.

SPY AND COUNTER-SPY

The first of a series of articles on the world's intelligence services

How, in the ashes of the Nazi defeat, a German intelligence organisation was saved for the West by the man who now heads Bonn's Secret Service

Germany's Secret Phoenix

By SEFTON DELMER

DO you know who is head of the British Secret Service? You do not? Neither do I. Nor do more than a handful of top officials in Whitehall.

And even those who do know his identity never refer to him by name. By them, as by the few hundred officers of his own service, the Cabinet Ministers, and the civil servants and Service officers on the distribution list of his reports, he is talked of only as "C," the coldly impersonal cypher inherited from his predecessors by each successive head of Britain's Secret Service.

Such discretion is not, however, practised by the Secret Service heads of other countries. When the Americans set up the Office of Strategic Services during the last war, it soon leaked out that its chief was that flamboyant character "Wild" Bill Donovan. The Central Intelligence Agency which later took the place of O.S.S. was equally unwilling or unable to hide that one of the United States' most successful operators in the fields of intelligence and underground diplomacy had taken charge of it—Allen Welsh Dulles.

As for the Germans, the identity of their Secret Service Chiefs was so well known to us during the war that at least one branch of Britain's propaganda service was able to make great play of the cut-throat intrigues and rivalries between Hitler's secret men, from Admiral Canaris and Heydrich, to Schellenberg, Kaltenbrunner, and "Gestapo" Müller. Only one of Hitler's spy chiefs escaped publicity, a quiet methodical young staff officer named Reinhard Gehlen, who from 1942 to the end of the war, as chief of the Army High Command department "Foreign Armies East," was in command of all anti-Soviet operations.

In the Limelight

Alas for this quiet Prussian. Now that he has become the head of Chancellor Adenauer's Secret Service the 59-year-old ex-General Gehlen has not been able to keep out of the limelight.

Mind you, I have little doubt that General Gehlen himself would prefer the anonymity of his British opposite number. He takes Garbo-like precautions to remain hidden. In his own organisation the name Gehlen is never allowed to be mentioned. His 6,000 subordinates call him "Number Thirty" or more simply "the Doctor." (Is it evidence of a subconscious hankering after academic distinction that this studious intelligence chief invariably affixes a "Dr." to the aliases he assumes on his travels? Two examples known to me: "Dr. Schneider" and "Dr. Fritz Wendlandt.")

And never, but absolutely never, has "the Doctor" in all the years that have gone by since the collapse of Hitler wittingly permitted a photograph to be taken of himself. Such pictures as exist of him today all date back to the old days under Hitler. Pictures showing him addressing his men on the Führer's birthday, sitting in a group with his staff, or receiving the report of a Russian officer fighting for Hitler.

The purpose of this photographic blackout, I presume, is to safeguard him from attempts on his life. For Gehlen, like everyone else in West Germany, has to do all his work in close proximity to the Iron Curtain and he is very conscious that his Soviet or Soviet-German antagonists might try to rub him out, or kidnap him in the same way that they have already succeeded in abducting some of his men. He never uses the same car two trips running (although he indulges a give-away passion for variations of the Mercedes 300). He carries a gun himself and wherever he goes he is accompanied by two bodyguards—even, as I discovered for myself, when he calls at Adenauer's office in Bonn.

But even if they had a good photograph of him I fancy the agents of Soviet-German spy chief Erich Mielcke would have a tough job memorising his face. For the fact is that Gehlen has one of those expressionless faces of which there are thousands sitting behind desks in German government offices.

I met him once, seven years ago, when we both of us happened to be calling on Dr. Hans Globke, Chancellor Adenauer's Chief de Cabinet. And, although I was fully aware of Gehlen's job and its importance, his features made so little impression on me that I find it hard to recall them today.

All I can remember is a lean and whippy little civilian in a light, sporty-looking grey suit—height about five foot seven—who struck me as a typical cavalry officer in mufti. Deep-set light blue eyes looked out at me from a smooth, fallow, thin-lipped face. The most distinctive thing about him were two enormous ears which stuck out from his head like jug handles.

But although there is a dearth of Gehlen photographs there is no lack of other details to make up the picture of the man who is not only one of the most influential and powerful Germans active today, but also, in the view of Washington, the West's most successful operator in collecting and evaluating intelligence from the Soviet world.

Take only the amazing story of how Gehlen at the end of the war not merely escaped the trials and internment which were the fate of Hitler's other generals, but even managed to salvage his espionage organisation from the wreck and get it working again within a few months of the collapse. Only a genius of diplomacy and psychology could have brought off that miracle. No story could be more revealing of the character of this soldier whom Adenauer affectionately calls his "lieber General"—his dear general—because of his services in restoring Germany to military power and importance.

Remember 1918

Consciously or subconsciously Reinhard Gehlen must have had at the back of his mind in those desperate last weeks of the war the memory of how the German generals of 1918 successfully played on Western fears of Bolshevik expansion to preserve their army and their power as a caste. He must have remembered it all the better as he himself took part as a young officer in the army's clandestine come-back at that time. For Gehlen, the son of a Prussian officer turned publisher, had in 1920 at the age of 18 entered the new Reichswehr as an ensign.

Gehlen's 1945 plan for German military resurgence also relied on his being able to exacerbate and exploit the coming breach between Stalin's Russia and the Western allies. Not that he was alone with this idea. Many German leaders were thinking and even talking on these lines, from the leaders of the Conservative Resistance to men like Himmler and Security Chief Walter Schellenberg.

What was original about Gehlen's concept was that he planned to use the know-how of his anti-Soviet intelligence unit as his stake in the game. He planned to offer his services to the victorious Americans. For his own work had shown him that O.S.S. had not even begun to function in the Soviet Union. He reckoned that Washington would jump at the chance of

obtaining the help of an expert agency like his. And he was right.

As early as January 1945 he took the first steps to put his plan into effect. Shortly after having been received by the Führer for what was to be his last personal report—the date was January 9, 1945—Gehlen summoned the key members of his staff to a conference. They met in his room in the underground steel and concrete shelter of the Army High Command's "Maybach" H.Q. at Zossen, near Berlin.

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How to Surrender

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He did not have to wait long. Through their binoculars Gehlen and his officers were two days later able to make out the first American armoured spearheads racing through the alpine valleys below in the dash that was to take them to the gates of Prague.

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In this prediction—his last as an Intelligence Chief of Hitler's Wehrmacht—Gehlen was to be proved correct. It was almost a week before one sunny morning a burst of automatic fire against the walls of the chalet was followed by the arrival of a platoon of G.I.s. The general decided the time had come for him to climb down from his mountain and give himself up.

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
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Gehlen, on left, on wartime visit to interrogation camp for Russian prisoners-of-war.

GERMANY'S SECRET PHOENIX-II

Berlin Battleground of Spies and Counter-Spies

Bonn's Secret Service is nowhere more effective than in the bridgehead of West Berlin, its window on the Soviet world...



By SEFTON DELMER

Married behind the wall is Reinhard Gehlen, looking older now than in this picture. The wall hides his headquarters at Pullach, near Munich. Gehlen is known to the British Secret Service as "Rusty," but there is nothing rusty about his organisation.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

BERLIN remains the main battlefield in the war between the two rival gangs of Hitler's former Secret Service men.

On the one side are those working under Communist Security chief Erich Mielcke for East Germany and Moscow. On the other, those working for the West under 59-year-old Reinhard Gehlen, Hitler's former chief of anti-Soviet espionage, who, after spying for the Americans during the first ten post-war years, is today the Secret Service chief of Chancellor Adenauer's Federal Republic. Hardly a week passes without announcements from both sides of agents captured, of murders, abductions and disappearances.

While I was in West Berlin recently the newspapers there announced the shanghaiing from West Berlin of Heinz Brandt, a former leader of the Soviet-German metal workers' union, who two years earlier had escaped from the East to the West. The Soviet-Germans promptly retorted that Heinz Brandt had been arrested on Soviet-German territory at Potsdam while trying to recruit informants for the service of Reinhard Gehlen.

And as I write the West German newspapers are full of the trial for treason of a certain Commander Walter Krenz of the West German Navy. Krenz is a former officer of Hitler's Navy who became a spy for the Russians after the war. Under instructions from his Soviet masters he joined the new German Navy in 1957 as a radar specialist. For four years he passed them all the N.A.T.O. secrets that came his way.

Earlier in the year a deputy of the West German Parliament named Frenzel was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for espionage. Gehlen men had caught him too passing N.A.T.O. secrets—he had obtained them by virtue of his membership of the Bundestag's top secret defence committee—to contact men of Prague's Communist government. And so it goes on.

Many Change Sides

The fact is that cases like that of George Blake and the former R.N. petty officer Harry Houghton, sensational in Britain because of their rarity, are by comparison commonplace in Germany. There the political upheavals, the defeats suffered by such super-patriots and super-chauvinists as the Kaiser and Hitler, the to-ing and fro-ing between militarism and authoritarianism and anti-militarism and anti-authoritarianism, coupled with the post-war division of the country, have produced among many Germans an opportunism in their loyalties unparalleled in Britain since the Jacobites and the Vicar of Bray.

As a result it is quite common for agents of the Gehlen service to be turned round by the Communists, and for agents of Mielcke to be turned round by Gehlen.

The Communists have boasted more about their prowess in this respect than Gehlen. For with a population in their zone which is at best apathetic to the Ulbricht regime, they must for ever try to impress it with the efficiency of their Security Service.

Gehlen, too, however, has allowed one or two of his triumphs to become known. Most impressive of these was his success in planting an agent in the office of Ernst Wollweber himself, the first almost legendary spy chief of Soviet Germany.

The agent was a certain Walter Gramsch who went under the cover name of "Brutus" in the Gehlen service. Because he was personally known to Wollweber as a Social Democrat and a transport expert, he was able to get himself a job in Wollweber's Transport Commissariat early in 1946.

This was only a few months after Gehlen had started up his espionage organisation again under American auspices. The Soviet-Germans had no

suspicion of Gramsch. He quickly worked his way up to the important position of director of the department "Fleet and Harbours".

From this position "Brutus" was able to send back much valuable information, not only about Soviet troop movements but also about the organisation, the personnel, and the activities of Wollweber's spy net. Wollweber far from suspecting Gramsch, went out of his way to praise him for the devotion and thoroughness he showed in his work in the Commissariat.

Gramsch might still be working as "Brutus" for Gehlen in the Soviet German administration had not Gehlen signalled him to drop everything and flee to West Berlin. The date was November 8, 1953.

What caused this sudden recall? The West German spy chief himself had fallen for a "Brutus", a former Himmler protégé called Geyer. Geyer, who had been working for Wollweber and his predecessor, had allowed himself to be taken on by a man doing "research work" in East Germany for Gehlen. He had so greatly impressed his bosses in the Gehlen service with his efficiency that after a time they called him to West Berlin and set him to work there in a branch of their organisation.

Geyer's job in West Berlin was to help direct the work of a group of Gehlen operators in Soviet Germany. He had access to some of the most important files in the Berlin section and learned the identities of many more than the 30 agents under his control.

Geyer kept it up for more than a year. Then, when he had prepared a coup which he feared would give him away, he escaped across the sector border to Soviet Berlin and safety. It did not take the Gehlen men long to discover his defection. And the moment they did, they sent out signals to all the agents they thought might be endangered ordering them home. "Brutus" was one of those saved.

Secret Telephone Link

Among Geyer's victims was Werner Haase, a tough and courageous ex-officer of Hitler's Army, who under the name of Heister had command of Gehlen branch 120a in West Berlin. He had arranged to lay a secret telephone cable across a canal called the Heidekampfen from West Berlin into the Soviet Sector in order, as he drily put it when obtaining approval for his scheme, "to facilitate inter-sector communications."

Alas, for the gallant Haase. The Gehlen agent who was to have received the cable on the other bank had been arrested as a result of Geyer's denunciation and he had given away the plan. On the even-

This series on the world's Secret services will be continued next month with articles on the elaborate organisation which protects the lives of American Presidents and their close relatives.

ing of November 13, 1953, Haase arrived at his station on the canal. He waved to his fellow agent whom he could see waiting for him on the Soviet side.

Then Haase knelt down and placed a toy steamer in the water to which a length of string was attached on which the cable was to be dragged to the other side. But just as he sent the model steamboat hissing on its way across the water, a posse of Wollweber men leaped out from behind a clump of bushes just behind him. They carried him off to the Soviet German security headquarters, and he was later sentenced to penal servitude for life.

Although Gehlen himself would always deny this, the greatest triumph of his organisation is one for which the credit has generally been given to his erstwhile American employers, the Central Intelligence Agency of Allen Welsh Dulles.

Famous Speech

In 1956, when his period of service with the Americans was almost at an end and his espionage organisation was about to be transferred to the Bonn Government, Gehlen, through one of his Russian agents, obtained the text of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech before the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. It was the sensational speech in which Khrushchev denounced the crimes of Joseph Stalin. Before the Soviet propagandists were able to edit and howlerise it the Americans had published it throughout the world.

Gehlen is particularly well equipped for staging coups of this kind. For he and his officers, reinforced in the meantime by many civilian technicians and experts, have had long experience in handling Russian defectors and sending them back to work in the Soviet Union itself. Nor have all the agents Gehlen left behind him in Russia and the East European countries as Hitler's armies retreated, been expended yet. There are still a number there whom Gehlen has deliberately refrained from using. They await their turn to serve.

One point in particular appeals to me about these hidden agents. Many of the secret signallers whom Gehlen has installed with special high speed transmitters at various points in Soviet Europe share a common characteristic. They all suffer from some grave physical disability.

Why has Gehlen chosen to be served by an army of cripples? Because he expects that cripples will not be called up for military service, and so can be relied on to remain in the area to which Gehlen has assigned them.

This business of information-getting through agents forms only a comparatively small portion of the duties of the Gehlen organisation. Interception of radio messages and cypher breaking—for which he has the latest and most up-to-date electronic computer equipment—and the interrogation of travellers is equally important, and less dangerous. But probably the most valuable part of all the work done by the Gehlen service is that concerned with the evaluation and interpretation of intelligence, with the study of Soviet newspapers and periodicals, particularly the technical, scientific and economic publications, and the compilation from them of data revealing what is happening and what is going to happen.

Scientists Came Back

Of particular usefulness in this field are the German scientists who have returned to Germany from Russia after spending the post-war years in Soviet research plants. For many years they worked in the Soviet Union helping the Russians to design space rockets, and to perfect new radar devices and many other scientific developments. They got to know the Soviet technicians' methods and way of thinking their approach to technological problems. Now they are back.

All these scientists have been carefully examined by the Gehlen men. Many of them have been taken on to work for the organisation.

Ostensibly they are employed in German industry or cover they share with many other Gehlen operatives. For ever since the Gehlen service started up again its cover has been industrial and business enterprises, some of them genuine, others mere camouflage.

The branches stretch right through the Balkans and South East Europe to Turkey, Persia and the Middle East, and use many genuine German firms as their front. But the sector in which the Gehlen organisation is still strongest and most effective is, today as before, Berlin and East Germany.

It is a power which puts a great responsibility on this little German staff officer who was once the most successful of Hitler's spy chiefs—a responsibility not only to Germany but to the world.

© Sefton Delmer, 1961.

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OELA-34532
TO INFO	Chief, WE Chief of Station, Germany		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. Unknown
FROM	Chief <i>L</i>	DATE 30 August 1961	
SUBJECT	"Germany's Secret Phoenix" - Reinhard Gehlen	RE: "433" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED	FYI	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

REFERENCE(S)

Attached are copies of two articles entitled "Germany's Secret Phoenix" which appeared 20 August and 27 August 1961 in the London Sunday Telegraph. Both Headquarters and Frankfurt are of course aware of the author's background and past dubious connections. These are the first of a series of articles on various world "intelligence" services. Next on Delmer's list is the U.S. Secret Service and its protection of the presidents but undoubtedly an article on KUBARK is in the offing.

2 Attachments

Distribution:

- 4 - WE w/atts h/w
- 2 - Frankfurt w/atts h/w

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Summary of DCI Meetings with General Gehlen,
24 and 25 September 1961

1. On 24 September 1961, beginning at 1720 hours, the DCI, in a meeting held at his home, met with General Gehlen. The meeting had been requested by General Gehlen, who made a special trip to the United States for the purpose, apparently at the instruction of Chancellor Adenauer. The meeting may be summarized as follows:

a. According to General Gehlen, he had not actually seen the Chancellor personally, but was given instructions for the present U.S. trip by Dr. Globke, who was transmitting the Chancellor's views and desires. The Chancellor had been concerned over remarks reportedly recently made by Mr. McCloy in talks with certain German industrialists, especially Dr. Fritz Berg. In essence, the McCloy remarks, as relayed to General Gehlen, urged that West Germany should itself take the initiative in opening up dealings with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on various matters including the Oder-Neisse line. Reportedly, Mr. McCloy stated that the President was of the same opinion. Apparently, General Gehlen had been commissioned to find out whether it was true that the U.S. Government wished West Germany to take the initiative on its own with the GDR. For his part, the Chancellor, according to Gehlen, felt that this initiative would mean giving Khrushchev what he wanted before real negotiations between the West and the Soviets actually began. The remarks of Mr. McCloy were reportedly made in San Francisco after previous attempts of McCloy to elicit an invitation to visit Germany from Mr. Pferdemenges had failed. General Gehlen also made reference to statements attributed by the press to General Clay indicating that some major accommodations between Germans would soon have to be made, but Gehlen pointed out this particular incident had occurred since he had received his trip instructions from Dr. Globke.

b. The DCI stated his surprise and skepticism to Gehlen about the reports attributed to Mr. McCloy, expressed the view that if there was in authoritative quarters in Washington any desire for a German initiative, as alleged, this would certainly have been made known through

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appropriate official channels. The DCI advised Gehlen that no such desire had come to the attention of the DCI. General Gehlen's attention was drawn to the fact that Mr. McCloy has been assigned no responsibilities with respect to the Berlin situation, but had been concerned with the disarmament problem.

c. With respect to political developments in West Germany, Gehlen indicated that a main task of a new German government would be to enact an emergency law, already extant in draft form. The purpose of the law would be to provide the internal security provisions necessary to facilitate a military build-up. (Note that Gehlen has previously mentioned the theme of the necessary military build-up in connection with his opinion, expressed to the DCI, that the West would probably have to make some sort of an accommodation with the Soviets on Berlin because a really hard position was impossible, since NATO is not combat ready.) Reference was made to the fact that a two-thirds majority of the Parliament would be required to pass certain provisions of the law, and that should a full emergency be invoked under the present draft law, the Chancellor would be required to form an all-party government.

d. General Gehlen said he believed the situation in France had somewhat improved. He felt that even if General De Gaulle resigned, the danger of the People's Front would not be as eminent any more.

e. The DCI expressed the view to Gehlen that the BND had been harmed to a certain extent by the reporting they had been disseminating in connection with the Berlin crisis. The DCI stressed the need for adequate background -- the backing of hard intelligence.

1. The UJDROWSY case was briefly discussed, and the DCI expressed reluctance to provide illegal entry assistance. For his part, Gehlen said the BND had been advised against illegal entry by the Federal Attorney's office, and that plans had therefore been abandoned.

2. In a second meeting on 25 September, the DCI brought Gehlen together with General Maxwell Taylor, and Gehlen repeated his story for Taylor's benefit. It was made entirely clear to Gehlen that the rumors troubling the Chancellor were not to be credited, and that the official American viewpoint had been clearly communicated both to Brentano and to Carstens. The hope was expressed that Gehlen would make clear to the Chancellor that the United States government would express its views through appropriate channels and not indirectly. The DCI and General Taylor stressed the importance of making this point clearly to the Chancellor.

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3. In a discussion with Gehlen about the German political situation, it was difficult to separate Gehlen's view from those he attributed to the Chancellor. Gehlen expressed the opinion that Adenauer would not agree to head a one-party minority government, but that he would instead seek an alliance either with the FDP or the SPD, or possibly would try to work out a grand alliance of the three to meet the present crisis.

4. The State Department was advised concerning the Gehlen visit and the views he expressed. The fact that the German Foreign Office and Washington Embassy knew nothing of his trip was emphasized by Gehlen. The Department was apprised of this point.

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FOREIGN VISITOR PASS RECEIPT

1. I hereby acknowledge receipt of Special Privilege Security Pass # 344,419, issued to me to facilitate the entrance into Agency buildings of 335/ Gen. Reinhard Goben, and for the period 25 September 1961 to 2 October 1961.

2. This Special Privilege Security Pass will be retained in my custody or in the custody of a responsible staff employee at all times and will be shown to the building guards on behalf of the subject individual. When not in official use this pass will be kept in a 3-way combination safe cabinet, and will be returned by hand to the Physical Security Division, OS, Room 1401 "I" Building on or before 3 October 1961.

3. I agree to accept responsibility for the conduct and security of this visitor while on Agency property. Any classified Security Information made available to him will be handled in accordance with the provisions of Agency Regulation 50-7 and Regulation 60-110 which outlines the President's Directive of 25 May 1953 pertaining to the release of classified Security Information to foreign nationals.

DATE

RECEIVED

Returned:

9/24/61
DATE

[] /
PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

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SECRET

26 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/R&A

SUBJECT: Sefton Delmer's Articles on Gehlen in the
Sunday Telegraph

1. These two articles are subtly and maliciously slanted, either as a result of British distaste for German militarists or a more sinister intent to serve Communist ends. Here are a few examples:

a. Delmer says that at the end of the war Gehlen was "in command of all anti-Soviet operations". He wasn't. He was in command of German military intelligence against the USSR. Then as now, he was mainly concerned with OB.

b. "For his own work had shown him that OSS had not even begun to function in the Soviet Union" (by the end of the war). True, it had not. But there is a nasty implication here that Gehlen had been busily at work against the OSS and had been so successful that he knew what it was doing and what it wasn't.

c. "For most of that first conversation Gehlen was examining General Patterson, not Patterson Gehlen." Here Delmer is describing Gehlen's first postwar contact with U.S. intelligence. How does he know? He wasn't there. The invention is in line with Delmer's consistent attempt to show Gehlen as very clever and very sinister.

d. "And it was in Washington that Gehlen made his all-important deal - the deal which was the dream of Himmler and Schellenberg, the deal which enabled him to revive a section of Hitler's General Staff and lay the foundation of German rearmament at a time when such rearmament was still anathema...." This is distorted and vicious. Gehlen laid the foundation for postwar German intelligence, not the General Staff or armaments.

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e. "For not only was he able to turn his unit into a shadow of German General Staff but more important still he was now in a position to supply the Americans with the kind of intelligence which would make them feel that it was essential to recreate the German Army to help in the defence of Europe against the Russians." The same twist is evident here. Some of Gehlen's key people were and are officers; others were not. The model on which the organization was fashioned was, naturally, the FHO (Fremde Heere Ost) of the OKW, not the General Staff itself. And Gehlen's product was not diabolically altered to pit us against the Soviets or to lay the groundwork for the remilitarization of Germany. Here and elsewhere, Delmer portrays the Americans as the naive dupes of the subtle, scheming Gehlen.

f. Delmer also charges that Gehlen's organization recruited many former SD and Gestapo members. This is an old Communist canard. Most of Gehlen's people were straight G-2 types, a few were Abwehr, but very few were SD or Gestapo, precisely because Gehlen knew he could not afford them politically - and also because these types were looked upon with distaste by the professional officer class.

g. The second article starts, "Berlin remains the main battlefield in the war between the two rival gangs of Hitler's former Secret Service men." The main lie here is the assumption of moral - or immoral - equality between East and West. This lie is basic to Communist propaganda. Another lie is the "Hitler's Secret Service men" - i.e., SD and Gestapo, as noted above. As a matter of fact, some of Gehlen's key people were part of the military plot against Hitler.

2. The two articles are, in effect, mischievous. Their net effect is to render a service to the East, not the West.

[CI/R&A]

2 - Addr
1 - DP

SECRET

25 OCT 61

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: General Gehlen's Recent Mission to DCI
and Similar Demarche by Klaus Dohrn

1. This memorandum is for your information and recommends no action.
2. Attached at Tab A is a summary of your conversations with General Gehlen on 24 and 25 September 1961, subsequent to his urgent request for a conference with you and his special flight here for the purpose. Essentially, General Gehlen called to your attention the uneasiness of German officialdom, and this may also be reflected among the populace, with respect to present United States policy on Berlin and Germany.
3. You may also be interested in Tab B, a portion of a letter from Klaus Dohrn, roving Time/Life correspondent in Europe and mirror of West German CDU opinion. Dohrn has excellent contacts with Dr. Adenauer and Dr. Giebkke, as well as other leading CDU lights. He also maintains a relationship, the details of which are not precisely known to us, with General Gehlen. We do not know whether the Dohrn letter is based upon his relationship with Gehlen, or with the CDU. At any rate, the Dohrn letter was written on 23 September 1961, precisely the day General Gehlen set out on his urgent flight to see you, and seeks to convey exactly the same message. Dohrn assumes that his material is brought to the attention of persons with influence at a high level in the United States Government.
4. Also of interest in this context is the recent visit of Mr. Eric Warburg. When he talked to me on 2 October 1961, the subject uppermost in Mr. Warburg's mind was the need to restore confidence and to

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201 Gehlen

clear the air between the leaders of opinion in Germany and those in the United States, and, of course, between the two governments. He wanted someone of the stature of Mr. John McCloy to go to Germany and lecture in Hamburg and the Ruhr. In fact it was his intention later in the afternoon of 2 October to extend an invitation to Mr. McCloy to visit Hamburg for that purpose. The invitation was to be issued on behalf of Mr. Pfordemenges, also mentioned in both Tabs A and B.

GORDON M. STEWART
Chief, Eastern European Division

Attachments:

- Tab A - Summary of Conversations
- Tab B - Letter from Klaus Dohrn

cc: DDCI

DDP/EE/C: []:vob (25 Oct 61)

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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

November 2, 1961

DBF 93488

Re: Unknown Subject also known as
① "A Friend", in Contact with
Soviet Delegation to the
United Nations, November 2, 1961

On November 2, 1961, a highly confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on this date, a person known to the informant as "a friend" was in contact with the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, 680 Park Avenue, New York City.

According to the source, this person recently returned from Bonn, Germany, and feels he has information which would be of value to the Soviets. Source ascertained that "a friend" believes the leading CIA undercover agent in Germany is Reinhold Sehlen, who is a Nazi and a former Major General in the Nazi Party. G ✓ Sehlen resides with his wife a few miles south of Munich, Germany, in a town known as Pullock. This residence is surrounded by concrete walls. The residence is heavily guarded and frequently patrolled. Sehlen reported has four children.

Source learned from "a friend" that Sehlen visits CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., at regular intervals. "A friend" knows exactly when Sehlen visits Washington, D.C., and believes he is the only person who knows when these visits are made. "A friend" also knows where Sehlen stays while in Washington, D.C.

"A friend" understands that the Soviets will pay a large amount of money for Sehlen and feels that he, with assistance, can kidnap Sehlen and bring him to any area the Soviets might desire.

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FOR COORDINATION WITH FBI

DBF 93488

Re: Unknown Subject also known as
"A Friend", in Contact with
Soviet Delegation to the
United Nations, November 2, 1961

According to the source, if the Soviets are interested, they should place an advertisement in the "New York Journal American" (a New York City daily evening newspaper) under the Personal column or the Lost and Found column, stating, "Willie, come home". The Soviets should also leave a telephone number. "A friend" will then get in touch with the Soviets and discuss the matter.

The source stated that "a friend" may reside or be employed in the Bellmore, Long Island, New York, area.

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Re: "A Friend Letter"

Bank signature
card

IRVING DAVID TONER - believed
responsible - partial identification of TONER's
handwriting made with letter. Comparison
made from signatures at a bank
in Bellmore - Long Island -
Laboratory examining specimens to
confirm N.Y. identification -

Toner appears to be somewhat a
"nut" - An ^{NY} agent in N.Y. has an
entree with Toner & will interview
him under pretext & attempt to determine
identity of friends in effort to see if
he knows Fritz - Both live in
Bellmore - N.Y. believes Toner
got material for letter from
Time Mag. article 7/11/60 re
Gehlen & attempt to tie him
up with Agency



CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

BY LIAISON

Date: November 9, 1961
To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: ⁽³⁾ UNKNOWN SUBJECT ALSO KNOWN AS
"A FRIEND," IN CONTACT WITH
SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS, NOVEMBER 2, 1961
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

Reference is made to a memorandum from this Bureau regarding the above-captioned matter dated November 2, 1961, which was furnished to your Agency on November 6, 1961.

The "Reinhold Sehlen" mentioned therein is undoubtedly General Reinhard Gustav Gehlen, Chief, West German Intelligence Service, who is well known to your Agency.

This Bureau is attempting to identify the unknown subject in this matter. Any information your Agency may be able to furnish concerning General Gehlen's regular visits to Washington, D.C., and the extent of secrecy surrounding these visits, as related by the unknown subject, will assist us in evaluating the unknown subject's story. We would also appreciate any information available to your Agency which would lead to the identification of the unknown subject.

It is requested that your reply be given expeditious attention.

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FOR COORDINATION WITH FBI CONFIDENTIAL

18 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Report of Conversation with General Gehlen
and His Advice with Respect to Briefing
Chancellor Adenauer

1. During a meeting with Mr. James H. Critchfield and ☐ of our organization in Munich on the morning of 18 November General Reinhard Gehlen, President of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), advised us as follows.
2. On 16 November Gehlen met with Chancellor Adenauer and briefed the Chancellor, apparently among other subjects, on the balance of power between East and West.
3. According to Gehlen the Chancellor is not convinced that the United States holds nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. (Gehlen says he, himself, is convinced.) Furthermore the Chancellor questions estimates citing the percentage of our strategic Air Force planes which can be expected to reach their targets in event of war. He specifically asked Gehlen whether BND estimates are based on info supplied by the U.S. Gehlen acknowledged to the Chancellor that an information exchange occurs but advised the Chancellor that the BND had independently produced an estimate which coincides with U.S. views. In this conversation Gehlen referred to an estimate that "50 percent" of planes would get

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through to targets. However Mr. Critchfield and [] were not positive this the actual figure he used with the Chancellor.

4. Gehlen stated that the Chancellor was not taking into account Polaris and other nuclear capabilities and that after all the Chancellor is very much a layman on military affairs. Gehlen then recommended that during the Chancellor's visit to Washington an effort be made to convince him of U. S. nuclear superiority and other matters pertinent to western military strength. Finally, Gehlen urged that the Chancellor should under no circumstances get the impression that Gehlen informed us of above or that he had made such suggestion.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

GORDON M. STEWART

SECRET

20 Nov 61

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: General Gehlen Suggests Briefing for Chancellor
Adenauer on Nuclear and Military Matters

1. This memorandum is for your information. The essence of the information provided below was given to Mr. Foy D. Kohler on November 18, 1961. According to Mr. Kohler, present planning already includes briefing of the Chancellor on the subjects in question. The information is also being given to Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the White House.
2. On the morning of November 18, 1961, two CIA staff members (Mr. James H. Critchfield, Chief, Near East Division, DDP, and Mr. [redacted] Chief of Munich Liaison Base) had a lengthy discussion with General Reinhard Gehlen, President of the West German Federal Intelligence (BND). During the course of this talk, General Gehlen said he had met with Chancellor Adenauer on November 16th and had briefed the Chancellor on several subjects, including the question of the balance of power between East and West. In this connection, General Gehlen had the following comments.
3. The Chancellor is not convinced that the United States holds nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Chancellor questions estimates of the percentage of Strategic Air Command retaliatory force which can be expected to reach their targets in event of nuclear war. He specifically asked Gehlen whether BND estimates are based on information supplied by the United States. While Gehlen acknowledged to the Chancellor that an information exchange occurs, he assured the Chancellor that the BND estimate, which coincides with United States views available to him, had been arrived at independently. (NOTE: Through arrangements with the Air Force, General Gehlen was recently briefed by SAC in Omaha. Gehlen himself appears to be thoroughly convinced of United States superiority. In the conversation with Critchfield and [redacted] Gehlen referred to an estimate that 50 percent of attacking planes would get through to their targets, but it is not clear whether this is what he had told the Chancellor.)

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Huber
Hester

4. Commenting that the Chancellor has not taken into account the Polaris and other nuclear capabilities, Gehlen observed that the Chancellor is after all very much of a layman on military matters. Then Gehlen recommended that an effort be made to convince the Chancellor of the nuclear superiority of the United States and to brief him on other matters pertinent to western military strength during his visit to Washington. Finally, Gehlen urged that the Chancellor should under no circumstances become aware of the fact that Gehlen had informed CIA of the above, or that he had suggested a special military briefing for the Chancellor.

GORDON M. STEWART
Chief, Eastern European Division

cc: DDCI

DDP/EE/G: [] :bk (20 November 61)

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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DBF

97472

C O N F I D E N T I A L

New York, New York

December 22, 1961

① Re: Irving David Toner also known as
David Toner

On December 12 and December 14, 1961, another government agency which maintains personnel type records made available the following information on Toner:

Toner served in the United States Army from September 6, 1940 to July 28, 1945, when he was honorably discharged by reason of demobilization. Effective July 29, 1945, he received 40% disability from the United States Government for a nervous condition which was deemed service connected. During the period March 12, 1946 to August 18, 1946, he was confined to hospitals for a mental condition.

On May 1, 1946, a representative of the government agency conducted a neuropsychiatric examination of Toner. Toner indicated to the representative of the government agency that he was born in New York City on August 23, 1922. He lived with his mother for the first eight years of his life and then with his grandmother. He remained with his grandmother until he enlisted in the United States Army at the age of 18. Prior to entering military service, he had two years of high school, taking a mechanical course. He did not like school and left to enlist in the United States Army. He had no employment prior to entering military service.

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FOR COORDINATION WITH FBI

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CS COPY

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Re: Irving David Toner also known as
David Toner

Toner advised that he was in a hospital in New Guinea in 1944 for psychoneurosis. He was hospitalized over an argument which resulted in Toner's attempting to shoot another soldier over a grudge of long standing.

During the examination, he stated that he was a scout attached to a patrol for spotting artillery fire. He said that he knew many Japanese in Hawaii before the start of the war and thought highly of them. It was his opinion that the Japanese were generally misunderstood in the United States.

Toner stated that he was glad to be discharged since he hated guarding German prisoners of war. He stated that after his Army service, he needed a rest.

On March 12, 1946, Toner was given 100% disability based on his nervous condition which was deemed to be service connected. As of September 1, 1946 he was receiving \$138 a month.

Toner was afforded periodic neuropsychiatric examinations by physicians during the period 1946 to 1961. His most recent neuropsychiatric examination was on January 6, 1961. At that time, his condition was diagnosed as schizophrenic reaction, chronic, incapacity marked. He is confined to his dwelling and family premises. The physician examining Toner also noted that Toner's memory is good but his judgment is partially impaired.

As of October, 1957, Toner's 100% disability gave him a United States Government allowance of \$225 a month.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Re: Irving David Toner also known as
David Toner

In an undated handwritten letter received by the government agency at its Washington, D. C. office and referred to its New York City office on November 2, 1960, Mrs. Fred Toner, 2510 Ocean Avenue, Bellmore, New York, mother of Irving David Toner, inquired as to the new Public Law 663, which would increase compensation for her son, Irving David Toner.

On February 10, 1961, the government agency advised Toner that he would receive \$265 a month, effective November 1, 1960, rather than \$225 a month, since his condition was found to come within the meaning of Public Law 86-663, under which law disabled veterans, who are house bound due to service disability, would receive a special monthly compensation. The file on Toner reflected that he is single, that his mother is Mrs. Fred Toner also known as Mrs. Minnie Duncan Toner whose residence is indicated to be 2510 Ocean Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.

No employment for Toner is shown in the file since his discharge from military service other than his statement that he worked for a four month period immediately after his discharge for an antique firm in New York City.

On December 14, 1961, a representative of the government agency advised that it is his interpretation that the term "house bound" meant that a veteran would be restricted to the area around his residence. This might include trips on subway trains from his residence to New York City but such a condition would not permit him to drive an automobile.

On December 11, 1961, records of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), State of New York, 155 Worth Street, New York City, were reviewed and it was reflected that on January 20, 1961, David Toner renewed his Motor Vehicle registration and received 1961 New York registration NN9039 for a 1960 white Studebaker.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Re: Irving David Toner also known as
David Toner

In an undated BMV form, Toner desired to amend his operator's license to drop his first name.

BMV also reflected that Toner holds a current chauffeur's license issued October 11, 1960 and a current operator's license issued September 30, 1961. His address is shown as 2510 Ocean Avenue, Bellmore, New York.

On December 8, 1961, a review of the records of the Credit Bureau of Greater New York reflected in a credit report, dated September 30, 1961, that Irving D. Toner, wife Marietta, resided at 2510 Ocean Avenue, Bellmore, New York. Toner was shown to be self-employed as a dental mechanic at his home address. His wife is employed as a packer with the Custom Made Paper Bag Company, 3302 Stillman Avenue, Long Island City, New York.

On December 18, 1961, the records of the Bureau of Criminal Identification, New York City Police Department, were reviewed and no record was located for Irving David Toner.

On December 20, 1961, records of the Nassau County Police Department, Mineola, Long Island, New York, which department covers Bellmore, New York, were reviewed and no record was located for Irving David Toner.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Re: Irving David Toner

On December 21, 1961, Irving David Toner was interviewed by Special Agents (SAS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). At the beginning of the interview he was questioned as to any knowledge he had of criminal activities in the New York City area. Following this SAS expressed an interest in any information Toner may have regarding the Soviets. It was pointed out to him that he recently wrote to the FBI in New York City, stating that he had a friend in the Russian Embassy, Washington, D.C.

Toner stated that the person he referred to in this letter is a Russian by the name of Boris, last name unknown, whom he first met in about 1948, when Boris worked in a Communist Party (CP) Headquarters in Long Island City, New York. About September, 1961, Toner was in a restaurant in New York City in the vicinity of 58th Street on either First or Second Avenues when a person approached him. During conversation with this person, this person identified himself as Mirasov or Morozov, a Soviet. While Toner was speaking with Mirasov, Boris appeared and joined the conversation.

Toner described Boris as being about 5'7" in height, wearing glasses and having thin light brown hair. He was unable to estimate his age. Boris spoke excellent English. Toner could not give a description of Mirasov.

At this point in the interview Toner interrupted and asked if SAS knew of Reinhard Gehlen. SAS indicated to Toner that Gehlen may be connected with the West German Government. Toner asked if Gehlen was connected with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and he was advised that this was not known to the interviewing agents.

Toner asked if Gehlen was a Nazi Major General in World War II, and he was advised it was not known if he was a Nazi, to which Toner replied that all Germans in World War II were Nazis. Toner continued that Gehlen resides in Pullach, Germany, a town situated on a river about 4 or 5 miles from Munich, Germany.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: Irving David Toner

Toner was questioned as to where he obtained his information concerning Gehlen and stated he got this from Mirasov in about September, 1961. Mirasov told him there was a price of half a million dollars on Gehlen's head. Toner stated that he became interested in Gehlen since he wanted to "make a bundle" and Gehlen might be the means by which he could make a large amount of money.

SAS told Toner that in his recent letters to the FBI in New York City, he mentioned that the Communists desired him to obtain information about a nuclear submarine. Toner stated that Boris had asked him in September, 1961 to obtain information about the submarine Tullibee, which had been constructed in Groton, Connecticut. This proposition interested him since he saw this as an opportunity to make money by getting such information and selling it to the Soviets.

Throughout the interview with Toner he expressed interest in obtaining money for any work he might do for the FBI. It was pointed out to him that much of the information the FBI receives is on a voluntary basis from loyal patriotic citizens. Using extensive profanity, Toner ridiculed loyalty and patriotism, stating that he would only perform intelligence work for money for whomever would pay him the most. If the Russians would pay him a good deal of money and expect him to do intelligence work against the United States, he would work for the Russians but would try to deceive them if the opportunity arose.

At two other periods during the interview Toner returned to Gehlen and mentioned that Gehlen was in charge of intelligence in Germany in World War II, and toward the end of the war he obtained many of his files and furnished them to United States authorities. Toner also mentioned that Gehlen carries on double agent operations.

Toner feels that Gehlen is an opportunist and will eventually turn against the United States. He feels that Gehlen is marked for death and said that an attempt had already been made to blow up Gehlen. Gehlen, according

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: Irving David Toner

to Toner, has a wife but Toner did not mention any children.

Toner feels that if he could get to Germany he could "cut down Gehlen with a machine gun" as he comes out of his residence. Toner feels that Gehlen might be shot as he emerged from a plane if he comes to the United States, but he did not elaborate on this.

Toner indicated during the interview that he has a dislike for all Germans.

Toner mentioned that the United States Government has a man in a Soviet building at 1609 Decatur Street, Washington, D.C. This person is a clerk. He was questioned as to how he knew this, but was unable to furnish any source regarding this information.

The address 1609 Decatur Street, North West, Washington, D.C. is that of the Soviet Consular Office.

Toner stated that the Soviets have a man in CIA and stated he received this information from Boris. He could not be more specific in this regard and was unable to state in what office this person was employed.

SAS questioned Toner as to where he gained his information regarding intelligence matters and he said he obtained almost all of it from the "New York Times" (a New York morning daily and Sunday newspaper). He did not read any other newspapers or magazines. At one point he questioned the SAS as to where they obtained information regarding Gehlen and he was told that the Special Agents recalled seeing an article on Gehlen in "Time" magazine a little over a year ago. Toner did not appear convinced of this.

Toner indicated that he knew the Soviets occupied a building at 68th Street and Park Avenue, New York City, and stated that they plan to move to a new building.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Re: Irving David Toner

Regarding his personal life Toner stated he is self employed as a dental technician working out of his residence under the name Dunton Laboratory. He received dental technician training during military service, but he does very little work along this line. With regard to his income he stated he works as a private detective doing commercial investigations, but would not elaborate on this. He also indicated in a general way that he was engaged in criminal activities. He has an automobile and mentioned driving to New Jersey on several occasions.

He is a disabled veteran and receives only about \$60 a month from the United States Government. A few years ago he was receiving \$100 per month.

He is married and has no children. He has a mother and father but declined to identify his parents or where they reside.

Regarding his associates, Toner stated that he and his wife remain to themselves at their residence in Bellmore, Long Island, New York. He has some friends, but declined to name them. It was pointed out to him Bellmore has a high percentage of residents of German descent but he stated this was not known to him.

Regarding trips abroad he has made he said he was in Australia while in military service. In 1946 or 1947 he went to Morocco and also visited Munich, Frankfurt and Hamburg in Germany and visited in England and France. He indicated that his trip abroad at this time was in connection with looking into the criminal field, but he would not elaborate on this. In 1952 or 1953 he visited Cuba for a two month period for purposes of pleasure. He has not made any trips abroad for the past 8 or 9 years. However, he plans taking a trip to Italy on March 20, 1962.

Throughout the interview Toner expressed interest in making a large sum of money and repeatedly indicated he desired to "make a big bundle". He said that he has no scruples about doing intelligence work for the Russians against the United States if the Russians are willing to pay him enough money.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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1961

SUBJECT: Biographic Sketch of General Reinhard GEHLEN

1. General GEHLEN is the President of the West German Federal Intelligence Service. He has held this position since 31 March 1956 when the predecessor organization became legalized. During the postwar period and prior to that time General GEHLEN headed the private intelligence organization which bore his name before becoming the present West German Federal Intelligence Service.

2. General GEHLEN was born 3 April 1902 in Erfurt and was educated in Breslau. He entered the military service in 1920 and was commissioned in 1923. His first service was in the horse cavalry. In 1935 he attended the War Academy and subsequently became a General Staff Corps officer. He was a battery commander at the outbreak of World War II and was almost immediately promoted to the rank of Major. He filled a number of staff assignments coming in close contact with Generals HALDER and HEUSINGER. By 1942, he was placed in command of Fremde Herre Ost which was roughly the German equivalent of American G-2 intelligence operations on the German East front. He was a colonel at this time and was soon promoted to Generalmajor. His unit had both an operational and an analysis function regarding Soviet Army order of battle on the East front. He aroused the ire of Hitler as early as 1943 when during the course of an order of battle briefing for Hitler it was implied the German Army was facing defeat. Nevertheless his organization continued to function effectively during the remainder of the war under General Staff Corps protection at the time when the Abwehr disintegrated. By the time the general military situation began to disintegrate, GEHLEN made plans with several of his senior officers to withdraw with the files for the purpose of caching them in Bavaria. Basic plans were also laid for recontacting key personnel after the inevitable surrender in event a continuation of their work were possible.

3. In May 1945 and from a hideout in Bavaria, General GEHLEN surrendered to the United States Army. During the course of his interrogation he chose to reveal his ideas and plans for a continuation of his work. He and certain of his coworkers were sent to Camp Richey for a more detailed interrogation and a decision was made at the G-2 level to return General GEHLEN to Germany and allow him to rebuild his organization under G-2 responsibility. His organization was first located in Oberursel and later in Pullach. In 1948, CIA was requested to look into the GEHLEN Organization with a view to making a decision to take it over. By 1949, the decision was made and Pullach Operations Base was created to conduct liaison with the German organization and assist them as necessary. GEHLEN worked during this period to preserve the integrity of his organization from American control so that it would be politically acceptable to Bonn at the proper time. The essential American position was that of holding the

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

201 GEHLEN, Reinhard

SECRET

German organization together so that it would be available to Bonn when they required such an organization. General GEHLEN worked during this period to achieve the legalization of his organization which was accomplished in March 1946 and in recognition of previous American cooperation, CIA was accorded a most favored position as a liaison partner.

4. General GEHLEN has always enjoyed a personal relationship with Mr. Dulles and his immediate predecessors. Privileged communications have been exchanged. General GEHLEN last made an official visit to Washington in late April 1961. He also visited Washington in September 1961 at the request of Dr. GLOBKE and the German chancellor. Chief of Station, Germany and Chief, Munich Liaison Base serve as the personal representatives of the DCI vis a vis General GEHLEN and the General has Brigadier General KUEHLEIN here in Washington as his personal representative.

5. General GEHLEN is married and has three daughters and a son ranging in age from the late teens to the mid twenties. One of his daughters is married to his Bonn office representative. General GEHLEN appears to enjoy relatively good health despite a gall bladder or liver condition. He does not drink nor smoke. It is expected that he will continue in his present position for several more years before he chooses to retire. He lives in a house on Lake Starnberg some ten miles south of Munich. He lives there in as inconspicuous a manner as possible as is his characteristic of conduct of official matters.

SECRET

VIA TELETYPE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

TO	CHIEF, EE	PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
INFO.	CHIEF OF BASE, MUNI	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
FROM	CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
SUBJECT	UPHILL BIRTHDAY PRESENT FOR UTILITY		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	

1. THE FIRST OF APRIL WILL BE UTILITY'S SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY. IN THE PAST I HAVE GIVEN HIM HAVANA CIGARS BOTH ON HIS BIRTHDAY AND AT CHRISTMAS, BUT THIS TIME ☐ AND I FEEL SOMETHING EXTRA IS CALLED FOR, SINCE THE GERMANS MAKE SUCH AN OCCASION OF ROUND-NUMBER BIRTHDAYS.

2. AS YOU KNOW, UTILITY IS FOND OF AMERICANA. YOU WILL REMEMBER THE LARGE REVOLUTIONARY WAR SCENE WHICH HANGS IN HIS OFFICE, AN EARLIER KUBARK GIFT. IT OCCURRED TO US A GOOD PIECE OF STEUBEN GLASS ENGRAVED WITH SOME AMERICAN MOTIF WOULD BE SUITABLE. BOOKS WOULD PROBABLY NOT, THOUGH OTHER TYPES OF ART WORKS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

3. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN PROCURE THE RIGHT SORT OF THING IN WASHINGTON AND GET IT HERE IN TIME. PERHAPS ☐ COULD BRING IT. I SUPPOSE YOU WILL ALSO WISH TO INSPIRE BIRTHDAY GREETING FROM ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ , ETC.

DISTRIBUTION

BY TAPE
2-C/EE

BY POUCH
1-WASH

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DATE TYPED
14 MAR 62

DATE DISPATCHED

TOR-14 MAR 62

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

EGOT-14357

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE

OFFICER

TYPIST

EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL

DATE

OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL

DATE

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

C. / Liaison

FORM 53

USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 6100 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(40)

DISPATCH

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings for General GELLEN

1. This memorandum suggests action by the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. We wish to call to your attention that 1 April 1962 is General GELLEN's sixtieth birthday. In past years it has been customary for the Director of Central Intelligence to send birthday congratulations to the General. This year seems more important because Germans make a greater occasion of round number birthdays.
3. Attached is a cable greeting which you might feel appropriate to send for passage to General GELLEN.

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DATE 2005

Gordon M. Stewart
Chief
Eastern Europe Division

1 Attachment

cc: DDCI

DDP/EE/G/L: [] :hj 19 March 1962

Distribution:

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- 1 - EE/G/L w/o attachment

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201 GELLEN, Reinhard

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 217
21 MAR 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : WE 6

INFO : COP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CI/OPS, EE 4, SIC 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. _____
RI file this copy as indicated X _____
Branch copy filed as indicated _____
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked _____ No _____

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 21 1202Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 46070

PARI INFO MUNI DIR CITE FRAN 8783

UPHILL

REF: PARI 9856

SEE MUNI 0210 BEING RELAYED. [] HAVE NOTHING TO ADD. *S F 19*

NO PICTURES DESIRED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED IF GERMAN STATION DESIRED GIVE [] ANY HELPFUL
BACKGROUND INFO ON GEHLEN AND [] BEFORE VISIT.

RI COPY
BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	<i>W</i>
RID/NTS	<i>W</i>
RID/PS	<i>W</i>
RID/HT	<i>W</i>
<i>EE/E</i>	
DESTROY	

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

SECRET

22 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Reinhard GEHLEN

This memorandum is a reminder that 1 April 1962 is General GEHLEN's sixtieth birthday. [] and I both feel he would appreciate a message of congratulations from you. We think it would be particularly appropriate in recognition of the fact that Germans make such an occasion of round number birthdays.

Gordon M. Stewart
Chief
Eastern Europe Division

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DATE 2005

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SECRET

201 GEHLEN, Reinhard

22 March 1962

General Reinhard Gehlen
President of the Bundesnachrichtendienst

Dear General Gehlen,

I wish to extend to you on the occasion of your sixtieth birthday my sincere congratulations. A real milestone has been reached and with my congratulations I send best wishes for your good health and continued success. I look back with great pleasure on our meetings during the past years and the opportunity they afforded for us to renew our friendship and I trust the future will afford us similar occasions.

Cordially,

Richard Helms

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2006

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201 001111, Reinhard

ORIG : Gordon Stewart
UNIT : C/EE
EXT : 6978
DATE : 19 March 1962 1582

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1	<i>C/EE</i>	4	<i>ch</i>
2	<i>6</i>	5	<i>C/EE</i>
3		6	<i>at</i>

TO : MUNICH BASE FRANKFURT HEADQUARTERS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: EE 6

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, S/C 2

23 MAR 62 20 38 Z

SIG GEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 64537

00164537

TO MUNI INFO FRAN

CHE DIR

UPHILL

FROM C 2 FOR UTILITY

49411

I WISH TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO EXTEND MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU ON YOUR SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY. I WISH YOU GOOD HEALTH AND CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THE COMING YEARS AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE SAME CLOSE COOPERATION WHICH HAS ALWAYS EXISTED BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

Richard Helms

DCI
RELEASING OFFICER

DDP

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

Gordon Stewart

C/EE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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*C: 201
SCHILLER Reinhard*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

243

SECRET

DATE : 2 APR 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

ACTION : FE 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, EE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	<i>G</i>	4	<i>un</i>
2	<i>EX</i>	5	
3	<i>un</i>	6	

APR 2 1254Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 12540

PRITY MUNI INFO DIR CITE SAIG 8398

UPHILL

PLEASE CONVEY

WARMEST BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO UTILITY

ON HIS 60TH ANNIVERSARY.

END OF MESSAGE

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DATE 2005

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201 GEHLEN, Reinhard

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

24 APR 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : KOBLENZ

SUBJECT : C/EE 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 24 1835Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 24534

MUNI INFO FROM DIR CITE KONZ 0311

RYBAT UJDROWSY

WOULD APPRECIATE FOLLOWING INFO:

1. WHAT WAS EXACT ITINERARY UJDRACO VII? DID THEY VISIT STANFORD? DID UTILITY EVER VISIT HOOVER LIBRARY STANFORD, MONTEREY LANGUAGE SCHOOL OR [] RANCH?
2. IDENS V-2619, 2857, 9592, 2619, 2070, 20727
3. DOES 363/VI STAND FOR UPHILL BONN OFFICE OR FOR AN INDIVIDUAL. PLS IDENTIFY.

END OF MESSAGE

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DATE 2005

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

C/EE/C/L

2071

27 April 1960

1646

KOBLENZ

FRANKFURT HEADQUARTERS

DIRECTOR

MUNICH BASE

C/EE 3

ADCP, C/CI, C/CI 2, C/CI 3, C/WE 1, C/CI 2

SIG GEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 77235

66880

KOMZ

INFO FRAN MUNI

CITE DIR

RYBAT WIDROWBY

RE: KOMZ 0011 (IN 24534)
MUNI 0919 (IN 25156)

1. ACCORDING TRAVEL BUREAU RESERVATIONS WDRACO VII ITINERARY AS
FOLLOWS: 14-15 SEPT 56 FROM WASH TO DETROIT, 15-17 DENVER, 17-20 SAN
FRANCISCO, 20-22 LOS ANGELES, 22-24 TUCSON, 24-25 NEW ORLEANS, 26-28
NEW YORK AND DEPARTED FOR EUROPE BY SHIP EXCEPT WIDROWBY WHO LEFT BY
AIR ARRIVING FRAN MUNI 29 SEPT. SINCE NO RECORD HQS OF ESCORT TRAVEL
REPORT, SUGGEST L [] COULD COMMENT IF YOU DESIRE FURTHER DETAILS
INCLUDING STANFORD.

2. CANNOT FIND INDICATION UTILITY VISITED STANFORD, MONTGOMERY OR
[] RANCH THOUGH CANNOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY. IF SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT
SUGGEST MUNI MAKE APPROPRIATE QUERIES TO UPHILL.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

END OF MESSAGE

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C/EE/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS


S E C R E T

C/EE/C/L


AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION Secret	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGNA-23723
TO	Chief, EIE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO	Chief of Station, Germany Chief of MLR, Munich		<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
FROM	Chief of Base, Bonn		DATE 23 May 1962
SUBJECT  Transmittal of personal letter	RE "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)		
	<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
ACTION REQUIRED	For your information		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)			

The attached letter to the undersigned is self-explanatory.
Note the statement of intention to remain in harness another five years.



Enclosures:
1. (letter, dated 9 April 1962), one copy ~~original~~ h/w

Distribution:
✓ 2—EE, w/enc. noted
2—COS, w/enc., 1 copy, h/w
2—MLB, w/enc., 1 copy, h/w

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DATE 2005

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1 ENCL

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION, REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION Secret	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING	
TO	Chief, Munich Liaison Base	PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
INFO.			MARKED FOR INDEXING	
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
SUBJECT	Chief, EE UTPHILL UTILITY		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
			ABSTRACT	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				

Ref: ROMA 58612, 11 May 1962

1. We are still confused regarding UTILITY's rank in the Bundeswehr reserve. He was a Generalmajor in the Wehrmacht which is equivalent to the United States one star rank. Ref indicates he is now a Lieutenant General (Reserve). Presumably this means he now holds the equivalent of three star rank. Are we correct? If so did he skip the two star equivalent or did we miss out on that phase.

2. We pose the foregoing merely to maintain a correct Headquarters record.

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Distribution:
2 - MCB
2 - COS/G

REMARKS

I've talked this over with x Veeck and a few (and checked the others. Apparently, there is no record that UTILITY had any rank whatever in the reserves before - his X'mas cards etc. being "General Major A.D." This rank is equal to Brigade Gen. in present Bundeswehr. Therefore the confusion re his ~~rank~~ recent emergence as a Lt. Gen. Veeck thinks the "promotion" UTILITY got recently really ~~xxx~~ means that he was given a reserve rank for the first time - as a Lt. Gen. Suggest @ HARTWIG might best be able to straighten this out. pdh - who is this?

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 June 1962	13 JUN 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
ROMA 11921	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
TING TYPIST HLJ	EXT 6196

2 - EE/G/L 1 - EE/G/IS	C/EE/G/L	COORDINATING		
ROUTING RI	INITIAL	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
RID/AM				
RID/MIS				
RID/EE				
RID/ET				
EE/G/L				
		OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	RELEASING
		C/EE/G	12/62	

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ECMA 60225
TO Chief, EE	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 32W-		
INFO Chief of Station, Germany			
FROM Acting Chief, Munich Liaison Base	DATE 17 October 1962		
SUBJECT UPHILL Operational Letter from General Gehlen for General Maxwell Taylor	RE "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)		
	<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
ACTION REQUIRED See below		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)			
<p>1. Attached is a letter we received on 17 October for forwarding to General Maxwell Taylor.</p> <p>2. If the contents of the letter are such that it would be appropriate, we would be interested in having a copy of the letter for our files.</p>			
<p>Attachment: HERewith Letter</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - C/EE w/Att 2 - COS/G w/o Att</p>			
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>			
<p>BEST AVAILABLE COPY</p>			
<p>FORM 10-57 53 100</p> <p>USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.</p> <p>CS COPY</p>			
		CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SECRET

2-56/15

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Letter for General Maxwell Taylor from
Gen Reinhard Gehlen


1. Attached for delivery to General Maxwell Taylor is a letter from General Reinhard Gehlen, President of the West German Federal Intelligence Service. The letter was sent to us from Munich via agency pouch. We do not know the content of the letter but think it may be a letter of congratulations to Gen Taylor on his selection to the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

2. We suggest that Mr. [] might be the most appropriate channel to see that the letter reaches General Taylor. If the letter requires reply we would be pleased to serve as the channel to General Gehlen.

[]
David E. Murphy /
Chief
Eastern Europe Division

Attachment: Letter

SECRET



General Taylor

You will recall that you attended Mr. Allen W. Dulles' dinner for General Gehlen on his last visit to the United States in the spring of 1961.

If you desire to reply, we will be glad to serve as channel to General Gehlen.

Richard Helms

Att.-Env. addressed to
General Maxwell Taylor

26 Oct. 1962

(Note & attached envelope given to
[] for delivery - 26/10/62)

cc: EE ✓



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

25655

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Helms

I would appreciate if if you would pass this letter
to General Gehlen.

Maxwell D. Taylor
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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DATE 2001 2005

FOR COORDINATION WITH ed DOD

2-5655

26 October 1962

Dear General Gehlen:

I have just received your kind message of October 15 commenting upon my new assignment as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. I appreciate very much your good wishes and look forward to our working together in the common cause.

Sincerely,

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lieutenant General Reinhard Gehlen
Der Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes

FOR COORDINATION WITH
DOD

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING																					
TO		PRO- POSED	ACTION	ACCOM- PLISHED																					
	Chief, Munich Liaison Base		MARKED FOR INDEXING																						
			NO INDEXING REQUIRED																						
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING																						
FROM	Chief, EE		ABSTRACT																						
			INDEXING																						
SUBJECT	UPHILL/Liaison Letter for General GHELM																								
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES																									
<p>Ref: EGMA 60225, 17 October 1962</p> <p>1. Forwarded herewith is an envelope containing a letter for General GHELM from General Maxwell D. Taylor. It is requested that you deliver the letter promptly.</p> <p>2. Also attached is a copy of the letter from General Taylor to General GHELM which makes clear that the letter transmitted in reference was one of congratulations.</p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;">[] []</p> <p>Attachments: A. Letter B. Copy of Letter</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - MEB v/att A & B 2 - COS/G v/att B</p>																									
<div style="transform: rotate(-15deg); font-size: 24pt; font-weight: bold; opacity: 0.5;">BEST AVAILABLE COPY</div> <div style="font-size: 10pt; margin-top: 10px;"> DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005 </div>																									
<div style="border: 1px dashed black; width: 150px; height: 100px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> <p style="margin-top: 20px;">2 - EE/G/L w/o att 1 - EE/G/IS w/o att 1 - RI w/att B</p>		<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="font-size: 8pt;">DATE TYPED</td> <td colspan="2" style="font-size: 8pt;">30 OCT 1962</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="font-size: 8pt;">29 October 62</td> <td colspan="2"></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4" style="font-size: 8pt;">DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4" style="text-align: center; font-size: 8pt;">EGMA 3821</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4" style="font-size: 8pt;">HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER</td> </tr> </table>				DATE TYPED		30 OCT 1962		29 October 62				DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER				EGMA 3821				HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER			
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OFFICE C/EE/G/L		OFFICER E	TYPIST ld	EXT. 5871																					
COORDINATING																									
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME																							
RELEASING																									
OFFICE SYMBOL C/EE/G/L	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE E																							

*Die besten Wünsche und alles Gute
zum Neuen Jahr!*

R. Gehlen
Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes

Mr. David Murphy

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DATE 2005

25 Dec 62

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

VIA: Chief, CI Staff
Chief, FI Staff

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit of General Reinhard Gehlen,
President of the BND

1. This memorandum contains two recommendations in paragraphs 10 and 11 which require approval by the DD/P.

2. General Gehlen has visited the United States on many occasions at the invitation of CIA. His last official visit took place in April 1961. Since then the retirement of Mr. Allen W. Dulles and the Felte case have occurred and it is our belief that these events have led General Gehlen to suspect that the previous close relationship with CIA may have changed to some degree. General Gehlen felt he had a particular personal relationship with Mr. Dulles which allowed him to address himself to Mr. Dulles through a privileged channel when he felt the need for Mr. Dulles' counsel and advice. This channel was often used by Chancellor Adenauer as well and created a sense of particular trust and confidence. Mr. Dulles' retirement and the arrest of Felte occurred almost simultaneously. Concomitant with the revelations of the depth of compromise caused by the Felte case, a cut-back in our personnel in direct liaison with the BND in Munich took place. This reduction had been previously planned and was not connected with the Felte case. All of these events together seem to have created the impression in the mind of General Gehlen and some of his senior staff members that a fundamental change in CIA's attitude toward the BND had occurred and that the BND and its intelligence product are no longer as significant for CIA as in previous periods.

3. There do exist problems in regard to the internal security of the BND and to the quality of BND's product but in our view CIA must, while observing appropriate security restrictions, continue its liaison relationship with the intelligence service of the Federal Republic and should if at all possible retain the most favored relationship which

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we have continued to enjoy generally even after the legalization of the Organization Gehlen in February 1956 and which provides a window to the Federal German Government and its activities as well as a channel for exercising influence.

4. We therefore feel that an invitation to General Gehlen to visit the United States in the late spring or early fall of 1963 is in the interest of CIA and our liaison objectives. Such a visit with its customary and unchanged VIP treatment and the opportunity to meet with the DCI and DDCI and other senior CIA officers should go a long way to reassure General Gehlen that CIA's basic attitude toward him and his organization as such have not changed although we would leave no doubt as to the pressing need for the continuation of the vigorous pursuit of tightening BRD personnel security. General Gehlen has met the DCI on one previous occasion in Frankfurt/Main in the company of Mr. Dulles in November 1961, but he has never met the DDCI.

5. The substantive agenda would include briefings for General Gehlen on topics proposed by him, the German Station and Headquarters. We would be particularly interested in exploring with him ways and means by which the BRD could increase its contribution of military intelligence on the Warsaw Pact Forces. We would further want to discuss with him aspects of our computer program and the exchange in machine language of non-sensitive counter-intelligence information held by his service and CIA. Such an exchange requires compatible systems. It is believed General Gehlen would be receptive to such a proposal, which would be further pursued by the German Station. We also propose to make arrangements to show General Gehlen Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base. During his last visit in April 1961 General Gehlen visited SAC Headquarters in Omaha which resulted in a much better appreciation by General Gehlen of United States military preparedness and capabilities. We therefore believe that visits to Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base would update General Gehlen's views on United States military capabilities.

6. Biographic data on General Gehlen is contained in Attachment A.

7. It is our intention when extending the invitation to General Gehlen to state that we would also welcome a visit by General [] at the same time. General [] is chief of Auswertung (Evaluations) in the BND and has a position comparable to the DDI in our organization. General [] has always been particularly interested in a close exchange of views between his and our organizations and a continued discussion of problems of mutual interest. Under his leadership the evaluations section of the BND has become considerably more flexible in its analysis and evaluation of the intelligence product of the BND. General []'s close connections to policy levels in the German Foreign Office and his pro-American attitude make him quite useful as a window into German thinking and a receptive partner to accept and pass on American views on specific situations.

8. Biographic data on General [] is attached as Attachment B.

9. It is conceivable that General Gehlen would desire to bring with him one other officer from his staff. The identity of such a person could only be determined after the invitation to General Gehlen is issued.

10. If the DD/P concurs, C/RE would like to extend the invitation personally to General Gehlen on the occasion of his TTY to Germany in March. Permission to do so is hereby requested. It is felt that late May or early June would be the most appropriate time for the visit to take place. It is anticipated the visit would be of two weeks duration and would include a full five day work week to allow time for substantive briefings and discussions. The remaining week would be spent in travel to Florida and California.

11. The basic cost of the visit will be financed from Project HELAURITE funds contained in sub project UJDRACO. However, authority is requested to expend up to \$1500.00 from Headquarters OOA funds to cover representational costs while General Gehlen is our guest in Washington.

12. It is planned that [] would serve as CIA escort officer during the course of the visit. Both Generals Gehlen and [] would travel in mufti. They shun publicity and their previous travels to the United States have not created security problems of any type. Brigadier General [], the BND permanent representative in Washington, would serve as the BND escort officer.

David E. Murphy
Chief
Eastern Europe Division

Attachments: A. Biographic Data on General Gehlen
B. Biographic Data on General []

destroyed

CONCURRENCES:

Chief, CI

Chief, FI

APPROVED:

Deputy Director (Plans)

Date

cc: C/CI, w/att
C/FI, w/att

SECRET

Extract from contact reports in EGM 61049, Att B, 21 Jan 63

para 5. UTILITY/FLEMING: Fleming had ...several recent indications that UTILITY was miffed about something or other involving FLEMING.... FLEMING said he though he knew UTILITY pretty well, that he had had a number of talks with him lately, and that it was funny how tangentially and obscurely UTILITY handled some matters.

*file utility
201*

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

23 Jan. [] Observed on a cable designation 101
RE: Jpn Utility Office

CONTACT REPORT

[] with @KURZ
14 February 1963, 1230-1445 hours
Bruecke

✓ 155/UTILITY

UJDROWSY Ops chrono (paras 1, 2)

1. @KURZ took off after the way UTILITY had handled the UJDROWSY matter, noting that UTILITY had made the statement before a gathering of people (@KURZ was not present) that he had known that UJDROWSY was a spy for a considerable time. (I got the impression that the "considerable time" referred to "years" and not "months.") He asked how you could have any respect for anyone who made such a patently false statement.

2. @KURZ then noted that he failed to understand how anyone could have passed the latest copy of the OPTIC to UJDROWSY just six weeks before the man was arrested. As the story unfolded, UJDROWSY was given a copy of the latest revised OPTIC by the Chief of the CI Abteilung (@STURM) just six weeks before he was arrested. @STURM knew that he was a spy at the time, and how could this have happened. Had @KURZ known that this action would be taken, he never would have given two copies of the OPTIC to the CI Section.

3. I told @KURZ (considerably later during the luncheon) I was sorry I hadn't seen him at the UPHILL "Christmas Party." @KURZ bridled, stated he didn't go to parties to which he wasn't invited, and noted that he was well aware that UTILITY didn't think much of him any more. It all stems from his refusal to accept work under someone who has loose morals. Admittedly, @PETERSEN has only had one affair and there is no evidence that he has dabbled any more since, but he cannot work for someone whom he doesn't respect. After telling UTILITY this, the Doctor commented that he would therefore loose Herrn @KEMPF but @KURZ commented (not clear whether he also commented to UTILITY) that this was ridiculous since @KEMPF would also refuse to work under @PETERSEN. It therefore looked as though he (@KURZ) would remain Oberregierungsrat. He then said that he couldn't tell this to a "Mitarbeiter" but that the Leadership (UTILITY) would change by fall of this year. (By this time @KURZ had worked himself up to the point where he was furious, and it was quite clear that his anger was directed at UTILITY.) I asked him if this was a result of the Spiegel, and he commented that the Spiegel wasn't the only thing that would bring about the change. He warned me several times not to repeat this to a soul.

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SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE) REINHARD GEHLEN <i>C-32539</i>		REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK Nº 126466 DATE 15 Feb 1963	
2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC. DR. SCHNEIDER Robert GRABER		TO CHIEF, FI/D	
3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 3 Apr 1902, Erfurt, Thuringia		ORIGINATING OFFICER NAME E	
4. CITIZENSHIP German		OFFICE DESIGNATOR EE/G/L ROOM, BUILDING 3 D 5509 EXTENSION 5871	
5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION President - West German Intelligence Service (BND)		13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE) <input type="checkbox"/> FIRST TIME SUBMITTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ADDITIONAL DATA <input type="checkbox"/> RECHECK FOR CURRENT	
6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION 1908-1920 Gymnasium Breslau (Reifeseugniss) Professional Army Man (Present Rank Lt. Gen.)		14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE) <input type="checkbox"/> ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	
7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE			
ACTIVITY		LOCATION	DATES
German Army	Germany	1920-45	
U. S. PW	Germany & US	1945-46	
WOIB and predecessor organization	Germany	1946 to present	
8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED Protestant,			
9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER) 174 cm 65-72 kg blue dark blonde white			
10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME) Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene 17 Mar/Apr 1904, Leobschuets, Silesia			
11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES daughter - Katharina DUEKHAUSER born 19 Jan 34, Berlin Christoph - born 11 Feb 37, Berlin Dorothee, born 28 Feb 43, Liegnitz Marie Therese, born 4 Sep 40, Liegnitz			
12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.) All			

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION (Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)		DATE
TO: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CI/Operational Approval and Support Division	FROM: <input type="checkbox"/> 18 February 1963	
Security Support Division/Office of Security	EE/O/L <input type="checkbox"/> 3 D 5309 x 5871	
SUBJECT: (True name) GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN	PROJECT HELAURITE	
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER Robert GRABER	CI/OA FILE NO. C-32539	
	RI 201 FILE NO. <input type="checkbox"/>	SO FILE NO. <input type="checkbox"/>
1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED		
<input type="checkbox"/> PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL	
<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> PROPRIETARY APPROVAL	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> COVERT NAME CHECK	
<input type="checkbox"/> COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)	
<input type="checkbox"/> COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		
2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE		
3. FULL DETAILS OF USE Subject, who is the President of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) will be visiting the Agency Headquarters Building in the late spring or early fall of 1963. A firm date has not been established.		
4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER		
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		YES
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		YES NO
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		YES NO
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		YES NO
E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		
F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		
IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY		
5. PRO AND GREEN LIST STATUS		
<input type="checkbox"/> PRO I. OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	<input type="checkbox"/> PRO II WILL BE FORWARDED	
<input type="checkbox"/> PRO II. OR EQUIVALENT, IN (3) COPY ATTACHED	<input type="checkbox"/> GREEN LIST ATTACHED. NO	
6. RI TRACES		
<input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WILL FORWARD	<input type="checkbox"/> NON-DEROGATORY <input type="checkbox"/> DEROGATORY ATTACHED
7. DIVISION TRACES		
<input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WILL FORWARD	<input type="checkbox"/> NON-DEROGATORY <input type="checkbox"/> DEROGATORY ATTACHED
8. FIELD TRACES		
<input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WILL FORWARD	
<input type="checkbox"/> NO DEROGATORY INFO.	<input type="checkbox"/> DEROGATORY ATTACHED	
LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		
SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)
3-61 112-101000-1

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DATE 2005

(9)

DISPATCHCLASSIFICATION
Secret

PROCESSING

TO	Chief, Munich Liaison Base	PRO-POSED	MARKED FOR INDEXING	ACCOMPLISHED
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany; Chief, EE	XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief of Base, Bonn		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	UPHILL — Problems of Succession		ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For your information

Alias WIELAND was in Bonn the weekend of 16 March for the confirmation of his son, and we had lunch together at the American Club 18 March. His most interesting contribution was the opinion that UTILITY's successor would be alias WENDT. He didn't seem to be enormously enthusiastic about it, although he obviously respects WENDT's managerial talents. He said nothing about his own prospects, but he did say that he thought the successor should be a civilian. About the timing he said UTILITY had once told him that he would like to retire at 62. This was around the time of his 60th birthday, and we agreed that such a thing would be easier to say at 60 than at 61. I would still consider WIELAND himself as the likeliest prospect, possibly with WENDT as deputy.

Distribution:

2-MLB
2-COS, Germany
2-EE

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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GEHLEN

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1 -
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
EGNT-1081	20 March 1963
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
EGNT-1081	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
32W-5-25	

CLASSIFICATION
Secret

155/UTILITY

C

1 w/@KURZ

22 March 1963

4. @KURZ again complained about the treatment he's been receiving, and felt that after his long service he should have been given the job of chief of 83. Although UTILITY no longer confides in him, UTILITY has spoken with other UPHILL'ers who in turn have spoken with @KURZ. They state that UTILITY is looking into the question of retiring. @KURZ feels that GLOBKE may leave when ADENAUER retires, and that UTILITY won't stay once GLOBKE leaves. @KURZ will consider retiring this year (at 60) and has looked into the question of how much money he will receive, but he intends to wait and see what happens this fall since he thinks there's a chance that UTILITY will step out.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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ORIG
UNIT
EXT
DATE

CARE
5871
27 March 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO MUNICH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONT EE 6

INFO DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADOP, NE 4, S/C

ROUTING
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO MUNI INFO FRAN

CITE DIR 28525

UPRILL

ON BEHALF OF [] AND [] PLEASE EXTEND
APPROPRIATE BIRTHDAY GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TO UTILITY
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTY FIRST BIRTHDAY. []
~~AT HEADQUARTERS ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS VISIT TO THE~~

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DDP

AC/EE

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

C/EE/G

AUTHENTICATING
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VIA TELETYPE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

TO	INFO	FROM	SUBJECT	PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
				XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING ABSTRACT MICROFILM	
CHIEF, EE	CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY - CHIEF OF BASE, BONN	CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE	OPERATIONAL UPHILL CONVERSATION WITH ALIAS HARTWIG 17 APRIL 1963			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FOR INFORMATION

1. IN ADDITION TO THE [] CASE, HARTWIG COMMENTED ON THE TORGAU ASSIGNMENT TO REPLACE KUEHNE FOR ONE MONTH THIS SUMMER AND SAID THERE WAS REALLY NOTHING BEHIND IT. KUEHNE HAD RECOMMENDED THAT SOMEONE BE SENT TO WASHINGTON FOR THIS PURPOSE AND TORGAU WAS CHOSEN. HARTWIG WISHES HE HAD BEEN. HARTWIG SAID THAT TORGAU HAD TOLD HIM ALSO THAT HE HOPED THERE WOULD NOT BE TOO MUCH WORK IN WASHINGTON SO THAT HE CAN DEVOTE HIMSELF TO LEARNING THE COUNTRY.

2. ASKED ABOUT UTILITY'S PLANS, HARTWIG EXPRESSED CERTAINTY THAT UTILITY WILL NOT STAY IN HIS PRESENT POSITION UNTIL RETIREMENT AGE 65 WHICH WOULD BE REACHED IN 1967. HE SAID THAT UTILITY SPEAKS FREQUENTLY ABOUT RETIRING AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A CHANGE IN CHANCELLORS COULD VERY WELL MEAN A CHANGE IN THE PRESIDENCY OF UPHILLS OF COURSE, IF THE NEW CHANCELLOR ASKS UTILITY TO STAY ON, HE WOULD DO SO.

3. HARTWIG DISCLOSED THAT UTILITY'S DAUGHTER, MARIA THERESA, HAS BECOME ENGAGED TO A STUDENT OF PHILOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH. UTILITY IS LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF HIRING HIS FUTURE SON-IN-LAW. MARIA THERESA WORKS IN THE TRANSLATION SECTION.

4. I THANKED HARTWIG FOR GETTING THINGS MOVING ON UDROVER WITH THE SELECTION OF ALIAS JUERGENS. HE COMMENTED THAT HE NOW HAS THE JOB OF TRYING TO FIND PERSONNEL FOR JUERGENS FOR THE UDROVER PROJECT.

DISTRIBUTION

BY TELETYPE

2 - EE
2 - COS/G
2 - BONN

BY POUCH

1 - WASH

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
E 2005

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED 18 APR 63	DATE DISPATCHED 18 APR 63
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMA-61937	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER UJKNOWN	

@BROCK and []

30 April 63

c. UTILITY: BROCK said the feeling still seemed to be that it was likely that UTILITY would leave early in 64. (Comment: there was a long and relaxed discussion about the pros and cons of this and the following para; on the question of UTILITY, BROCK claimed that the thing that made his departure probable was the fact that it now was definite that GLOBKE would be leaving shortly after Adenauer did. I noted that we had the impression that GLOBKE would stay on. BROCK said this definitely was not the case and that GLOBKE most probably would be succeeded by either CARSTENS or GUMMEL; BROCK also mentioned a third possibility, but I can't remember the man's name or position.)

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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Per EXMA-62096, 31 May 63

4. ~~NOTE~~: We think there is a good chance that ~~MOCK~~ is right in pro-
viding that ~~UTILITY~~ may leave in early 1964.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

TO	CHIEF, MLB /E	PRO- CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM- PLISHED
INFO	COS, GERMANY /E COB, BERLIN /E	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
FROM	CHIEF OF BASE, BONN	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
SUBJECT	UPHILL/		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
			ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

REF - EGOA-19983, PARAS 4, 5, 6 AND 7

ASCHAM, IN HIS TALK WITH UPTHURST ON JUNE 4, PICKED UP SOME OVERTONES OF ALL THIS. ACCORDING TO ASCHAM, HE WAS ASKED FOR HIS OPINION OF UTILITY AND REPLIED, AS USUAL, THAT HE HAD KNOWN HIM LONG AND WELL AND REGARDED HIM AS A STOUT AND HONEST FELLOW. UPTHURST RESPONDED, SURPRISINGLY, BY ASKING IF ANYBODY INVOLVED IN THIS BUSINESS COULD BE REALLY HONEST. ASCHAM ASKED IF UPTHURST DID NOT REGARD HIM /ASCHAM/ AS AN HONEST FELLOW. UPTHURST REPLIED THAT ONE IN ASCHAM'S FORMER EXALTED POSITION COULD PROBABLY AFFORD TO BE HONEST, ETC. ASCHAM SAYS THAT THIS WAS ALL SAID IN A BANTERING MANNER. ALL WOULD PROBABLY AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH BANTER WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THINKABLE TWO OR THREE YEARS AGO.

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
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COSG
BOB
EE

BY POUCH
① - EE

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE
DATE 2005

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	6 JUNE 63	TOR-
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
CLASSIFICATION	EGNA-25899	
	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
S E C R E T	32W-5-25/4 FF - UPHILL	

SECRET

Chief, Munich Liaison Base

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, EE

Letter from UTILITY for Robert A. Ascham

EGMA 62102, 6 May 1963

Since attachment to reference dispatch was sent direct from RID/Incoming Pouch to the Executive Registry, we regret that we are unable to comply with your request for a copy.

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2 - MLB
2 - COS

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DATE 2005

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EGMA 4284

20 June 1963

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SECRET

21 JUN 1963

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1 - EE/G/Chrono

EE/G/CE

C/EE/G/IS

1:njc

5887

DC/EE/G

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

ROUTINE
R 191320Z

JUL 63

EE

FM OUSARMA BONN GER
TO RUEPDA/DA WASHDC
INFO RUFLC/USEUCOM PARIS
RUFDAA/USAREUR
DA GRNC

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS.
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

BT

CONFIDENTIAL CITE: CX-137.

FOR ACSI. SGD HILL.

1. (U) GERMAN PRESS HAS REPORTED PUBLIC RUMORS AND OFFICIAL DENIALS THAT REINHARDT GEHLEN (AN ARMY RESERVE LT GENERAL) WILL RESIGN THIS FALL AS DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BECAUSE OF REACHING THE AGE OF 62. PRESS ALSO REPORTED, AS OFTEN BEFORE, THAT A POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR WOULD BE BRIG GENERAL GERHARD WESSEL.

2. (C) NEITHER OCA NOR ARMA IS AWARE OF ANY INDICATIONS CONFIRMING RUMOR OF GEHLEN'S RETIREMENT. BOTH BELIEVE WESSEL WOULD BE A CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION IF RUMORS PROVE TRUE.

3. (FOAO) THE CURRENT TRIAL AGAINST ALLEGED COMMUNIST INFILTRATORS IN GEHLEN'S ORGANIZATION HAS RECEIVED WIDE PRESS COVERAGE AND WILL DOUBTLESS GIVE RISE TO CONTINUING CRITICISM OF GEHLEN AND RUMORS OF HIS RESIGNATION.

4. GP-3

BT

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ACTION: ACSI
DISTR: DCSOP, ACSFOR, CSO, JCS, NAVY, AF, CMC, DIA, DIA (SA)
DA IN 68475

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

SCO FORM
A JUN 54

35

PAGE 52

FOR COORDINATION WITH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

⁸ SECRET

ROUTING

1	5	4
2	up	5
3	h	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: C/EE 1 (EE NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1300, 12 JUL/LMG)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RF 2.

12 JUL 63 IN 78476

SECRET 121445Z

PRITY DIR FRAN (EYES ONLY) ²² CITE (BONN 4860 ¹ ACTING)

RYBAT UPHILL

1. AMB CALLED ¹ OUT IN MIDST LUNCHEON AND STARTLED HIM WITH FOLLOWING WHICH FOR OBVIOUS REASONS AMB ASKED KUBARK TO HANDLE WITH DISCRETION:

A. UPTHURST TOLD AMB YESTERDAY THAT IN HIS OPINION UTILITY IS AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN STUPID.

B. THAT IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE OF ASCHAM'S PERSONAL INTEREST IN UTILITY THAT HE HAS PUT UP WITH HIM ALL THESE YEARS. THE FELFE CASE AGAIN ATTESTS TO UTILITY'S STUPIDITY AND INCOMPETENCE.

2. AMB EXPRESSED OWN OPINION TO ¹ THAT PERHAPS KUBARK DOES HAVE A VESTED HISTORICAL INTEREST IN UTILITY AND THAT PERHAPS UTILITY HAS NOW OUTLIVED HIS USEFULNESS. AMB WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WAS KUBARK'S CURRENT EVALUATION OF UTILITY.

3. ¹ VOLUNTEERED IN LOW KEY TO THE EFFECT THAT FROM HIS LIMITED KNOWLEDGE KUBARK HAS ALWAYS HELD UTILITY IN PROFESSIONAL ESTEEM, VALUED HIS COOPERATION AND EARLIER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE OVERALL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THERE

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SECRET

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SECRET

BC 4860
IN 78476 PAGE 2

APPEARS TO BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT POSSIBLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS
OF THE FELFE CASE ANGERED UPTHURST, ⁴ ¹ ¹ PROMISED TO GET
CURRENT KUBARK ³ EVALUATION OF UTILITY ⁵ AS WELL AS KUBARK ³ POSITION
ON UTILITY'S POSSIBLE DISMISSAL.

4. AMB REQUESTED THAT HE BE INFORMED OF ABOVE SOONEST AND THAT
MATTER BE HANDLED IN MOST CAREFUL MANNER. IN VIEW DELICACY SITUATION
AND NEED TO KNOW FULL CURRENT AND BACKGROUND FACTS KUBARK UTILITY
RELATIONSHIP, SUGGEST ³ ⁵ PERSONALLY BRIEF AMB EARLY NEXT WEEK.

5. FRAN PASS TO MLB AT YOUR DESCRETION.

SECRET

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71

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

2

SECRET

ROUTING

1	<i>C</i>	4	
2	<i>C</i>	5	
3	<i>W</i>	6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3, (EE NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1505, 12 JUL LMG)

12 July 1963

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RF 2

SECRET 121736Z

PRITY DIR INFO BONN MUNI CITE FRAN 0347 (C ACTING)

78602

RYBAT UPHILL

REF BONN 4860 (BEING RELAYED TO MUNI) (IN 78476) 8

1. WOULD PREFER BRIEFING AMBASSADOR ON UPHILL AND UTILITY

WITHIN MORE SUBDUED FRAMEWORK THAN SEEMINGLY REQUIRED BY TONE HIS REQUEST. THIS INDEED PLANNED AS IMPORTANT PART OF COS'S COMPREHENSIVE BRIEFING OF THE NEW AMBASSADOR.

2. RE PARA 4: PROPOSE CALL ON AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY [] AT AMBASSADOR'S CONVENIENCE NEXT WEEK TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A FACTUAL STATEMENT ON THE CURRENT KUBARK/UPHILL RELATIONSHIP. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WILL TELL AMBASSADOR THAT A MORE DEFINITIVE STATEMENT, INCLUDING COMMENTS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS INTERESTS CONVEYED IN-REF., WILL HAVE TO AWAIT []'S RETURN.

3. APPRECIATE HQS VIEWS/COMMENTS ON REF.

SECRET

CS Comment: *Requested KUBARK (5) evaluation of UTILITY (3) as well as KUBARK (5) position on UTILITY's (3) possible dismissal.

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DATE 2005

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ORIG : David E. Murphy
UNIT : Chief, EE ☐ INDEX
EXT : 7586 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 12 JULY 1963 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

³⁵ SECRET

12-62

ROUTING

1	Cee-6	4
2	Cep	5
3	Ch	6

12 JUL 63 21 28 Z

TO : FRANKFURT INFO: BONN MUNICH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/EE 3

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, RF

SIG GEN
DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

TO PRITY FRAN

INFO BONN MUNI

CITE DIR

53921

RYBAT UPHILL

1 2 3 4
[] [] AND [] ONLY FROM []

REFS: A. BONN 4860 (IN 78476)*

B. FRAN 0347 (IN 78602)*

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1. FOLLOWING FOR AMBASSADOR PERSONAL INFO ONLY:

A. KUBARK UNDERSTANDS UPTHURST IRRITATION RE FELFE CASE AS
RESULT REPORTED WIDESPREAD PRESS ATTACK ON MANAGEMENT OF UPHILL BY
UTILITY. THIS IS LATEST INCIDENT IN TWELVE MONTHS PERIOD OF INCREASINGLY
COOL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UPTHURST AND UTILITY. THIS WAS ACCELERATED
BY UPHILL INVOLVEMENT IN SPIEGEL AFFAIR.

B. IN OUR VIEW UTILITY HAS COMPILED GOOD RECORD IN MANY
AREAS IN RE-ESTABLISHING GERMAN INTELL SERVICE. LIKE OTHER ELEMENTS
GERMAN GOVERNMENT HE IS FACED BY VERY SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS WHICH
STEM PRIMARILY FROM DIVISION OF GERMANY AND GREAT NUMBER GERMANS WHO
WERE IN SOVIET HANDS FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. UTILITY CAN BE CHARGED WITH
RELYING ON STANDARDS OF DECENCY AND HONESTY WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN GENERALLY
APPLICABLE TO OFFICERS AND GENTLEMEN OF A NOW BY-GONE ERA AND IN MANY
CASES ACCEPTED THE WORD OF FORMER PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES AND

RELEASING OFFICER

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

U-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

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ROUTINE

TO

INFO

CITE DIR

53921

SUB-ORDINATES WHERE A THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN. THUS, THE GREATER THOROUGHNESS WITH WHICH PERSONNEL SECURITY MATTERS ARE BEING PURSUED SINCE THE FELFE ARREST SHOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED CONSIDERABLY EARLIER. IT MUST BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT OTHER FEDREP ELEMENTS HAVE HAD SIMILARLY SERIOUS CASES OF HOSTILE PENETRATION AS DISCUSSED IN NATO SECRET WORKING PAPER AC/35 - WP/19 DATED 31 JULY 1961.

C. FROM ITS VERY INCEPTION IN 1946 UNTIL ITS TRANSFER TO FEDREP CONTROL AS THE OFFICIAL GERMAN SERVICE UTILITY WAS THE MAN IN CHARGE AND WE DO NOT RECALL THAT UPTHURST EVER QUESTIONED UTILITY FITNESS AS HEAD OF SERVICE. ALSO DECISION BY UPTHURST THAT UTILITY ORG WOULD ONE DAY BECOME OFFICIAL SERVICE WAS MADE BEFORE ASCHAM BECAME CHIEF KUBARK. KUBARK HAS WORKED WITH UTILITY SINCE 1949 AND IS AWARE OF HIS GOOD QUALIFICATIONS AND HIS WEARNESES.

D. HOWEVER, QUESTION WHETHER UTILITY TO REMAIN AS HEAD OF SERVICE IS ONE EXCLUSIVELY FOR FEDREP DECISION. NO U.S. OFFICIAL SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY. ANY INTERVENTION ON OUR PART WOULD INEVITABLY BECOME KNOWN AND COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DATE :

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S E C R E T

12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

P A G E T H R E E

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO

INFO

CITE DIR

53921

2. IN MAKING ABOVE AVAILABLE TO AMB PLEASE DETERMINE WHETHER AMB
IS EXPECTED TO REPLY TO ⁶UPTHRUST. IF SO ABOVE COMMENTS MAY BE USED AT
AMB DISCRETION.

3. FRAN: DEFER ACTION ON PARA TWO REF B UNTIL RESULTS ABOVE
KNOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comment: *Requested KUBARK (5) evaluation of UTILITY (8) as well
as KUBARK's (5) position on UTILITY's (8) possible dismissal.

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C/EE/G

DAVID E. MURPHY
CHIEF, EE
RELEASING OFFICER

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S E C R E T

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	6-11	4
2	ay	5
3	W	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: C/EE 3 (EE NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 0825 15 JUL LMG)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, RF 2

SECRET 151100Z

PRITY DIR FRAN ¹ ₃ ONLY INFO PRITY MUNI ² ₃ ONLY

CITE BONN 4865 C ₃ ACTING

RYBAT UPHILL

RE A) DIR 53921

B) FRAN 0347 (N 716 75)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY 15 JUL 1975

1. GREATLY APPRECIATE REF A GUIDANCE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH PASSED
VERBALLY TO AMB THIS MORNING.

2. FEAR HOWEVER REF A CONTENT DID NOT WHOLLY SATISFY AMB WHO
PRESSING HARD FOR DIRECT ANSWERS WHICH HE PROPOSES TO USE IN FURTHER
DISCUSSING MATTER WITH UPTHURST. FOLLOWING POINTS MADE BY AMB:

A. UPTHURST SAID BOTH ASCHAM AND ₃ ASSURED HIM OF UTILITY'S
PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE AND ABILITIES IN CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE
FIELDS. AMB QUESTION IS THIS A FACT?

B. VIEW FACT UPHILL OUR CREATION WE CANNOT ESCAPE OUR
RESPONSIBILITY IN ITS SECURITY FAILURES.

C. ANY INVESTIGATION UPHILL WILL REVEAL OUR PAST ROLE.
AMB ASKS WHAT IS RPT IS OUR CURRENT EVALUATION OF UTILITY?

3. THOUGH AMB MOST CORDIAL WITH ₃ HE CONVINCED FELFE CASE,
"WILL REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE DISASTER" AND NO AMOUNT OF "DOUBLE
TALK" CAN HIDE FACT KUBARK RESPONSIBILITY ORGANIZING, SUPPORTING
AND GUIDING UPHILL EARLY ACTIVITIES. FEELS THIS WILL BE EVENTUALLY

SECRET

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SECRET

IN 515 PAGE 2

MOST EMBARRASSING TO PBPRIME. HE REPORTING HIS OPINION TO ODACID.

4. RE REF B PARA 2₈ APPRECIATE OFFER BUT DO NOT FEEL AMB SEEKING
OVERALL BRIEFING ON UPHILL AT THIS TIME. WHEN ☐ SUGGESTED
SUCH HE SAID HE HAD IT IN WASH AND WHEN ☐
RETURNS WILL BE PLEASED TO REVIEW IT AGAIN; HOWEVER, WHAT HE IS
INTERESTED IN^NOW ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONTAINED PARA 2 AND
3 ABOVE.

5. APPRECIATE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON ABOVE.

SECRET

S/C NOTE: PORTION GARBLED BEING SERVICED.

C/S Comment: *Requested KUBARK(7) evaluation of UTILITY (5)
as well as KUBARK (7) position on UTILITY's (5) possible dismissal.
**Forwarded Hqs views on UTILITY (5). Question
whether UTILITY (5) should remain as head of service is one
exclusively for Fedrep decision.

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ORIG: David E. Murphy
UNIT: Chief, EE
EXT: 7586
DATE: 15 July 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

12-62

ROUTING

1	Plc - G	4
2	Ch	5
3	L	6

TO: BONN INFO: FRAN MUN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/EE

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADOP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, RF

5 JUL 63 22 39z

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

TO PRITY BONN

INFO

CITE DIR 54400

RYBAT UPHILL

[] , [] , [] AND [] ONLY FROM []

REFS: A. BONN 4860 (IN 78476)

B. DIR 52921

PLS PASS AMBASSADOR:

1. IMPACT FELFE TRIAL ON CHANCELLOR ATTITUDE TOWARD GEN GEHLEN DISCUSSED AT MEETING 15 JULY IN DEPARTMENT. PRESENT WERE MR. RICHARD DAVIS, EUR, MR. THOMAS HUGHES, INR, [] AND []

2. GEHLEN ROLE IN PRESERVING WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL AND CREATING POST WAR ORGANIZATION CANNOT BE UNDER-ESTIMATED NOR CAN HIS CONTRIBUTION BASED ON COMINT AND COVERT COLLECTION TO THE COVERAGE OF SOVIET BLOC MILITARY FORCES. KUBARK HAS NOT CHANGED ITS POSITIVE VIEW OF GEHLEN'S ABILITY IN THESE AREAS. IT HAS NOT ALWAYS AGREED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH GEHLEN HAS HANDLED INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS.

3. KUBARK HAS NEVER SOUGHT TO AVOID ITS SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BND SECURITY. A MAJOR PORTION OF THE KUBARK LIAISON STAFF WORKING WITH BND HQS HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO SECURITY AND CE MATTERS. IT WAS A KUBARK OPERATION AND SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION THAT IN FACT UNCOVERED FELFE CASE. HOWEVER, KUBARK NEVER ABLE TO IMPOSE U.S. SECURITY STANDARDS ON

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET

12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO

INFO

CITE DIR

54400

BND BY FIAT. FOR EXAMPLE, IT TOOK SEVERAL YEARS PERSUADE GEHLEN ADOPT LCFLUTTER AS BASIC TOOL IN PRE-EMPLOYMENT AND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. THIS HE HAS NOW DONE ALTHOUGH HE IS ONLY AGENCY IN FEDREP TO DO SO AND ONLY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN WESTERN EUROPE. NOTE: BRITISH SERVICES DO NOT USE LCFLUTTER. NONETHELESS, HAD WE TRIED TO FORCE THIS AND SIMILAR ACTION SOONER GEHLEN WOULD HAVE HAD GLOBKE AND ADENAUER SUPPORT IN RESISTING THIS BECAUSE LATTER WOULD NOT HAVE RISKED HAVING THIS DEGREE OF AMERICAN CONTROL BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

4. THE U.S. ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BND HAS BEEN REPORTED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ACCURACY IN GERMAN AND FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS MANY TIMES IN PAST. REPETITION OF SIMILAR STORIES WOULD NOT PROVE UNDULY EMBARRASSING. GIVEN NUMBER PEOPLE OCCUPYING POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDREP WHO ARE FORMER MEMBERS BND, DOUBT IF THERE WILL BE PUBLIC ORGY OF DENUNCIATION OF GEHLEN OR BND WHICH WOULD GO BEYOND STORIES THAT HAVE ALREADY APPEARED. LIST OF FORMER BND MEMBERS INCLUDES: GENERALS HEUSINGER, SPEIDEL, FERBER (J-2, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE), RADKE (VICE PRESIDENT BfV), ETC.

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DATE :

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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ROUTING

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TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE THREE

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TO

INFO

CITE DIR 54400

5. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT ADENAUER IRRITATION WITH SITUATION WHICH NOW POLITICALLY EMBARRASSING IN SHARP CONTRAST WITH FORMER COMPLETE RELIANCE ON GEHLEN. GROWING IRRITATION ADENAUER WITH GEHLEN MAY HARK BACK TO ADENAUER DISSATISFACTION IN WINTER 1961-62 WITH GEHLEN'S ESTIMATES SOVIET CAPABILITY IN CONVENTIONAL AND MISSILE ARMAMENTS. GEHLEN'S ESTIMATES PARALLELED THOSE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT, HENCE WERE FOR POLITICAL REASONS UNACCEPTABLE TO ADENAUER WHO THEN WAS ANXIOUS TO MAGNIFY EXTENT OF SOVIET THREAT TO WEST.

6. IN SUM KUBARK VIEWS OF GEHLEN AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE NOT CHANGED NOR HAS ITS POSITION ON THE WEAKNESSES IN BND'S SECURITY PROCEDURES. BECAUSE OF KUBARK INSISTENCE AND AS A RESULT OF FELFE INVESTIGATION AND ARREST (WHICH TOOK PLACE IN NOVEMBER 1961) MANY NEW PROCEDURES KUBARK RECOMMENDED HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED ALTHOUGH SITUATION FAR FROM PERFECT. FINALLY, IF FEDREP AUTHORITIES, AFTER MORE BALANCED VIEW OF PROBLEM THAN POSSIBLE UNDER EMOTIONAL VIEWS PROMPTED BY FELFE CASE HEADLINES, DECIDE INVESTIGATE BND OR APPOINT NEW BND PRESIDENT DO NOT BELIEVE U.S. SHOULD INTERVENE.

7. IN LIGHT ABOVE DO NOT CONSIDER FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH

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DATE :

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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE FOUR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 54400

CHANCELLOR OF THIS ESSENTIALLY INTERNAL GERMAN PROBLEM WOULD SERVE
USEFUL PURPOSE. IF CHANCELLOR RAISES MATTER AGAIN AT HIS INITIATIVE
SUGGEST YOU INDICATE KUBARK VIEWS ON GEHLEN ABILITIES AND CONTRIBUTION
WESTERN INTELL EFFORT HAVE NOT CHANGED.

8. DEPARTMENT CONCURS WITH THIS APPRAISAL.

END OF MESSAGE

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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David E. Murphy
Chief, EE
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

15 July 1963

SUBJECT: Ambassador McGhee's Request for CIA's Current
Evaluation of General Gehlen

1. On 12 July 1963 Ambassador McGhee informed [

] the acting chief of the CIA Base in Bonn, that

(a) the Chancellor told the Ambassador on 11 July that in
the Chancellor's opinion General Gehlen is and always has been stupid;

(b) that it was only because of Mr. Allen W. Dulles' personal
interest in General Gehlen that the Chancellor has put up with General
Gehlen all these years. The Felge case again attests to General Gehlen's
stupidity and incompetence.

(c) The Ambassador expressed as his own opinion that
perhaps the CIA does have a vested historical interest in General Gehlen
and that perhaps General Gehlen has outlived his usefulness. The
Ambassador wanted to know CIA's current evaluation of General Gehlen
and requested this information soonest and general handling of this matter
in a most careful manner.

2. CIA Headquarters replied on 12 July 1963 as follows:

(a) CIA understands Chancellor irritation re Felge case as
result reported widespread press attack on management of BND by General
Gehlen. This is the latest incident in twelve months period of

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increasingly cool relationship between Chancellor and General Gehlen.
This was accelerated by BND involvement in Spiegel Affair.

(b) In our view General Gehlen has compiled good record in many areas in re-establishing German Intelligence Service. Like other elements German government he is faced by very serious security problems which stem primarily from division of Germany and great number Germans who were in Soviet hands for extended period. General Gehlen has until the Felke arrest relied greatly on "words of honor of former associates and sub-ordinates" instead of depending on thorough security background investigations. This has changed since the Felke arrest. It must be noted, however, that other Federal Republic elements have had similarly serious cases of hostile penetration as discussed in NATO Secret Working Paper AC/35 - WP/19 dated 31 July 1961.

(c) From its inception in 1946 until its transfer to Federal Republic control as the official German service, General Gehlen was the man in charge and we do not recall that the Chancellor ever questioned General Gehlen's fitness as head of service. Also, decision by Chancellor that General Gehlen's organization would one day become official service was made by Adenauer before Allen W. Dulles became Chief, CIA.

(d) However, question whether General Gehlen to remain as head of service is one exclusively for Federal Republic decision. No United States official should become involved in this controversy. Any

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intervention on our part would inevitably become known and could prove embarrassing.

(e) We asked [] to determine whether the Ambassador expected to discuss this matter again with the Chancellor and stated that the above comments may be used in such further discussion at the Ambassador's discretion.

3. On 15 July 1963 [] reported that he had passed the CIA Headquarters comments to the Ambassador that morning but expressed his apprehension that the CIA Headquarters comments had not wholly satisfied the Ambassador who pressed hard for direct answers which the Ambassador proposes to use in further discussions of this matter with the Chancellor. The following points were made by the Ambassador:

(a) The Chancellor said that both Mr. Allen W. Dulles and Mr. John McCone had assured him of General Gehlen's professional competence and abilities in clandestine intelligence fields. The Ambassador asked what is CIA's current evaluation of General Gehlen.

(b) Since the BND is CIA's creation CIA cannot escape its responsibility in the BND security failures.

(c) Any investigation of the BND will reveal CIA's past role.

(d) The Ambassador is convinced that the Felfe case will "reveal an Intelligence Disaster" and no amount of "double talk" can

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hide the fact of CIA's responsibility for organizing, supporting and guiding the early activities of the END. The Ambassador feels that this will be eventually most embarrassing to the United States and he is reporting his opinion to the Department.

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SECRET

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____
REF TO FILE NO. _____
FILE REC ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ☒ 2
TO DIRECTOR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
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FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

SECRET 171243Z

17 JUL 63 11:31:274

DIR INFO BONN MUNI CITE FRAN 0434

UPHILL

RE BONN 4871 (79994)*

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 17 JULY REPORTS FROM BONN QUALIFIED
DENIAL FROM OFFICIAL QUARTERS THAT UTILITY WOULD RETIRE AT
AGE LIMIT THIS FALL. NEITHER RELIEF NOR VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT
SAID TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN RECENT DAYS.

REPORT ADDS THAT NONETHELESS BRIG GEN GERHARD WESSEL BEING MENTIONED
AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR.

SECRET

C/S Comment: 1 (2) learned from Dr. Erwin Gehrhardt, MINIT
press officer of talk within ministry that UTILITY (1) to go 1 October
1963 together with CAUSA (3) as result necessary reorganization of
German services following Felfe trial.

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SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3825
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE
DATE 2005

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GROUP 1

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33

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ROUTING

1	C. C. - G.	4	
2	C. C.	5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, RF 2

SECRET 171310Z

17 JUL 63 11:41

DIR FRAN (C¹ ONLY) INFO MUNI (C² ONLY) CITE BONN 4887(C³ ACTING)~~PTSD~~ UPHILL

REF DIR 54400*

1. IN ORDER TO GET DISCUSSION WITH AMB RE GEN GEHLEN AWAY FROM CRASH BASIS AND ON A MORE BALANCED KEEL AFTER CONSULTING WITH C¹ C³ DELAYED PASSING REF TILL THIS MORNING.

2. AMB ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATION PROVIDED PER PARA 7, STATING THAT THOUGH HE PERSONALLY DID NOT WHOLLY ACCEPT OUR STAND HE NEVERTHELESS WOULD BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY.

SECRET

CS Comment: *KUBARK's (4) views on Gehlen's abilities and contribution to the Western Intelligence effort have not changed.

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per DOI 70-17

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2	3	4	5	6	7
3	4	5	6	7	8

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2,
RF 2

JE BP
CE
97

SECRET 171625Z

17 JUL 63 IN 81487

DIR INFO MUNI FRAN CITE (BONN 4890 E I ACTING)

REF BONN 4877 (IN 80324) * ~~CE~~ RC/BP

UPHILL LIAISON

1. NEWSPAPER REPORTS SPECULATING ON UTILITY RETIREMENT
AND POSSIBILITY ^{CON} CONSOLIDATION FEDREP INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
DISCUSSED WITH ~~CE~~ I AND SEVERAL OTHER BFV STAFFERS. GAINED
IMPRESSION BFV NOT AWARE FULL EXTENT UPTHURST PREOCCUPATION THIS
MATTER. ~~CE~~ I LABELED REPORTS AS PURELY JOURNALISTIC SPECULATION
AND FLATLY STATED UTILITY WILL NOT RETIRE THIS AUTUMN.

2. BFV CONTINUES CONSIDER CONSOLIDATION INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
COMPLETELY OUT OF QUESTION BECAUSE SUCH ARRANGEMENT POLITICALLY
INFEASIBLE. ON OTHER HAND BFV RECOGNIZES FEASIBILITY AND POSSIBLE
VALUE TOP LEVEL COORDINATION AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, NO INDICATION
AS YET THIS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED.

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C/S COMMENT: *NEWSPAPER STORY DAID GEHLEN WILL RETIRE THIS FALL.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

gehlen, E
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GROUP 1
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INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒ 27/32 SECRET

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. SECRET

X-REF TO FILE NO. SECRET

FILE NO. SECRET

DESTROY: ☐ DIRECTOR ☐ BRANCH ☐ SIG. ☐ FROM: ☐ FRANKFURT

ROUTING			
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ACTION: EE 6

INFO : ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D 4, RF 2

SECRET 171752Z
 I MUNI BONN INFO DIR CITE FRAN 0450
 C UPHILL UJDROWSY
 O
 P REF BONN 4882 (IN 81211)*
 Y

17 JUL 63 IN 81728

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REQUEST NO FURTHER ACTION ON REF. WILL DISCUSS THIS AND
 RELATED MATTERS WITH [] IN FRAN 19 JULY.

BT

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C/S COMMENT: *CBS CORRESPONDENT DAN SCHORR WOULD LIKE TO DO TV INTERVIEW OF
 UTILITY.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3826
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

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INDEX: YES ☒ NO ☒

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ☒

X-REF TO FILE NO. ☒

FILL: ☒ RET. TO: ☒

DESTROY: ☒ SIG. ☒
TO: DIRECTOR

22/30
SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

FROM: MUNICH

ACTION: EE 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, RF 2

R I C O P Y
S E C R E T 171532Z

17 JUL 63 IN 81638

BONN INFO FRAN DIR CITE MUNI 6838

UPHILL

UTILITY NOT LIKELY GRANT INTERVIEW. ONLY IN VERY EXCEPTIONAL CASES HAS HE GRANTED INTERVIEWS TO REPORTERS. WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT HE WILLING CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO PUBLICITY HE ALREADY GETTING. AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED HE IS PRESENTLY ON LEAVE.

S E C R E T

R I C O P Y
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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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ORIG: ☐
UNIT: C/MLB
EXT: 54
DATE: 17 July 1963

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ROUTING

1	2
3	4
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TO: FRAM DIR INFO BORN

FROM: MONICH

CONF: C/MLB

INFO:

6835

File: 801 RYAN

per DOI 70-17

~~SECRET~~

DIR 55-31

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO: FRAM DIR

INFO BORN

ONE MONI

KAPOR IDHILL

6835

1. ALIAS TORGAU 17 JULY REQUESTED SPECIAL MEETING TO TELL [] THAT UTILITY AT PRESENT HAS NO INTENTION OF RESIGNING AND THAT THERE NO INDICATION CHARCELLONY WANTS HIM RESIGNED. FURTHER STATED THAT FRANKFURTER ALIENES WOULD CARRY ¹⁷⁶⁴ 17 JULY CONTAINING OFFICIAL DENIAL OF STORIES ABOUT UTILITY LEAVING 1 OCTOBER. HE ALSO SAID THAT CONTRARY TO NEWSPAPER REPORTS HEH HAS NOT REQUESTED PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATION UPHILL.
2. WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY UTILITY TO PASS ABOVE ON TO US, TORGAU REPLIED NEGATIVELY AND THAT IDEA WAS HIS ALONE.
3. DURING MEET WITH TORGAU UTILITY PHONED FROM BORN. [] NOT PRESENT DURING PHONE CONVERSATION BUT AFTERWARDS TORGAU SAID UTILITY HAD SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE TO [] THAT STORIES ABOUT UTILITY BEING OUSTED IN OCTOBER STEH FROM ORGANIZED CAMPAIGN AND FORMER DEPTIN STRAUSS REHIED IT.
4. TORGAU MENTIONED UTILITY DISAPPOINTMENT WITH APT BROADCASTS AND EXPECTATION WE MIGHT DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. TORGAU HAD CORRECTLY POINTED OUT TO UTILITY THAT APT MERELY REPLAYING WHAT APPEARING IN PRESS.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMINALS CLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

COORDINATING OFFICER

~~SECRET/REPORT~~

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ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

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6835

PAGE TWO

5. TOSMAN PROMISED HE WOULD GET FULL EVIDENCE ON CLOSED SESSIONS UNPROSECUTED
TRIAL FROM ALIAS REBERHART AT CONCLUSION OF TRIAL.

END OF MESSAGE

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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EXCLUDED TO FILE NO.

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FILE NO. ☐ REL. TO BRANCH ☒
TO: ☒ DIRECTOR **E.**

FROM : BONN

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DOP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, SC/2

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SECRET 171038Z

MUNI INFO FRAN DIR CITE BONN 4882) **E**

ACTING 17 JUL 63 IN 81211

UPHILL UJDROWSY **E**

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1. CBS CORRESPONDENT DAN SCHORR WOULD LIKE DO TV INTERVIEW
OF UTILITY. IF NECESSARY COULD SHOOT THIS WITHOUT SHOWING
UTILITY'S FACE. NATURALLY WANTS RAISE QUESTIONS SUCH AS EXTENT
UPHILL FEARS IT MAY STILL BE PENETRATED, WHAT EXTENT FORMER
NAZIS USED, WHAT SUCCESSES HE CLAIMS, ETC. IS QUITE PREPARED
TO HAVE MANY QUESTIONS EVADED OR LEFT UNANSWERED.

2. PLS ADVISE.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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135-124
FORMATIONSFUNK IN GERMAN TO EUROPE 0745 18 JUL 63 L

MANY ALLEGATIONS OF THE INTENTION TO RETIRE GENERAL GEHLEN,
THE FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WERE DENIED BY FEDERAL
OFFICER VON HASE IN BONN ON 17 JULY. HE SAID THAT GEHLEN
IS NEAR THE AGE LIMIT FOR RETIREMENT. VON HASE SAID
HE DOES NOT HAVE SLIGHTEST KNOWLEDGE OF ANY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
REGARDING THESE SPECULATIONS.

727A FRK/CH

Gehlen

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
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3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADOP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RF 2

TO
BF

SECRET 181357Z

MUNI INFO FRAN DIR CITE (BONN 4894)

ACTING)

IN82191

KAPOK UPHILL

REF A BONN 4877

(4877)

78 JUL 1953

RC, BP

B DIR 55231

1. AFTER CHECKING ☐ STATES REF A STORY NOT ACCURATE:
NO DECISION RE UTILITY RETIREMENT MADE YET AND MUCH WILL DEPEND
ON WHETHER UJDROWSY SENTENCE CONTAINS CRITICISM OF UTILITY'S
SUPERVISION AND UPHILL PERSONNEL PRACTICES, ETC.

2. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS AT TOP PBEROPING
RE POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR. UPTHRUST FAVORS SCHRUEBBERS BUT LATTER'S
WIFE "DOES NOT WANT LEAVE COLOGNE". VESSEL ALSO MENTIONED.

SECRET

CS COMMENT: * UTILITY HAS NEITHER REQUESTED RETIREMENT NOR HAS HE BEEN
ASKED RESIGN.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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UJDROWSY OPS

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ROUTING

1	4
2	5
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : STUTTGART

ACTIONS: C/EE 3 (EE NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1530, 18 JUL 1943)

INFO : ADON, C/CI, C/PI 2, C/PI/D, RF 2

AT 17/1725Z

11N82380

PRIORITY INFO FROM MUNI CITE STUT 5647

18 JUL 1943

RYBAT UJDROWSY

1. THURSDAY SESSION, LASTING FR 10:00 TO 13:00 HRS, PRESENTED ROUND-UP CASE BY PROSECUTION. BUNDESANWALT FISCHER OPENED WITH CASE AGAINST CLEMENS AND FELPE. AFTER BREAK, BUNDESANWALT HERARD CONCLUDED WITH TIEBEL. FISCHER MADE STRONG PITCH FOR MAXIMUM SENTENCING CITING MAGNITUDE BETRAYAL, EXTENSIVE TIME COVERED AND INTENT OF DEFENDENTS TO COMMIT TREASON NOT ONLY RE AND BUT RFV, RUNDSEWEHR, AS WELL AS AMERICAN INTERESTS. GAVE BRIEF SUMMARY TREASONOUS ACTIVITIES THRU PAST 10 YEARS INDICATED TRUE EXTENT BETRAYAL ONLY IN HANDS OF RUSSIANS. CITED AGAIN KINDS OF INFO PASSED, SOURCES (INCLUDING SOME AMERICAN WHEN KNOWN BY FELPE), EMPHASIZED FELPE'S ACCESS VITAL SENSITIVE INFO, EXPRESSED LIKELIHOOD ALL PASSED VIEW FELPE'S RELUCTANCE REVEAL EXTENT DAMAGE AND ATTEMPTS RECONTACT KOB. STATED CLEMENS NO LESS GUILTY BUT HAD COOPERATED WITH COURT TO FULLEST EXTENT AFTER ARREST. CITED CHAP AND VERSE WHICH OFFENSES CHARGED AGAINST SPECIFIC SUBSECTIONS PENAL CODE. STATED UNDER TERMS TRUPPENVERTRAG, AMERICANS COULD PRESENT LETTER TO COURT COVERING BETRAYAL AMERICAN AND NATO INTERESTS BUT HAD NOT DONE SO SINCE, IN EFFECT, SIMILAR PENALTIES TO BE METED

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SOURCE'S METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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SECRET

2. IN CASE AGAINST TIEREL, BERARD INDICATED TIEREL AS INTELLIGENT MAN WITH RSMA BACKGROUND AWARE REASON HIS CONTACT RUSSIANS. EXTENT CLEMENS AND FELFE HIS LIAISON. FULLY AWARE EXTENT HIS OWN COMPLICITY. REJECTED TIEREL'S DENIAL KNOWLEDGE OF CONTENTS CARRIED IN SECRET COMPARTMENT ON COURIER TRIPS.

3. PROSECUTION RECOMMENDED FOLLOWING SENTENCES: FELFE 15 YEARS; CLEMENS 12 YEARS (LESSENED BECAUSE OF COOPERATION); TIEREL 5 YEARS. IN ADDITION, RECOMMENDED REMOVAL PRIVILEGES AS GERMAN CITIZEN FOR FELFE 10; CLEMENS 6; TIEREL 3 YEARS. PAYMENT COURT COSTS, ETC., ALSO COVERED IN RECOMMENDATION.

4. FELFE, AS USUAL MADE NOTES DURING PRESENTATION, CLEMENS SAT WITH ARMS FOLDED, APPEARED SERIOUS; TIEREL, HEAD BOVED AND HANDS FOLDED IN LAP. FRAU KONZ WIPED AWAY TEARS AFTER RECOMMENDATIONS BY PROSECUTION.

5. DEFENSE ATTORNEY REQUESTED REINSTATEMENT PAROLE STATUS FOR TIEREL SINCE HE HAD NOT BROKEN TERMS PREVIOUSLY SET. AFTER BRIEF DELIBERATION, COURT DECIDED TO PULL HIS BPA, RESTRICT HIM TO KARLSRUHE AND REQUIRE DAILY REPORT-IN TO RUNDERSANWALTER.

6. FRIDAY SESSIONS TO BE DEVOTED TO PRESENTATION BY DEFENSE INCLUDING FINAL STATEMENTS BY DEFENDENTS. MONDAY AND TUESDAY COURT CLOSED WHILE JUDGES DELIBERATE. WEDNESDAY MORNING, SENTENCES TO BE PRONOUNCED.

7. ON WEDNESDAY EVENING, ALIAS BERNHARDT CONFIRMED FELFE HAD REVEALED NOTHING FURTHER RE KURARK OR OTHER MATTERS IN CLOSED SESSIONS, IN FACT, DISCUSSION DID NOT COVER ALL INFO GIVEN IN PRE-TRIAL TESTIMONY. THOUGH PERHAPS ACADEMIC, FELFE STILL ALLEGED HE DID NOT REVEAL JOINT KURARK/RND BRN OPS PLANS TO RIS. BELIEVE

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

IN 7350 PAGE 3

ALIAS ETTNER MAY HAVE ERRONEOUSLY ACQUIRED OPPOSITE VERSION REPORTED
EARLIER. BERNHARDT ALSO CONVINCED FELFE'S STORY RE OSS CONTACT
ANOTHER LIE DESIGNED MAKE HEADLINES. BERNHARDT PROMISED WOULD
DISCUSS ABOVE IN DETAIL WITH ME UPON RETURN HOME.

SECRET

RECEIVED
JAN 10 1951
FBI
WASHINGTON
D.C.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CA 2, CA/REC, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT 2, RF 2

SECRET 191441Z

DIR INFO FRAN MUNI CITE BONN 4903 1 ACTING

UPHILL UDDROWSY

19 JUL 63 IN 83131

REF DIR 55115

PAPERS CITED REF CONTAIN SEVERAL STORIES ON UPHILL IN LIGHT
FELFE TRIAL. BOTH CITE AND COMMENT ON ATTACK AGAINST UPHILL
PERSONNEL POLICIES, AS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE BY SPD BUNDESTAG MEMBER
HEINRICH RITZEL IN 11 JULY SPD PRESSEDIENST. LATTER, PRESUMABLY
BY NOW AVAILABLE TO HQS, CONTAINS NO INFO NOT GENERALLY AVAILABLE
AND IS SIMILAR IN TONE AND CONTENT TO EDITORIALS CARRIED BY MOST
NEWSPAPERS SINCE TRIAL BEGAN. THUS ASSUME DIR 54561 HAD REF TO
FAZ ARTICLE CONTAINING, INTER ALIA, PERSONNEL AND BUDGETARY FIGURES.
IF SO, REGRET BONN DOES NOT KNOW CORRESPONDENT'S SOURCE FOR INFO
AND HAS NO CHANNEL FOR OBTAINING MATERIAL ON WHICH ARTICLE BASED.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: HQS INTERESTED IN FULL MATERIAL ON WHICH THESE NEWSPAPER STORIES
BASED.

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DATE 2005

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, RF 2

SECRET 191739Z

MUNI INFO DIR CITE FRAN 0519

19 JUL 63 IN 83260

UPHILL UJRANDOM

REF MUNI 6844 (IN 82394) 8

IMMEDIATE HANDLING

1. OSI APPROVES MEETING BUT ADVISES BIRCHEN ON LEAVE UNTIL 28 JULY. SUGGESTS MEETING TAKE PLACE AT 9 AM TUES OR WED, 30 OR 31 JULY, AT RHINE MAIN OSI HQS, WHICH IS ACROSS STREET FROM PX AND IDENTIFIED BY SIGN.

2. OSI WOULD LIKE TO BE BRIEFED BY UPHILL BEFOREHAND BUT STATES THIS CAN BE DONE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING UPHILL MEETING WITH BIRCHEN

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: UPHILL WANTS DEBRIEF BIRCHEN ON HIS RELATIONS SPECK ON 23 OR 24 JULY.

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DATE 2005

Gehlen 20/

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
BOM 25044

EXA-24044

HEADQUARTERS TELETYPE

TO
INFO Chief, EM
COS, C and MID

E

32W 005

E

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FROM
Chief of Base, Bonn

DATE
19 July 1963

SUBJECT
Operational/UPHILL/LIAISON
Remarks by General SELMAYR Concerning UPHILL

RE "43-3"-(CHECK "X" ONE)

XX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED
BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

1. We will summarize below some remarks by Brig. Gen. Josef SELMAYR
[] Chief of the ASDW, on the occasion of a routine luncheon on
18 July 1963. Some of his remarks are not particularly new, but we feel they
may be of interest coming from him at this time.

2. In discussing the UDROWSY trial and the current reports concerning
UTILITY's early retirement SELMAYR expressed the opinion that the reports were
probably exaggerated and based primarily on journalistic speculation possibly
inspired in part by UTILITY's political opponents. He pointed out that, on the
other hand, it is possible that UPTHRUST will consider it necessary to find a
scapegoat in which case UTILITY would be the logical choice. SELMAYR doubted,
however, that UPTHRUST has made a firm decision on the matter or that any
changes will be made in the near future. He commented that UPHILL had suffered
heavily in prestige as a result of the UDROWSY case and the Spiegel Affair,
the consequences of which will continue to plague that service for a long time.

3. SELMAYR commented favorably on the support which his service has
received from KUBARK in the past, mentioning in particular [] and the
RELEADLE leads, at the same time adding that he had never received such support
from UPHILL and it is now abundantly clear why he had not. He then embarked
upon a long tirade concerning the shortcomings of UTILITY and UPHILL generally,
pointing out that the latter was never an organization, but rather an
"unorganization". He stated that part of the problem lay in the fact that
UTILITY was never an intelligence officer, but rather a staff officer with
experience as an intelligence evaluator. He added that UTILITY lacked experience
in military command which also might have been useful in his position as UPHILL
Chief. SELMAYR remarked that, in its entire existence, UPHILL has not achieved
a single professional success of any significance, and now with the publicity
accorded the UDROWSY case any would-be sources in the Soviet Bloc would be
insane to work for UPHILL. SELMAYR acknowledged that while under GDMOKE spons-
orship UPHILL did some excellent work in OB collection and reporting, but he
stressed that this was the type of information which was easy to collect and
evaluate, and UPHILL by no means qualified for the major league by its
performance in this area. Moreover, according to SELMAYR, UPHILL's competence
in military reporting suffered badly with legalization and the shift in
emphasis to political collection, a field in which their performance has been
uniformly pathetic. SELMAYR stated that he served for a time on the political
evaluation staff just before leaving UPHILL and was appalled by what he saw.
In his opinion GWINTERSTEIN has never qualified as an intelligence officer
and never will. GWINTERSTEIN's practice was to recruit a number of would-be
analysts many of whom were unable to earn a living without the UPHILL salary.
In turn, [] slotted the UPHILL reports processing machinery with trash
which would have been totally unacceptable to their own newspapers, but for
which GWINTERSTEIN readily compensated them liberally. SELMAYR commented that,
of a hundred-odd reporting political sources which GWINTERSTEIN at one time
claimed to have, not a single one could qualify as a genuine intelligence source.

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
DISPATCH 26044

4. It was SELMAYR's opinion that UTILITY's concept of personnel security was basically wrong. Instead of thorough and painstaking background investigations and assessments, UTILITY depended upon compartmentation, which in theory was rigid but in practice lax, and on the ridiculous practice of using cover names within the organization which fostered the idea that the individual staffer should know a minimum about his colleagues and should not concern himself with their affairs, personal or otherwise. It was precisely this practice which, in the opinion of SELMAYR, facilitated UDROVSKY's success in escaping exposure for so many years.

5. In response to our query concerning the future plans of Brig. Gen. Gerhard WESSEL, ^{OK} SELMAYR said that WESSEL was scheduled to join Gen. HEUSINGER's Staff in Washington this autumn to replace Gen. STEINHOFF (Phonetic). WESSEL's current troop assignment was intended to be only of one year's duration and the year will be up in the autumn. SELMAYR commented that if UTILITY is, in fact, relieved in the near future WESSEL's plans for the Washington assignment may be affected. He acknowledged that WESSEL is the only person he has heard mentioned as a possible successor for UTILITY. When we inquired as to the possibility of WESSEL succeeding UTILITY, SELMAYR stated this was absolutely out of the question and if it were to take place would result in an utter catastrophe. He expressed the opinion that UTILITY's successor, whoever he may be, is not to be envied.

6. Several days earlier the BIV's Erich WENGER informed us that he had heard SELMAYR was to be replaced in the spring of 1964. WENGER did not know whether SELMAYR would receive another assignment or be retired, but thought the latter would probably be the case; nor was he aware whether this development resulted from the FURBER case. SELMAYR did not comment to us on his future plans. The ID/USAREUR and OSI liaison officers have also heard that SELMAYR is to be retired in the spring, but this has not been confirmed to them by SELMAYR or announced officially. Apparently SELMAYR is not happy with the prospect. According to the latter mentioned liaison officers, SELMAYR is to be replaced by Col Willi WACENGECHT (possibly) ☐
Adjutant for military matters to
Minister von Massel (possibly born 22 January 1912)

Distribution:

3-SH
2-CO:G
2-MIS

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Gehlens Geheimdienst

Der Mann im Zwielficht und die Männer im Dunkeln

Von Marion Gräfin Dönhoff

„Lieber nicht zur Abwehr“

Vor einigen Jahren nahm ich an einer Diskussion teil. Es war ein kleiner Kreis von Professoren, die irgendein kulturpolitisches Problem behandelten. Man war ein wenig vom Thema abgeirrt und in die aktuelle Politik geraten: totalitäre Herrschaftsformen und menschliche Verhaltensweise, Ost-West-Probleme, kalter Krieg. Schließlich ging es um ganz konkrete Sachfragen.

„Das weiß wahrscheinlich nur Gehlen“, wandte ich ein, als die Spekulationen allzu spekulativ wurden.

„Ja, weiß denn der etwas darüber?“ fragte erstaunt der anwesende Germanist und er fügte hinzu: „Denken Sie an sein Werk *Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter*!“

„Nein, ich meine nicht den Philosophen Arnold Gehlen, sondern Reinhard Gehlen.“

„Reinhard Gehlen?“ Der Professor schüttelte den Kopf; den Namen hatte er nie gehört. Heute wüßte er wohl genau, wer gemeint war. Denn seit die Spione *Felke, Clemens und Tiesel* in Karlsruhe vor Gericht standen, wird täglich über Reinhard Gehlen und seinen Bundesnachrichtendienst berichtet — über eine Organisation also, von der niemand spricht, solange alles gut geht; ja, von deren Existenz die meisten Leute überhaupt erst dann erfahren, wenn eine Panne passiert ist.

Reinhard Gehlen, der Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, könnte alles andere eher sein als ein General. Weder in Gesten, Gebaren noch Diktion erinnert er an den Typ des in langer Zucht geprägten Offiziers. Er ist vollständig gelöst, hat etwas Weltmännisches an sich — nicht im Sinne agiler Gewandtheit, sondern im Sinne souveräner Gelassenheit, Unzufälligkeit und Bescheidenheit. Er macht kein Aufhebens von sich, und dieser Eigenschaft mag es auch zu danken sein, daß es dem Chef des Geheimdienstes der Bundesrepublik in dieser film- und fotofreundlichen Zeit immer wieder gelingt, den Bildreportern zu entgehen. Das Photo, das seit Jahren überall erscheint, stammt von 1944. Seither ist offenbar nur noch ein einziges gemacht worden.

Dabei kann man sich kaum jemanden vorstellen, der weniger geheimnisumwittert erschiene als dieser Mann. Obgleich er stets unter anderem Namen reist, immer wieder seine Autos und deren Nummern wechselt, nie ohne Revolver in der Tasche geht, führt er doch sonst ein normales Leben. Er fährt mit Wohnwagen und Segelboot in die Ferien, er verschickt Glückwunschkarten zu Neujahr, und seine Privatadresse in Starnberg kann man in jedem biographischen Dienst nachschlagen.

Irgendwie *Landedeutscher* — eher ein süddeutscher als ein norddeutscher — würde man vielleicht denken, wenn man ihn in einem Hotel-foyer sitzen sähe, das eine Bein lässig auf den Stuhl gezogen, das andere darübergeschlagen; mit blonden, kurzgeschorenen Schnurrbart, grauen Schläfen und einer hohen Stirn, die in eine Glatze übergeht. Freilich könnte man ihn sich auch als Forscher in einem Labor vorstellen oder auch im weißen Kittel des Chirurgen.

Reinhard Gehlen gehört jenem Jahrgang 1902 an, den Ernst Glaesers Roman einst berühmt machte. Sein Vater war Verlagsdirektor im Ferdinand-Hirt-Verlag in Breslau. Arnold Gehlen, der Philosoph, ist übrigens sein Vetter. Reinhard Gehlen hatte, ehe er sich für die Offizierslaufbahn entschied, eine Weile geschwankt, ob er nicht ins zivile Leben gehen, vielleicht einen akademischen Beruf ergreifen sollte. Es reizte ihn, Physik zu studieren, aber schließlich entschloß er sich, Soldat zu werden.

Mag es ein Zufall gewesen sein, daß er Soldat wurde, so scheint es zunächst fast ein Irrtum des Schicksals, daß er eines Tages — er war damals schon 20 Jahre lang Offizier — zur Abwehr kommandiert wurde. „Ich hatte mich davor gedrückt, moderne Sprachen zu lernen, weil ich auf keinen Fall in den Nachrichtendienst wollte“, sagte er einmal. Und ein andermal beantwortete er die Frage, was er wohl unternommen hätte, wenn sich nicht bald nach 1945 die Gelegenheit ergeben hätte, die „Organisation Gehlen“ aufzubauen: „Ich hätte sicherlich studiert — Jura oder Medizin.“ Er fügte hinzu: „Von Medizin verstehe ich wirklich was.“ Also kein Hang zu Spionage, Agententum, Gefahr und Geheimnis bei diesem Mann, dessen täglich Brot seit wiederum zwanzig Jahren der Einsatz von Dunkelmännern und die Auswertung ihrer Berichte, ist.

„Der Geheimdienst ist ein so schmutziges Geschäft, daß nur ein Gentleman ihn führen kann“, sagte einmal ein Engländer. Gehlen ist ein Gentleman, den merkwürdig widersprüchliche Eigenschaften auszeichnen. Er muß „mit allen Wassern gewaschen“ sein — das ist bei diesem Beruf gar nicht anders denkbar; und er wirkt doch zuweilen ganz arglos, fast könnte man denken naiv. Er kümmert sich bis ins Detail und mit großer Wärme um seine Untergebenen, auch um die letzte Sekretärin, und ist dabei doch ganz unsentimental, kühl und ohne politisches Engagement. Sein Beruf ist es, aufzuklären und abzuwehren, und damit basta.

Wie Gehlen dazu kam? Wie gesagt, er war 20 Jahre lang Offizier. Zwei Jahre auf der berühmten Kavallerie-Schule in Hannover, Generalstab, Operationsabteilung bei General Manstein, Adjutant beim Chef des Generalstabs Halder, im Polenfeldzug einer der drei aktiven Offiziere bei einer Landwehrdivision — zwanzig Jahre wechselnder Ausbildung. Und dann, eines Tages im Jahre 1942, wurde die entscheidende Weiche seines Lebens gestellt: Er bekam die Leitung der Generalstabsabteilung „Fremde Heere Ost“.

Damals tobte mitten im heißen Krieg der kalte Krieg zwischen Wehrmacht und Partei, zwischen dem OKW-Amt, der Auslands-Abwehr des Admiral Canaris und Himmlers Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). Als Chef der Abteilung „Fremde Heere Ost“ mußte der damalige Oberst Gehlen die Feindlageberichte auswerten, also die Gefangenenaussagen und die Ergebnisse der Erkundungsoperationen. Deren Beschaffung oblag ihm nicht, aber im Zeichen jener Rivalität gelang es ihm, unter dem Stichwort „Frontaufklärung“ allmählich auch sie an sich zu ziehen. Und als Canaris schließlich im Mai 1944 abgesetzt und die Spitze des militärischen Geheimdienstes vom OKW in Schellengs Amt IV in RSHA verlegt wurde, da hatte Gehlen einen eigenen, glänzend funktionierenden Heeresnachrichtendienst bereits fertig aufgebaut; er war mittlerweile zum Abwehrchef des östlichen Kriegsschauplatzes geworden.

Hitler tobt ...

Von seinen Lagebeurteilungen hieß es, sie seien von so hoher Qualität und Zuverlässigkeit gewesen, wie man ähnliches bis dahin im Zweiten Weltkrieg auf deutscher Seite nicht gekannt hatte. Sehr zum Zorn Hitlers haben Gehlens Berichte immer vor der Stärke der russischen Armeen gewarnt. Der letzte Generalstabschef des Heeres, Heinz Guderian, schildert in seinen „Erinnerungen eines Soldaten“, wie Hitler über einen solchen Lagebericht am Heiligen Abend 1944 in Ziegenberg, Hessen, in Tobsucht geriet:

„Mein Vortrag schilderte die feindliche Gliederungs- und Stärkeverhältnisse ... Die Arbeit meiner Abteilung *Fremde Heere Ost* war mustergültig und absolut zuverlässig. Ich kannte ihren Chef, den General Gehlen, lange genug, um ihn und seine Mitarbeiter, seine Methoden und Ergebnisse beurteilen zu können. Die Voraussagen Gehlens haben sich bewahrheitet. Das ist eine geschichtliche Tatsache. Hitler sah die Dinge anders. Er erklärte die Angaben der Abteilung *Fremde Heere Ost* für Bluff. ... Das ist der größte Bluff seit Dschingis Khan“, rief er aus. Wer hat diesen Blödsinn ausgegraben?“

Zu jener Zeit hatte Gehlen präzises Gehirn, einem unbestechlichen Elektronenrechner gleich, längst die Zukunft „programmiert“: Deutschlands Zusammenbruch steht vor der Tür; die Kenntnisse des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes über die Sowjetunion sind höchst lückenhaft; in spätestens zwei Jahren wird die amerikanisch-sowjetische Kriegsalianz zerbrechen — und dann werden die Archive und Karteien, die „Fremde Heere Ost“ zusammengetragen hat, von größter Wichtigkeit sein. Gehlen ließ alles Material vervielfältigen, auslagern und im Alpen-Reduit verstecken.

Früher als er gedacht hatte interessierten sich die Amerikaner für seine verborgenen Schätze. Der US-General Sibert holte ihn im Sommer



Hinter dieser Mauer in München-Pullach residiert Gehlens Bundesnachrichtendienst, Zielscheibe der östlichen Spionage

1945 aus dem Gefangenenlager, und es kam eine Art *Gentlemen's Agreement* zustande. Gehlen wurde die Aufgabe übertragen, für die Amerikaner eine rein deutsche, zivile Organisation mit militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Spezialisten aufzubauen. Das war die sogenannte *Organisation Gehlen*, die dann 1955 von den Amerikanern an die Bundesrepublik abgegeben und als *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) der direkten Aufsicht des Bundeskanzleramtes unterstellt wurde.

Die Aufgabe des Bundesnachrichtendienstes ist in seinen Statuten so definiert: „Beschaffung von Informationen militärischen, wirtschaftlichen und rüstungstechnischen sowie politischen Inhalts mit nachrichtendienstlichen Mitteln aus dem Ausland.“ Diese Aufgabe entledigt sich der BND mit beträchtlichem Geschick. Es heißt, er sei der erfolgreichste Spionageapparat der NATO

Die Zeit

30

Freitag den 26.

July 1963

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

• Da fragt sich manch einer: Wäre es nicht viel billiger, beide Seiten unterließe dieses kostspielige Geschäft? Und ist nicht der Schaden, den die Dunkelmänner anrichten, viel größer als ihr Nutzen? Erleichtert man nicht den feindlichen Spionen ihr Geschäft, wenn man selber Spionage betreibt und ihnen, die sich ihr Material sonst mühselig überall zusammensuchen müßten, ein wohlsortiertes Archiv und fertige Auswertung bietet, die sie dann dem Gegner verkaufen?

Leider ist es so einfach nicht. Stellen wir wirklich das kostspielige und gefährliche Geschäft einseitig ein, dann könnten die Sowjets ganz ungehemmt ihrer Spionen-Leidenenschaft fröhnen. Man braucht sich nur an die großen Fälle der sowjetischen Agententätigkeit zu erinnern, die in der letzten Zeit aufgedeckt worden sind. Da war der Schwede *Wennerström*, der fünfzehn Jahre lang Geheimmaterial der NATO und die Verteidigungspläne Schwedens an Moskau geliefert hat. Da war *George Blake* vom englischen *Secret Service*, den die Sowjets „umgedreht“ hatten und der ihnen drei britische Spionagenetze verriet — eines in der DDR, eines im Ostblock und eines in Ägypten. Und da war *William Vassall*, der in der Zentrale der britischen Seerüstung saß; die Sowjets erpreßten ihn, nachdem sie ihn in einer verfänglichen Situation fotografiert hatten, und er lieferte ihnen alle Rüstungsgeheimnisse, deren er habhaft werden konnte.

Die Gefahr von innen

Wenn man sich die Fälle vor Augen führt, dann ist man doch ganz froh, daß es westliche Nachrichtendienste gibt, die solche Verräter entlarven. Felfe ist ihnen übrigens keineswegs ebenbürtig gewesen. Er kannte keine Staatsgeheimnisse, die er hätte verraten können, und er steuerte auch keinen Spionagering in der DDR, dessen Mitglieder er hätte ausliefern können — er hatte nicht mit der DDR, sondern ausschließlich mit den Sowjets zu tun. Seine Aufgabe war es, zu verhindern, daß der sowjetische Geheimdienst die Bundesrepublik infiltrierte.

Seine Tätigkeit in der BND-Zentrale bot Felfe aber Gelegenheit, 15 000 Mikrofilmaufnahmen und rund 20 mit Informationen besprochene Minifonspulen an die Russen zu liefern. Material, das den Sowjets offenbar so wichtig war, daß sie ihm ihrerseits eine Menge Geheimmaterial zusteckten, mit dem er sich bei Gehlen lieb Kind machen konnte. Es heißt, sie seien dabei bis zum Verrat von Staatsgeheimnissen gegangen — allerdings nicht ihrer eigenen, sondern vorwiegend solcher der DDR. Sie scheuten sich auch nicht, einen keineswegs unbekannten Westdeutschen erst als Agenten anzuwerben und ihn dann durch Felfe „hochgelassen“ zu lassen. So konnte dieser sich eine exzellente Feder an den Hut stecken und dem BND sein Unentbehrlichkeit noch deutlicher vor Augen führen.

Es entbehrt im Grunde nicht der Komik: daß sich eine kilometerlange Mauer die Zentrale des Bundesnachrichtendienstes hermetisch von der Außenwelt ab, da patrouillieren Aufseher mit Sprechgerät und Polizeihunden auf dem Gelände, um jeden, dem es dennoch gelingen sollte, das komplizierte Ausweissystem und die Einteilung in Sicherheitskreise zu überwinden, sogleich festzunehmen, da werden alle erdenklichen Sicherungsmaßnahmen gegen die Feinde von außen getroffen — aber die eigenen, zum Feind gewordenen Freunde im Inneren können offenbar ziemlich ungestört sammeln, photokopieren und ihr Unwesen treiben. Gegen sie scheint kein Kraut gewachsen, auch wenn es vielerlei interne Überwachung gibt.

Geheimmaterial vorenthalten werden.

Ein englischer Fachmann erzählte, daß man rund 20 Leute brauche, um einen Spion in den eigenen Reihen lückenlos zu beschatten. Und selbst dann könne es ein oder zwei Jahre dauern, ehe man die Beweise gegen ihn in der Hand habe. Auch bei Felfe und seinem Außenmitarbeiter Clemens (der dritte Mann, Tiebel, gehörte ja nicht zum BND, sondern war als Kurier von den Sowjets angestellt und wurde erst entdeckt, als die beiden anderen entlarvt worden waren) — auch bei Felfe hat es lange gedauert. Nur die Beobachtung, daß Clemens, der im Rheinland lebte, jeden Sonnabend zwischen 11 und 13 Uhr zu Hause saß, zu einer Zeit also, in der die meisten Leute ausgehen oder einzukaufen pflegen, weckte den Verdacht, daß er vielleicht zu dieser Stunde Funkverkehr empfangt. Ein Verdacht, der, als er sich bewahrheitete, dann zur Verhaftung des Trios führte.

Gehlen's Nachrichtendienst ist natürlich die Zielscheibe der östlichen Spionage. Mit allen Mitteln versuchen die Kommunisten, seine Mitarbeiter „anzuzapfen“ oder wenigstens zu bespitzeln. Plötzlich findet einer zu Hause unter seinem Schrank im Wohnzimmer ein Mikrophon; der andere wird durch zufällige Bekanntschaften im Urlaub gefährdet. Und immer wieder entfesselt Ostberlin Kampagnen, um die Tätigkeit der Gehlen-Leute zu behindern. Der DDR-Geheimdienst — der SSD, der von General *Mielke* geleitet wird, welcher sich rühmt, 1931 auf dem Alexanderplatz in Berlin die beiden Polizeihauptleute *Anlauf* und *Lenk* erschossen zu haben — hat es nicht schwer: Will er im Raum Hanau in Hessen oder Gronau in Niedersachsen irgend jemanden oder irgend etwas bespitzeln lassen, so braucht er nur die Listen mit den Namen der dort in der Gegend wohnenden Kommunisten durchzugehen und sich einen Aktivisten herauszusuchen, wenn er keinen ausgebildeten Agenten schicken will. Das Ostberliner Ministerium für Staatssicherheitsdienst verfügt, so schätzt man, über 25 000 hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter (ohne Agenten und V-Männer). Die im Geheimdienst der Sowjetunion amtlich beschäftigten schätzt Cookridge in seinem Buch *Soviet Spy Net* auf 250 000.

Die Belastung der Mitarbeiter im Nachrichtendienst ist natürlich groß. In einem Jahr sollen beim BND mehr als ein Dutzend Leute mit Herzinfarkt zusammengebrochen sein. Auch die Mitarbeiter, die nicht Geheimnisträger sind, stehen doch dauernd unter einem gewissen Druck. Jeder muß Umschreibungen für seine Arbeitsstelle und seine Tätigkeit erfinden, kein Freund kann seine Freundin abends dort abholen. Auf dem Gelände in Pullach gibt es ein Krankenhaus, in dem alleinstehende Mitarbeiter Unterkunft finden können, die sonst in Krankheits-

Ausland, als Agent zu unterhalten und ihn dann in den Westen zu holen, als seine Situation prekär zu werden drohte.

Wenn es dem Laien unbegreiflich ist, wieso ein eigener Spion in der gegen fremde Eindringlinge so wohlgeschützten Zentrale viele Jahre lang wirken konnte, so mag dieses Staunen auf den Unverstand der Laien zurückzuführen sein. Nicht so leicht abzutun aber ist die Verwunderung darüber, daß jene beiden Spione im eigenen Haus ehemalige SS-Leute waren.


Ich weiß, da heißt es, die Leute aus der früheren Abwehr hätten sich damals beim Aufbau aus dem Nichts als erste angeboten. Sie hatten Erfahrungen, sie waren verfügbar, und die Amerikaner fragten nicht viel, woher die Leute kamen, sie wollten Sachverständige und Leute mit Kontakten. Und Kontakte hatten die SS-Leute, denn auch drüben gab es Männer ihrer Couleur in der gleichen Situation. So war beispielsweise der ehemalige Reichssicherheitshauptamtschef Müller lange Zeit Berater der Sowjets in Fragen der Spionage gegen die Bundesrepublik; und ein ehemaliger KZ-Kommandant war Führer sowjetischer Geheimdienstoperationen gegen die Bundesrepublik. Dennoch, oder gerade deshalb, erscheint das Argument mit den Kontakten eher belustigend; denn Hand in Hand mit dieser Kontaktmöglichkeit geht ja die Versuchung, auf beiden Schultern zu tragen. Es kommt mir so vor, als wollte jemand empfehlen, im Nachrichtendienst vor allem mit Homosexuellen zu arbeiten, weil es für sie so leicht sei, Kontakte auf der anderen Seite zu finden...

Nun muß man freilich feststellen, daß es sich bei den SS-Leuten des BND nicht um KZ-Kommandanten handelte, sondern um ehemalige Polizeibeamte, vor allem des Kriminaldienstes, von denen manche nur „in Rangangleichung“ einen SS-Dienstgrad erhalten hatten. Sie alle sind 1955 bei der Übernahme des Bundesnachrichtendienstes in deutsche Verfügungsgewalt vom Bundespersonalausschuß genau durchleuchtet worden; ihre politische Vergangenheit wurde nach den Unterlagen des *Document Centre* in Berlin überprüft. Übrigens werden die Beamten und Angestellten des Gehlen-Dienstes vom Bundeskanzleramt eingestellt und abberufen, nicht vom Chef der Organisation selbst.

Das eine Prozent

Der Staatssekretär im Bundeskanzleramt hat offiziell erklärt, weniger als ein Prozent aller Bediensteten des BND hätte einen SS/SD-Dienstgrad gehabt. Wenn die Zahl stimmt, die Interpress nannte, wenn es also etwa 4000 solcher Bediensteten gibt, dann wären unter ihnen 40 ehemalige Kriminalkommissare und Polizeibeamte mit SS-Rang. Man weiß nicht, ob man darüber verwundert und erschrocken sein soll, oder ob man vielleicht sogar feststellen müßte, daß der Prozentsatz ehemaliger Nazis in anderen Behörden noch sehr viel höher ist.

Neben dem Bundeskanzleramt, das die vorgesetzte Behörde des Bundesnachrichtendienstes ist, untersteht dieser noch zwei weiteren Kontrollinstanzen: dem Bundesrechnungshof, der jedes Jahr während mehrerer Monate die Ausgaben kontrolliert, und ferner zwei parlamentarischen Ausschüssen, nämlich dem Haushaltsausschuß und einem kleinen Ausschuß, in den die Fraktionen ihre besonderen Vertreter entsenden. Sie werden bei der Einstellung von höheren Beamten befragt und auch über die Auswertung und Lagebeurteilung des BND unterrichtet.



Erkennungszeichen

fallen der Pflege von zufälligen Mitbewohnern ausgesetzt wären. Auch das muß bedacht sein.

Die ganze Organisation zerfällt in zwei Bereiche: Beschaffung und Auswertung — wobei es sich nicht nur um militärisches, sondern auch um politisches, wirtschaftliches und wissenschaftliches Material handelt. Fachleute sagen, daß etwa sechzig Prozent des Anfalls militärische Informationen sind, was aber nichts über das Gewicht aussagt, weil jede Zahl, beispielsweise wieviel Züge auf einer bestimmten Strecke fahren, als Meldung gewertet wird; während unter Umständen eine einzige Information aus dem politischen oder wissenschaftlichen Bereich sehr viel größere Bedeutung hat.

Die Beschaffung spielt sich in der zweifelhaften Sphäre der Spione, Agenten und V-Männer ab. Die Auswertung, in der natürlich besonders qualifizierte Leute tätig sind, gleicht eher einem Institut mit Experten auf politischem, militärischem und wirtschaftlichem Gebiet. Dort wird mit wissenschaftlicher Akribie geordnet, mit elektronischen Geräten gerechnet, die einschlägige Literatur studiert und versucht, ein Bild des Rüstungsstandes, der wirtschaftlichen Kapazität, der militärischen Vorbereitungen und innerpolitischen Spannungen anderer Länder zu gewinnen.

Der Bundesnachrichtendienst ist wie ein Geschäftsunternehmen aufgebaut. Die Zentrale ist sozusagen die Generaldirektion, der die Generalvertretungen, Bezirksdirektionen und Filialen unterstehen, die zum Zweck der Nachrichtenbeschaffung gegründet und als geschäftliche Firmen getarnt wurden.

Reinhard Gehlen, der 1945 in amerikanische Gefangenschaft geriet, hatte vorausschauend das gesamte Archiv seiner Abteilung „Fremde Heere Ost“ mit allen Unterlagen über die sowjetischen Streitkräfte photokopiert und in den bayerischen Alpen auslagern lassen. Mit diesem Kapital von fünfzig Stahlkoffern war er für die Amerikaner ein höchst begehrteter Mitarbeiter.

Gehlen verkaufte sich nicht billig. Er stellte die Bedingung, mit einem festen Jahresgehalt und einem ausschließlich unter seiner Leitung stehenden Team für die Amerikaner zu arbeiten, wobei er die ausdrückliche Zusicherung verlangte, kein Angehöriger des Stabes dürfe gegen deutsche Interessen eingesetzt werden, und er müsse als Treuhänder der entsprechenden Interessen eines späteren deutschen Staates angesehen werden. Seinen Schatz holte er erst aus dem Versteck, als mit den Amerikanern das von ihm vorgeschlagene *Gentlemen's Agreement* abgeschlossen war.

So entstand 1946 die „Organisation Gehlen“, die dann 1955 vom Bund übernommen und als BND dem Bundeskanzleramt unterstellt wurde. Außer dem Kanzleramt untersteht der BND noch zwei weiteren Kontrollinstanzen: dem Bundesrechnungshof, der jedes Jahr eingehend die Ausgaben kontrolliert, und ferner zwei parlamentarischen Ausschüssen, nämlich dem Haushaltsausschuß und einem kleinen, interfraktionellen Gremium.

Und so kam es auch, daß anfangs eine verhältnismäßig hohe Anzahl von alten Nazis in der Organisation mitarbeitete — Leute, die wegen ihrer Kenntnisse und Verbindungen zunächst unentbehrlich waren (was vor allem für die ehemaligen Kriminalbeamten galt) und die nur langsam — oft meinte man, viel zu langsam — und nur unter erheblichem Druck der Öffentlichkeit ausgesiebt wurden oder allmählich herausalterten. Ein Umstand, unter dem Gehlen selbst wahrscheinlich am meisten gelitten hat, denn seine politische Gesinnung war immer absolut untadelig.

Erfolge und Pannen

„Was war wohl Ihr größter Erfolg?“ fragte ich „den Doktor“, wie er unter seinen Mitarbeitern genannt wird.

„Darauf kann ich nicht sprechen. Nur ein einziger in der Bundesrepublik weiß davon.“

„Und Ihre größte Panne?“

„Der Fall Feltie. Das Publikum glaubt zwar, es habe noch mehr dahinter gesteckt, als wirklich der Fall war, aber es war eine schlimme Panne. Übrigens bekamen wir damals von einem befreundeten Nachrichtendienst ein Telegramm: „Wir gratulieren, wir haben unseren Feltie noch nicht gefunden.““

Hat nun eigentlich der BND bei den politischen Überraschungen, die wir während der letzten Jahre miterlebt haben, rechtzeitig gewarnt? Oder hat er — beispielsweise vom Bau der Mauer 1961 — ebenso wenig gewußt wie wir



Aufnahme: Archiv, Klaus Barisch
Nach dem 2. Weltkrieg einmal von
Photoreportern erwischt: 1957 in Hannover

Normalbürger? Ich habe vor Jahren einmal einige Berichte des Gehlenschen Geheimdienstes aus dem Jahre 1961 zu Gesicht bekommen und kann nur sagen, ich wundere mich über das offizielle Bonn, das am 13. August aus allen Wolken fiel. Das wäre wirklich nicht nötig gewesen, wenn es jene Berichte gelesen hätte. Allerdings scheint es oft gar nicht so sehr daran zu liegen, daß die Politiker nicht lesen, sondern mehr daran, daß sie das, was sie lesen, nicht wahrhaben wollen. Hitler, dem Gehlens Lageberichte nicht paßten, nannte ihn 1944 einen Idioten, den man in die Irrenanstalt sperren sollte. Solche Reaktionen freilich waren ihm vorbehalten. Aber auch andere sind geneigt, das, was sie nicht hören wollen, für Falschmeldungen zu halten.

Damals, im Jahr 1961, meldete der BND vom Januar an, daß eine Isolierung Westberlins bevorstehe und sich offenbar eine Zernierung vorbereite. Im Juli wurden die Warnungen dringlicher — es hieß, die Sperrung der Sektorengrenze stünde bevor. Am 1. August wurde gemeldet, es müsse mit Unterbrechung des S-Bahn- und des U-Bahn-Verkehrs gerechnet werden. Dennoch fiel das offizielle Bonn am 13. August aus allen Wolken. Übrigens heißt es in Washington, daß die Aufklärung des BND vor dem Israel-Krieg im Nahen Osten besser war als ihre eigene und ihnen darum ganz unentbehrlich gewesen sei.

Reinhard Gehlen ist unter den westlichen Geheimdienstchefs derjenige, der bei weitem am längsten im Amt gewesen ist. Er hat sich als glänzender Organisator und ungewöhnlich begabter Analytiker ausgewiesen. Für die moderne Entwicklung mag ihn sein Interesse für Technik und neue Waffen besonders prädestiniert haben. Wer ihn kennt, ist vor allem über eines überrascht: daß ein Mann, dessen Metier es mit sich brachte, daß er seit Jahrzehnten den Osten als den potentiellen Gegner betrachten mußte, sich so freigekannt hat von antikomunistischen Komplexen.

Was jemand, der bis zu seinem sechundsechzigsten Lebensjahr kein Privatleben hatte, nun eigentlich tun wird? Er will sich endlich mehr seiner Familie — Ehefrau, ein Sohn und drei Töchter — widmen und seine drei Hobbys pflegen: Medizinstudium, Segeln und lateinische Dichtung.

Ein Frühling wie in Griechenland... Andreas Papandreu, auf der Terrasse eines Godesberger Hotels sitzend, den Drachenfels als römische Variante der Akropolis im Rücken, konnte an diesem heißesten April-Wochenende des Jahrhunderts nicht wissen, daß seine griechischen Landsleute zu Hause die Heizung anstellen mußten. Es war der 21. April, das Osterfest der Orthodoxen und der Jahrestag der Machtübernahme.

Der fünfzigjährige Exil-Politiker, der ein Englisch spricht, als sei er in Boston und nicht in Chios geboren, erzählt von der Putsch-Nacht mit der Distanz eines Berichterstatters, der nicht ein eigenes, sondern ein fremdes Schicksal zu schildern hat: Wie er am Abend des 20. April den Staatsstreich der Militärs in einer Rede vorhergesagt habe; wie in den ersten Stunden des 21. April Panzersoldaten in sein Haus eingedrungen seien; wie er über eine intakte Telefonleitung ein letztes Gespräch mit seinem Vater Georg Papandreu führen konnte; wie er sich auf dem Dach seines Hauses versteckte; wie die Eindringlinge seinem ältesten Sohn mit Erschießen drohten, wenn er nicht das Versteck des Vaters preisgäbe; wie er unter dieser tödlichen Erpressung von dem vier Meter hohen Dach heruntergesprungen sei; wie er sich bei diesem Sprung in die Unfreiheit eine schwere Knieverletzung zugezogen habe; wie er dann eine Odyssee von acht Monaten durch Gefängnisse antreten mußte, vorwiegend in Einzelhaft; wie er nun als Sprecher der Zentrumsunion wirkt, deren Führer sein Vater ist, und als Präsident der Panhellenischen Befreiungsbewegung.

Dieser Bewegung fehlt es nicht an Zielen und ihrem Präsidenten nicht an Worten, sie zu erklären, wenngleich das Hauptziel der umständlichen Erklärung nicht bedarf: Diese Bewegung möchte in Griechenland und im Ausland die Bestrebungen zur Befreiung des griechischen Volkes koordinieren.

Papandreu möchte den Eindruck des leichtfertigen Optimisten oder gar des geschwätzigen Illusionisten vermeiden. Deshalb bemüht er sich, bei der Abwägung von Wünschbarem, Denkbarem und Erreichbarem um die Sachlichkeit eines Strategen, der die Kräfteverteilung bei Freund und Feind realistisch einzuschätzen weiß.

„Worin sehen Sie den Hauptfeind des griechischen Volkes?“

„In der Schnellebigkeit der Zeit und in der Vergesslichkeit der Menschen.“

„Und worin sehen Sie den Hauptfeind Ihrer Sache?“

„In der Bereitschaft vieler Menschen, mancher Völker und einiger Einrichtungen, zur Isolierung der Junta beizutragen.“

„Isolierung“ — das ist das Schlüsselwort, das in der Erläuterung seiner Pläne immer wiederkehrt. Isolierung im Politischen, Militärischen, Ökonomischen und Moralischen werde die Macht haben in Athen zum Rückzug zwingen. Das Regime, das sich als stark aufspiele, sei in Wirklichkeit schwach. Wenn die Welt, der es ernst sei mit der Freiheit, die Diktatoren in Athen weder militärisch noch wirtschaftlich unterstütze, könnte in kurzer Zeit das Ende der Zwangsherrschaft herbeigeführt werden.

Was die Reduzierung militärischer und wirtschaftlicher Hilfeleistungen angeht, so haben jüngste amerikanische Versprechungen und Bonner Beschlüsse ihn ermutigt. Die moralische Disposition zur Befreiung seines Landes sei bei den Völkern der freien Welt ohnehin größer als Bereitschaft oder Fähigkeit mancher Politiker, aus richtigen Erkenntnissen die richtigen Entschlüsse abzuleiten.

In diesem Zusammenhang spricht der Exil-Hellene über die NATO teils mit Bitternis, teils mit Zuversicht: Sie habe das, was sich in seinem Lande vor einem Jahr ereignet habe, nicht verhindern können oder... wollten; dem Verteidigungsbündnis sei aber kaum mit einem Partner gedient, der seine besten Offiziere zu Tausenden entlassen habe und sich auf die Loyalität der Streitkräfte nicht verlassen könne.

„Die wirtschaftliche Isolierung, die Sie sich wünschen, würde dem Volk in Griechenland sicherlich mancherlei Beschwerden bringen.“

„Ja, aber unser Volk nimmt vorübergehende Schwierigkeiten gern in Kauf als Preis für die Rückkehr zur Freiheit.“

„Ökonomische und moralische Unterstützung zugleich bringt Ihrem Lande der Tourismus. Sollen Bürger der freien Welt Ihr Land im Augenblick besuchen?“

Auf diese doppelte Gewissensfrage, auf das Gewissen der Griechen und der Nicht-Griechen zielend, gibt Andreas Papandreu eine eindeutige Antwort: „So willkommen uns Touristen aus aller Welt sind, so sehr würde im Augenblicke jeder Tourist dazu beitragen, die Lebensdauer eines tyrannischen Regimes zu verlängern, unter wirtschaftlichen und unter psychologischen Aspekten. Als ich im vorigen Sommer, durch einen Spalt im vergitterten Fenster meiner Gefängniszelle blickend, die Touristen durch die Straßen Athens flanieren sah, erfüllte mich dieses Bild mit großer Melancholie, weil mir klar war, daß diese Menschen aus der Freiheit kamen, in die Freiheit zurückkehrten und die Unfreiheit bei uns — unfreiwillig — stabilisieren halfen.“

Von General Wessel, der am 1. Mai Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND) wird, also Chef des Auslandsnachrichtendienstes der Bundesrepublik, den Reinhard Gehlen aufgebaut hat, gibt es viele Photos, und viele Menschen — Inländer und Ausländer, Soldaten und Zivilisten — kennen ihn. Seine letzte Station war Washington, wo er 1965 den heutigen Inspekteur der Luftwaffe, Steinhoff, ablöste.

Ganz anders verhält es sich mit seinem Vorgänger, der am 30. April in den Ruhestand tritt: General Gehlen ist unbestritten der Mann mit dem höchsten Geheimniskoeffizienten in der Bundesrepublik. Nur ein paar Dutzend Leute des öffentlichen Lebens kennen ihn persönlich. Nie hat er erlaubt, daß Photos von ihm gemacht wurden, und nur ein einziges Mal erwiderte ihn ein Photoreporter, im Jahre 1957 in Hannover. Das war eine Panne, die den zuständigen Absichern einen kräftigen Rüffel eintrug, obgleich an Hand dieses Bildes, das ihn mit dunkler Brille und ins Gesicht gezogenem Hut zeigt, kaum jemand den Chef des BND identifizieren konnte.

In allen Archiven der Welt gibt es außer diesem nur noch ein Bild. Es ist vierundzwanzig Jahre alt und zeigt ihn im Jahre 1944 im Kreis einer Gruppe von Offizieren. Der Mann, ohne Gesicht, so wird er häufig genannt. Aber das Image des Mannes, dessen Gesicht fast niemand kennt, ist viel ausgeprägter als das Image einiger derjenigen, die man immer wieder im Fernsehen oder in den Illustrierten bewundern kann (das nebenstehende Photo wurde noch nie veröffentlicht).

„Wie machen Sie es nur“, fragte ich Gehlen, „daß Sie den Bildjägern immer wieder entgehen, die doch sicher ihren Ehrgeiz dareinsetzen, Sie aufzuspüren? Schließlich kennt man doch Ihren Wohnort außerhalb Münchens genauso gut wie Ihre Arbeitsstätte in Pullach.“

Der Chef des Geheimdienstes berichtet zu diesem Thema eine höchst belustigende Geschichte. Vor Jahren hatte er ein paar mal einen Studentengang mitgenommen, der gelegentlich am Ortsausgang stand und durch Gesten kundtat, daß er nach München mitgenommen werden wollte; wie sich herausstellte, studierte er Medizin und Beschäftigte sich nebenher mit Photographieren.

Eines Tages sah einer von Gehlens Mitarbeitern, der im gleichen Ort wohnt, denselben jungen Mann am Ortsausgang stehen und nahm ihn mit in die Stadt. Unterwegs erzählte dieser, er sei Medizinstudent und mache gelegentlich Photoreportagen für eine Illustrierte — ich glaube, es war *Quick*. „Was war denn die letzte Reportage, die Sie gemacht haben?“, fragte ihn der Geheimdienstler. Antwort: „Die letzte, die ich schiefgegangen. Ich sollte Gehlen photographieren, aber das ist nicht geglückt, obgleich ich eine ganze Nacht neben seinem Haus auf dem Baum gesessen habe.“

Selbst von den bei ihm Beschäftigten kennen nur die wenigsten Gehlen persönlich. „Eines Tages“, so erzählt er, „stieg ich in Würzburg in einen D-Zug. In dem Abteil saßen drei Leute. Ein einzelner mir in der Ecke gegenüber, die beiden anderen — offenbar Journalisten — saßen am Fenster und unterhielten sich darüber, daß es doch eigentlich möglich sein müsse, dem Gehlen mal irgendwo zu begegnen, schließlich werde ja wohl auch er gelegentlich mit der Bahn oder dem Flugzeug reisen. Daraufhin zog ich es vor, auf der nächsten Station in ein anderes Abteil umzusiedeln. Zwei Tage später landete, kuriositätshalber, auf meinem Schreibtisch eine Meldung, die alle Einzelheiten jener Konversation schilderte.“ Der dritte Mitreisende war nämlich ein Herr des BND gewesen, der seinen Chef nicht von Angesicht kannte.

„Schutz? Der beste Schutz ist Tarnung — und die beste Tarnung ist Unauffälligkeit.“ In der Tat, man kann sich kaum jemand Unauffälligeren denken als Reinhard Gehlen, in dem man alles andere eher vermuten würde als einen General. Ich bin überzeugt, daß an der Bushaltestelle oder auch am Briefschalter in der Post sich jeder an dem bescheidenen Mann vorbeidrängeln könnte, ohne daß dieser sich beschweren oder auch nur ein lautes Wort sagen würde. Fast schüchtern wirkt er, aber gar nicht verkrampt, sondern vollständig gelöst und vor allem nachdenklich, auch diplomatisch, dabei von einer Distanzierung, die vielleicht sogar gelegentlich in Isolierung umzuschlagen vermag. Sicherlich ist er empfindlich, aber auch empfindsam.

Sein Äußeres: Kurz geschorener, blonder Schnurrbart, graue Schläfen, hohe Stirn, die in eine Glatze übergeht. Noch immer ist er schlank, nur wenig vom Alter gezeichnet. Man könnte ihn sich gut in einem Labor vorstellen oder im weißen Kittel eines Chirurgen.

Ganz zweifellos stellen die meisten Menschen sich unter dem Spionagechef einen ganz anderen Typ vor: Harnisch, entschlossene Bewegungen, blitzschnell jede Situation überprüfend; geheimnisumwittert, nie allein auftretend; im vielhundertpfündigen Mercedes durch die Gegend brausend — eben weil er so anders ist, bleibt Gehlen unbehellig. „Im Privatleben fahre ich einen VW“, sagt er, „weil der weniger Benzin braucht.“

Im Dienst freilich benutzt er einen Mercedes, der immer wieder die Nummernschilder wechselt, und der kugelsicheres Glas hat — was Gehlen übrigens 1953 das Leben rettete, als ein Geschloß, das ihm galt, an der Scheibe abprallte. „Andere Attentate?“

„Ja, einmal ist ein Herr... aber nein, den Fall sollte man nicht erwähnen, weil die sonst wissen, daß wir wissen.“

„Das Magazin *Time* schrieb neulich, die Sowjetunion habe 225 000 Dollar auf Ihren Kopf gesetzt. Stimmt das?“

„Damals, 1953, nach dem Fall Geyer (ein Agent in der DDR, der dort umgedreht wurde), soll das wohl der Fall gewesen sein — ob ich ihnen das heute noch wert bin, ist mir zweifelhaft.“

„Sie sind doch auch als „a. D.“ eine Fundgrube der Information und mehr Wert als ein Tresor voller Geheimakten. Darum werden Sie ja wohl auch im Ruhestand die gleichen Vorsichtsmaßregeln beibehalten müssen als bisher, und die Mitwelt wird auch weiterhin auf ein neues Photo verzichten müssen?“

„Ja, das ist richtig.“

Die Vorsichtsmaßregeln sind so, daß für ein normales Privatleben kaum Spielraum bleibt: Reisen — auch Urlaubsreisen — immer unter anderem Namen. Privater Verkehr — außerhalb des engsten Mitarbeiterkreises — nicht möglich. Sein Grundstück und alle Zufahrtswege müssen immer wieder routinemäßig überwacht und untersucht werden. Und schließlich: Mehr Verantwortung als die meisten anderen Prominenten und noch weniger Zeit. Das Pensum an Aktenlesen — auch am Wochenende — ist für den Chef des BND wahrscheinlich größer als für die meisten Manager in Politik und Wirtschaft. Und das will etwas heißen.

Merkwürdig, so ein Leben, das ganz und gar um der Sache willen“, wie das in Preußen hieß, gelebt würde. Merkwürdig mindestens heute, wo doch die ersten Fragen für die meisten lauten: Was habe ich davon? Wieviel bringt mir das ein? Lohnt sich das? Macht man sich da nicht kaputt?

Für Gehlen ist das Leben immer so gewesen. Mit zwanzig Jahren hatte der Sohn des Verlagsdirektors im Ferdinand-Hirt-Verlag sich entschlossen, die Offizierslaufbahn einzuschlagen. Er ging durch die harte Schule des Hunderttausendmann-Heeres: Eiserner Dienst, wenig Aufstiegschancen und kein bißchen Wohlstand. Dann Generalstab, Operationsabteilung bei Manstein, Adjutant beim Chef des Generalstabs Halder und schließlich 1942 die entscheidende Wende: der damalige Oberst Gehlen übernimmt die Leitung der Generalstabsabteilung *Fremde Heere Ost*. Damit oblag ihm zunächst die Auswertung der Feindlageberichte und schließlich auch deren Beschaffung. Zwei Jahre später war er Abwehrchef des östlichen Kriegsschauplatzes.

Stolz erfüllt den General, wenn er vom Hunderttausendmann-Heer spricht. Er glaubt, es habe nie mehr und es werde wahrscheinlich auch nie wieder eine so glänzend ausgebildete Truppe geben. Damals sei die Operationsabteilung mit nur neun Offizieren ausgekommen. Freund und Feind hätten im Krieg immer wieder darüber gestaunt, daß im deutschen Heer jeder Divisionsführung nur drei Generalstäbler zugeordnet waren — während im allgemeinen anderwärts die doppelte Anzahl üblich gewesen sei. Und als Zeichen der außergewöhnlichen *efficiency* führt er an, daß der Feldzug gegen Jugoslawien in einer einzigen Nacht ausgearbeitet worden ist.

Reinhard Gehlen hat drei Chefs des Generalstabs gedient: Halder, Zeissler und Guderian. Seine Aufgabe als Chef von „Fremde Heere Ost“ war es, jeden Abend eine Lagebeurteilung — eine halbe bis eine Seite — vorzulegen und alle vier Wochen einen zusammenfassenden, längeren Bericht über die militärische Entwicklung, den Heusinger dann an höchster Stelle vortrug.

Auf meinen Wunsch zeigte er mir die Meßtischblätter, auf denen damals nach seinen Ermittlungen die Feindbewegungen — also die mutmaßliche Richtung des Vorstoßes oder der Gegenaktion — eingezeichnet worden waren. Andere Karten, die jeweils vier Wochen später dann den tatsächlichen Verlauf der Aktionen verzeichneten, bewiesen, daß die vorausgesehene und die tatsächlich eingetretene Lage sich durch einen unwahrscheinlich hohen Grad der Übereinstimmung auszeichneten. Fachleute sagen, daß die Akkuratess der Gehlenschen Aufklärung im Zweiten Weltkrieg ganz ungewöhnlich gewesen sei. Hitler hat er nur zwei- oder dreimal gesehen, als Heusinger ihn zu diesen Lagebesprechungen mitnahm.

„Wann war es für Sie denn klar, daß dieser Krieg verloren werden würde?“

„Im ersten Rußlandwinter 1941 vor Stalin-grad traf ich mit Henning von Tresckow zusammen, den ich gut kannte. Wir sprachen darüber, wie es weitergehen werde, und waren uns einig, daß der Rußlandfeldzug gewonnen werden könne, wenn er militärisch und politisch richtig geführt würde, daß es aber unter den obwaltenden Umständen schiefliegen werde. Auf die Frage, was also soll man tun, war uns ganz klar: Es geht nur ohne die Spitze. Über diese Erkenntnis aber waren wir beide so erschrocken, daß wir die Unterhaltung abbrachen, denn schließlich waren wir beide Offiziere, die unter Eid standen.“

Wenn man den Chef von Pullach in seinem kleinen, bemerkenswert bescheidenen Zimmer sitzen sieht: Schreibtisch, Geheimsafe, Sofa, drei Polsterstühle, ein Tischchen, darüber die Totenmaske Friedrichs des Großen und ein Photo des ehemaligen Abwehrchefs Admiral Canaris, verschiedene Koffer mit Akten, die wohl alle griffbereit ihren festen Platz haben, dann kommt einem der Verdacht, hier könnte vielleicht die Zeit stehengeblieben sein.

„Hat sich dieses Metier in Ihrer Lebenszeit eigentlich wesentlich verändert?“

„Ja und nein. Noch immer ist der V-Mann unentbehrlich, aber so, wie die Infanterie heute nicht mehr zu Fuß geht, sondern im Panzerspähwagen fährt oder mit dem Helikopter an den Brennpunkt gelassen wird, so haben sich auch bei uns die Mittel und Methoden stark verändert. Heute braucht man einen großen wissenschaftlichen Apparat, um das beschaffte Material auszuwerten.“

„Ohne Computer kann man also nicht auskommen?“

„Nein, man muß sie haben. Man muß den Weg in die Technik und mit der Technik gehen — aber man muß es bewußt tun und sich klar darüber sein, wo die Grenzen liegen. Und man darf auch nicht der Vorstellung verfallen, man müsse unbedingt alles wissen. Wenn man mit allzu vielen Informationen überschwemmt wird, dann kann man sich schließlich zu nichts mehr entscheiden und bringt überhaupt keine Entscheidung mehr zustande.“

Zufall oder System

„Was für eine Rolle spielt eigentlich der Zufall beim Geheimdienst?“

„Eine sehr geringe. Es kommt eben im Grunde doch auf systematische Arbeit an: Man muß Schwerpunkte bilden und versuchen, die verschiedenen Mittel der Aufklärung miteinander in Einklang zu bringen. Und dann ist, wie gesagt, die wissenschaftliche Auswertung von entscheidender Bedeutung.“

„Muß die Spitze immer ein General sein? Könnte man sich nicht auch einen Wissenschaftler, eine Art Hermann Kahn, als Chef vorstellen?“

„Einer der beiden, entweder der Chef oder sein Vize, muß militärischer Fachmann sein, und der Zivile muß mindestens zehn Jahre Erfahrung haben.“

Die Zahlen, die über Gehlen, Abwehr und Spionageamt, allenfalls auch über die 5000 Mitarbeiter und 100 Millionen Mark Etat. Von den 5000 Mitarbeitern sind offenbar etwa fünfzehn Prozent Beamte und rund zehn Prozent Soldaten. Ungefähr fünfzigtausend Mitglieder des Dienstes sind Akademiker, zum Teil Leute hoher Qualität.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: C/EE

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RF 2

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET 191120Z

19 AUG 63 IN 02040

DIR INFO FRAN MUNI CITE BONN 5026 [] ACTING

RYBAT UPHILL

REF. BONN 860* (78476)

1. AMB WAS CALLED BY LETHRUST'S OFFICE MORNING AUGUST 17
AND ADVISED THAT LETHRUST WISHED TO DISCUSS REF SUBJECT. AMB AGREED
AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BRING [] ALONG. IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INSTRUCTIONS, HE HAD NOT REFERRED TO SUBJECT IN MEANTIME.

2. MEETING TOOK PLACE AT 1300. AMB BEGAN BY STATING HE HAD
NOT FORGOTTEN THEIR EARLIER CONVERSATION. HE HAD WISHED TO CHECK
BACK WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS AND AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON
FOR LATEST EVALUATION OF UTILITY AND HIS ORGANIZATION.

HAD JUST RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON WHERE HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN
DISCUSSIONS THIS SUBJECT. AMB THEN REVIEWED WITH LETHRUST THE
SECURITY PROBLEMS FACING ALL WESTERN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES,
INCLUDING OUR OWN, CITED CERTAIN WELL PUBLICIZED CASES AND SAID

THAT AMERICANS, WHILE FULLY AWARE OF SERIOUSNESS FELFE CASE,
WERE SATISFIED UTILITY WAS A COMPETENT AND PROFESSIONAL UPHILL
CHIEF. WITH REGARD TO FELFE CASE, AMB SAID HE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTIVE
MEASURES HAD BEEN INTRODUCED SOME TIME AGO. LETHRUST WAS NOT
SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.

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SECRET

3. UPTHURST ANSWERED THAT HE HAD NEVER DOUBTED UTILITY'S INTEGRITY BUT ENTERTAINED CERTAIN DOUBTS ABOUT HIS INTELLIGENCE, WHICH SEEMED BORNE OUT BY FELFE CASE. HE SAID HE WAS FULLY AWARE THAT AT OUTSET MOST GERMAN AGENCIES HAD BEEN FORCED BY CIRCUMSTANCES TO CALL UPON FORMER NAZIS TO GET STARTED, AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN DONE WITH HIS APPROVAL. IT HAD BEEN HIS POLICY, HOWEVER, AND HIS EXPECTATION THAT SUCH INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE DISPENSED WITH AS SOON AS THEY COULD BE REPLACED. IN THE FELFE CASE A POLITICALLY DUBIOUS CHARACTER HAD BEEN KEPT ON FOR TEN YEARS AND BEEN GIVEN INSIGHT INTO MATTERS OUTSIDE HIS PROPER COMPETENCE. HENCE UPTHURST DOUBTS AS TO UTILITY'S SUITABILITY AS CHIEF OF UPHILL. 4. AMB PASSED THE BALL TO [] WHO STATED, FIRST, THAT HE REGARDED THIS AS PRIMARILY A GERMAN PROBLEM AND, SECOND, THAT THE ORGANIZATION'S HISTORY HAD A BEARING UPON IT. HE REVIEWED THE EARLY HISTORY OF UPHILL, EMPHASIZING ITS MILITARY NUCLEUS AND LEADING ON TO THE SEVERE PERSONNEL LOSSES SUSTAINED BY UTILITY WHEN HE SURRENDERED SOME HUNDRED ODD OF HIS SENIOR STAFF TO THE BUNDESWEHR IN 1955 AND 1956, RENDERING HIM MORE THAN EVER DEPENDENT UPON SENIOR PROFESSIONAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. [] ALSO REVIEWED EXTRAORDINARY SECURITY PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND NOTED PREVIOUS PENETRATIONS IN BUNDESTAG, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ARMED SERVICES, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELEGRAPH, ETC.

5. UPTHURST THEN SAID HE WAS NOT SO MUCH CONCERNED WITH UTILITY HIMSELF AS WITH THE ORGANIZATION AS SUCH. [] RESPONDED ACCORDING TO HQRS INSTRUCTIONS, UNDERLINING UPHILL'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN ORDER-OF-BATTLE COLLECTION AND IN TECHNICAL FIELDS. THIS UPTHURST

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IN

02040

PAGE 3

SEEMED READY TO ACCEPT. AMB THEN SAID HE HOPED THAT, WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS; WE HAD SATISFIED ²UPTHRUST'S INQUIRES AS FRIEND TO FRIEND. ²UPTHRUST EXPRESSED HIS THANKS.

6. INCIDENTAL NOTE: WHEN ³C ⁴DESCRIBED UTILITY'S PERFORMANCE IN FORESEEING POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS, HOLDING TOGETHER NUCLEUS OF FREMDE HEERE OST AND TURNING IT OVER TO AMERICANS IN 1945, PLUS DETAILS OF ⁴UTILITY'S INSISTENCE OF AUTONOMOUS GERMAN ORGANIZATION AND OUR TRUSTEE RELATIONSHIP, ²UPTHRUST STATED THAT THIS WAS ALL NEWS TO HIM. HE THEN SAID: "THEN IT'S YOUR CHILD". ³C ²REPLIED, "NO, HE SOUGHT US OUT". TO WHICH ²UPTHRUST QUIPPED, "WELL, THEN IT'S YOUR ADOPTED CHILD".

7. THIS MESSAGE COORDINATED WITH AMB AND MAY BE DISCUSSED WITH ODACID. HE SENDING NOTHING THRU HIS CHANNELS. PRESENT AT MEETING WERE OSTERHELD, WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE, AND WEBER, WHO INTERPRETED. CAUSA NOT PRESENT.

8. ³C ²COMMENT: IN VIEW ²UPTHRUST'S REFERENCE TO AMERICAN CHILD, WHETHER NATURAL OR ADOPTED, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL FORCE ⁴UTILITY'S RESIGNATION IN FACE OF AMERICAN ENDORSEMENT. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT ⁴UTILITY'S STOCK IS LOW.

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C/S Comment: Ambassador wanted to know KUBARK(8) current evaluation of UTILITY(4) in view of UPTHRUST(3) comments on the Felle case.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ROUTING

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TO DIRECTOR

FROM FRANKFURT

ACTION C/EE 3

INFO ADDP, C/CI, C/FL 2, C/FL/INT 2, RF 2

SECRET 201334Z

ZC AUG 63 IN 02972

BONN MUNI INFO DIR CITE FRAN 1222

RYBAT UPHILL

REF BONN 5026

(02040) eyes only C/EE*

WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HAVING ANY EVIDENCE YOU CAN
ASSEMBLE AS TO WHO IF ANYONE IS PUSHING THRUST IN THE MATTER
OF UTILITY. COULD THIS BE ANOTHER EVIDENCE IS INCREASED
AGGRESSIVENESS?

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *RE MEETING OF AMBASSADOR AND THRUST.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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DD/P-7-4/27.5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 20 August 1963

11:45 - 12:00

SUBJECT : Content of BONN 5026

PARTICIPANTS: Thomas Hughes, Director, Intelligence & Research, Dept. of State
Chief, EE/Germany

COPIES TO : DD/P, C/EE

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SOURCE: METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

1. The meeting with Mr. Hughes was at my request to brief him on the content of BONN 5026 as follow up to the meeting with Chief, EE on 15 July 1963.

2. At the end of the report of the substance of the Bonn cable Mr. Hughes asked why we thought that the Chancellor would not force Gehlen's resignation since it appeared to Mr. Hughes that this could be done with somewhat greater ease in view of the "adopted status of the child". I replied that we had only one conclusion which was shared by the Ambassador. Mr. Hughes asked whether we thought that the meeting of 17 August with the Chancellor closed the Gehlen matter as far as Embassy involvement is concerned and whether the meeting of 17 August was handled to our satisfaction. In reply to the part of the question, I replied that we hoped and thought so since the Chancellor has by now departed for Caddenabia and would return to Bonn only about two weeks before the change of the government and that there are a number of more important issues than Gehlen at the moment. In regards to the second part of the question, I stated that we would have preferred if there had been no meeting, but since the Chancellor had again taken the initiative and it had not been possible to refuse to discuss the matter we are satisfied that the subject had been handled most satisfactorily.

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3. The final two points raised by Mr. Hughes concerned Defense Minister von Hassel's position vis-a-vis the BND and the reemergence of former Defense Minister Strauss. I replied that we had no reading at this time on von Hassel's attitude toward Gehlen and the BND. In regards to Strauss I stated that in my view Strauss is simply pushing his return to a position of policy influence. Being the man he is, he is little if at all bothered by criticism of his previous and current actions and activities, and feels that he knows better than anybody else what is good for Germany.

4. At the end of the meeting Mr. Hughes requested to be kept informed of any further developments regarding the BND, particularly those with political overtones and possible consequences for the Embassy. He also stated that he would inform Mr. Richard Davis of the substance of our discussion and he thought that no further action in the Department was necessary.

Chief, EE/Germany

SECRET

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO	CHIEF OF BASE, BONN CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO	CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	CHIEF, EE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	OPERATIONAL/PHILL UTILITY STATUS AND FUTURE		MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES REFERENCE - BONN 5026				
<p>1. AS FOLLOW UP OF THE MEETING MENTIONED IN DIR 54400 IDENTITY 1 WAS BRIEFED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF REFERENCE. IDENTITY 1 REQUESTED THAT WE KEEP HIM CURRENTLY ADVISED OF ALL FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH POLITICAL OVERTONES WHICH MAY AFFECT HEFINCH OR ODOYKE. BONN 5036 IS ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD AND HAS BEEN DISSEMINATED TO HEADS OF MUSTAR AGENCIES ONLY. FOLLOW-UP OF THE [] OFFER PER PARAGRAPH 5 OF BONN 5036 IS REQUESTED.</p> <p>2. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE AND FROM 1222 HEADQUARTERS IS MOST INTERESTED IN DETERMINING THE ATTITUDE OF [] IDEN 2/ TOWARD UTILITY AND UPHILL SINCE [] WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A FAIR AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE IN THE SELECTION OF A SUCCESSOR AS WELL AS THE FUTURE MUSTRUSH POLICY GUIDANCE REGARDING STATUS AND ACTIVITIES OF UPHILL. OVERALL, THE TIMELY REPORTING OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES AND STATUS OF UPHILL, SAVATA AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS CONSTITUTES FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE A PRIORITY REQUIREMENT.</p> <p>3. COS- AT YOUR DISCRETION OTHER BASES MAY BE ALERTED TO THE NEED FOR INFORMATION ON THESE MATTERS.</p>				
ATTACHMENT - USC IDENTITIES			DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE/MET/D/EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005	
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CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
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		CLASSIFICATION	HQ'S FILE NUMBER	
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		RELEASING		
		OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
		AC EE		[]
FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION			DISPATCH	

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER SEPARATE COVER ATT. EGMW 3195
IDENTITY - 1 -	MR. THOMAS HUGHES, DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
IDENTITY - 2 -	DEFENSE MINISTER UWE KAI VON HASSEL	

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9 **SECRET**

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MUNICH

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, RF 2

BP

West/EL has action

S E C R E T 281328Z

28 AUG 63 IN 08384 *[Signature]*

/ DIR INFO FRAN BONN BRLN SITE MUNI 7231

CAMOG UPHILL CADORY ☐

1. ☐ RECEIVED OFFER FROM UTILITY'S OFFICE FOR EXCLUSIVE
INTERVIEW 3 SEPTEMBER FOR ARTICLE APPEARING 17 SEPTEMBER.

☐ SUBMITTING WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN WRITING
BY UPHILL.

☐ WILL ALSO HAVE PERSONAL DISCUSSION UTILITY AND ASSUMES
PICTURES POSSIBLE. WILL SUBMIT STORY TO UPHILL FOR APPROVAL PRIOR
PUBLICATION.

2. ☐ WILL BRIEF US RE UPHILL INTERVIEW AFTER 3 SEPTEMBER.

S E C R E T

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SCU 125 METHOD 03 EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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
SECRET

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
		SECRET/	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	CHIEF OF BASE, BONN CHIEF, EE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	CHIEF MUNICH LIAISON BASE		MICROFILM
SUBJECT OPERATIONAL UPHILL			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCE STATUS AND FUTURE			
<p>REF. FRAN 1222 EGNW 3195</p> <p>1. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US CONCERNING THE BACKGROUND OF UPTHURST'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS UTILITY AS REPORTED BY BONN. THE POSSIBILITY THAT [] HAS TALKED TO UPTHURST ON THE MATTER IS A LIKELY ONE BUT I WOULD BE MORE INCLINED TO THINK THAT UPTHURST HAS ARRIVED AT HIS OWN CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT ANY PUSH FROM OTHERS. HE HAS HAD NUMEROUS OCCASIONS TO SIZE UP UTILITY DURING THE YEARS SINCE LEGALIZATION OF UPHILL.</p> <p>2. AS ALIAS HARTWIG PUT IT, EVERYONE WHO HAS A GRUDGE AGAINST UPHILL OR UTILITY HAS HAD A WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY IN THE UDROWSY CASE TO SET HIS SIGHTS HIGHER AND BANG AWAY.</p> <p>3. WE HAVE VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE ATTITUDE OF [] TOWARD UPHILL. I BELIEVE HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN FAVORABLY IMPRESSED DURING HIS VISITS TO UPHILL BUT WE HAVE NO HARD INFORMATION ON HIS VIEWS. IN SOUNDING OUT HARTWIG I COULD ONLY GET THE REACTION THAT [] IS FIRST AND FOREMOST A POLITICIAN. ALTHOUGH WE KEEP PICKING UP RUMORS ABOUT THE MMBRUSH MILITARY SERVICES WANTING TO GET INTO THE CLANDESTINE COLLECTION FIELD, NO ONE IN UPHILL SEEMS TO PAY THESE RUMORS MUCH HEED. HARTWIG, FOR EXAMPLE, DOES NOT EXPECT [] TO SUPPORT ANY SUCH MILITARY DESIRES.</p> <p>4. WE HERE IN MUNICH ARE ALSO INTENSELY INTERESTED IN THE STATUS OF UTILITY AND SHALL KEEP OUR EARS BSEN. WE DO NOT EXPECT TO LEARN MUCH UNLESS IT COMES FROM THE VERY TOP LEVELS OF UPHILL.</p>			
DISTRIBUTION 2 - COS/G 2 - COB/BONN 2 - CHIEF, EE		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES MET 1003 EXEMPTION 302E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005,	
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	EGMA-62838	29 AUGUST 1963	
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : C 3

ACTION: C/WE 2

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 2, C/EE 3, RF, VR

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SECRET 091234Z

DIR MUNI INFO FRAN CITE L 0255

19 SEP 63 IN 1573C

RYBAT UPHILL

IDENT A HAS BEEN MET CASUALLY BY SEVERAL KUBARK 218.34 49.3
IN ADDITION IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE IF NOT PROBABLE THAT SOONER OR
LATER [] WITHOUT SO ARRANGING OR DESIRING WILL MEET IDENT A.
VIEW RELATIONSHIP IDENT A WITH IDENT B AND [] ACQUAINTANCE IDENT
A, WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE CURRENT POSITION FUNCTIONS AND IMPORTANCE
IF ANY IDENT A HOME AND ANY ADDRESSEE COMMENTS RE POSSIBLE CONTACT.

SECRET

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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SECRET

ROUTING			
1	2	3	4
2	3	4	5
3	4	5	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : C

ACTION: C/WE 2

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, RF, VR

SECRET 091235Z

DIR MUNI INFO FRAN CITE C 0256 C CTING)

119 SEP 63 IN 15704

RYBAT UPHILL

REF C 0255 (IN 15730)

IDENTITY A - UTILITY'S BROTHER

IDENTITY B - UTILITY

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September 20, 1963

Dear General Gehlen:

I should like to express my personal appreciation for the fine efforts of your ELINT staff in the conduct of the schnellboat operation off the Baltic Coast. Although the third generation of the Soviet surface-to-air missile system (SA-3) has been in existence for some time, extensive ELINT collection programs had been unsuccessful in intercepting this signal. As a result of BND and U. S. analysis of the unidentified signals collected by the schnellboat, we have, at least for the moment, established the best candidate for the SA-3 associated fire control system; at a minimum, it is a new and unusual signal of major interest.

This is another splendid example of the benefits to be derived from our continued liaison with respect to ELINT matters.

Very truly yours,

L

J

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SOURCE: MET 1005 EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION	
		SECRET		
TO	Chief, Munich Liaison Base		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief, EE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	Uphill/Operational Uphill ELINT		MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
<p>Transmitted under separate cover is a letter for UTILITY from Chief, KUCITY.</p>				
<p>Attachment: a/s, usc</p> <p>Distribution: Orig & 1 - Chief, MLB, w/att 2 - COS, Germany w/o att</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZINAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE		
	ECMS-4500	25 SEP 1963 23 September 1963		
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER		
	SECRET	Gehlen 201		
Hqs Distribution: 1 - RI 1 - EE/3/IS 1 - EE/3/CE	ORIGINATING			
	OFFICE	[]		EXT.
	EE/G/CE	hak		6028
	COORDINATING			
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
RELEASING				
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE		
C/EE/G/CE	24/9/63	[]		
FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION 1-62		DISPATCH		

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	3
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DOP, ADOP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, RF, VR

B.P. [Signature]

SEE C P F I 1016302

YUMI INFO DIP FROM CITE BOYM 5350

10 OCT 13 11 37 32 1

CATIDE

1. UTILITY CALLED ON ME OCT 8 TO DISCUSS CALLIDAY. NOTHING REPORTABLE IN THIS CONVERSATION, BUT PARENTHETICALLY HE ADVISED THAT BY SECRET DECISION OF THE CABINET, CATIDE HAS BEEN MADE "SUBORDINATE" TO THE CHANCELLERY RATHER THAN ATTACHED TO AS HERETOFORE. UTILITY OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERS THIS A CONSIDERABLE LOWERING OF STATUS AND A REFLECTION ON BOTH HIM AND HIS ORGANIZATION. HE SAID HE COULD LIVE WITH IT IF GLOVE'S SUCCESSOR WERE GUMMEL, BUT IF THE SUCCESSOR WERE ANYBODY ELSE HE MIGHT RESIGN. AS OF OCT 10 THE DECISION ON GLOVE'S SUCCESSOR WAS STILL OPEN.

2. UTILITY IMPARTED THE FOREGOING IN THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE, DESCRIBING THE DISCLOSURE AS A VIOLATION OF HIS SILENCE OBLIGATION. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED, THEREFORE, NOT TO DISCUSS IT OUTSIDE WASHINGTON UNTIL IT HAS SURFACED ELSEWHERE.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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SECRET

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Süddeutsche Zeitung

14 Oct 63

Gehlen: Geheimberichte gehen an alle Bundestagsfraktionen

München (AP)

Der Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) hat nach Angaben seines Präsidenten General a.D. Gehlen die Telefongespräche überwacht. In einem Interview mit der Illustrierten 'Revue' teilte der gegenumwobene Geheimdienstchef mit, das gemeinsame Abwehraktionen des BND mit alliierten Geheimdiensten "an den Fingern einer Hand" abzählen seien. Es sei die Regel, daß jeweils frühzeitig der Generalbundesanwalt verständigt werde. Gehlen kündigte an, daß er in drei Jahren in Pension gehen werde. Gehlen ist 62 Jahre alt. Mit den Worten "unmöglich völlig ausgeschlossen" antwortete Gehlen auf die Frage, ob er durch frühere Berichte an die Regierung die politische Lage in seinem Sinne beeinflussen und in den Gang der Politik eingreifen könne. Die Öffentlichkeit habe "völlig falsche Vorstellungen" von der Arbeit des Bundesnachrichtendienstes. Selbst ein BND-Chef, der "bewußt illegal" wäre, könnte den Dienst nicht für seine dunklen Zwecke einsetzen, sagte Gehlen. Er teilte ferner mit, daß die Berichte des BND nicht nur an die zuständigen Minister, an den Kanzler und dessen Staatssekretär, sondern auch an die Fraktionen im Bundestag einschließlich der Opposition gingen. "Oftmals kommt von uns Information", sagte Gehlen.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005